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ABSTRACT
Conflicts of interest between parent and subsidiary corporations often pre-
sent particularly difficult issues to which state corporate law attempts to re-
spond. This Article addresses one of these issues: the appropriate allocation
between a parent and its subsidiary of federal tax savings that arise when the
two corporations file a consolidated tax return. Tax savings in this context
arise because filing a consolidated return permits the corporations that join in
the return to combine their income, deductions, credits and other tax attrib-
utes and determine their federal tax liability largely as if they were divisions
of a single corporation. For example, if a parent and subsidiary file a consoli-
dated return, the subsidiary's deductions might completely offset the parent's
income and eliminate the federal tax liability that the parent would have if it
filed its own, separate return. The federal tax rules do not require a specific
allocation of tax savings that a parent or subsidiary achieves; that issue is
primarily the province of any agreement that the corporations enter into and
of areas of law other than the federal tax laws, including state corporate law.
The allocation issue is not a new one, but it is one that has proved espe-
cially difficult for the courts to resolve and that has arisen with increasing
frequency in recent years, particularly in the bankruptcy context. Minority
shareholders or creditors of a subsidiary have sought unsuccessfully in several
cases to compel the parent either to share its tax savings or to restore to the
subsidiary tax savings that the subsidiary was required to share with the par-
ent. This lack of success exists because, despite the well-established rule that
a parent corporation serves as a fiduciary of its subsidiary's minority share-
holders and, in some circumstances, the subsidiary's creditors, the courts have
developed what is tantamount to a per se rule that a parent has virtually
unlimited discretion in allocating tax savings. In this Article, the author dem-
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onstrates that the early judicial decisions primarily responsible for the devel-
opment of this rule do not constitute an appropriate foundation for the
construction of a normative rule. The author also discusses how the federal
tax rules, despite their lack of a required allocation, reflect a policy directly
contrary to the result of most recent judicial decisions. The author argues
that allocations of tax savings between parent and subsidiary constitute self-
dealing transactions that courts should review under an entire fairness stan-
dard and proposes an analytical framework under that standard designed to
encourage the negotiation between parent and subsidiary of express tax shar-
ing agreements.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A corporation's tax attributes can have significant value. A deduc-
tion of $100, for example, will produce $34 of tax savings for a corpora-
tion that is subject to tax at a 34 percent rate. Tax credits, which
reduce tax liability dollar-for-dollar, are even more valuable. It is pre-
cisely because tax attributes have value that corporate managers-
faced with significant pressure to reduce corporate tax liability-com-
monly seek to maximize attributes such as deductions and credits,
and are even willing to pay staggering fees to tax professionals who
market "tax shelters," which often are merely elaborate plans for cre-
ating favorable tax attributes.1
If corporations were free to purchase tax attributes from other cor-
porations, e.g., to pay $30 for a deduction that would produce $34 of
tax savings, there undoubtedly would be an eager market for them.
But corporations generally are treated as separate taxable entities
and cannot make their tax attributes available to one another.
2 The
1. See generally STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., STUDY OF PRE-
SENT LAW PENALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 3801 OF
THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998 (IN-
CLUDING PROVISIONS RELATING TO CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS) 211-59 (Comm.
Print 1999) (discussing problem of corporate tax shelters and possible responses),
available at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-3-99.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS - DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND LEGISLA-
TIVE PROPOSALS 2-24 (Jul. 1999) (discussing goals and characteristics of corporate
tax shelters), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/taxpolicy/library/ctswhite.pdf;
Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner's Perspective on Substance, Form and Busi-
ness Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54 SMU
L. REV. 47, 47-57 (2001) (describing the nature of tax shelters and their market-
ing by tax professionals).
2. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934) (interpreting former
Code provisions as limiting deduction of losses to taxpayers that sustained them
and making such losses "not transferable to or usable by another"). Indeed, Con-
gress and the Treasury Department have gone to great lengths to try to prevent
one corporation from making its tax attributes available to reduce the tax liabil-
ity of another through the mechanism of a corporate acquisition. One corporation
can acquire the tax attributes of another either by acquiring the other's assets in
certain transactions in which the tax attributes of the acquired corporation sur-
vive or by acquiring the stock of the other corporation and joining with it in a
consolidated tax return. I.R.C. § 381(a), (c) (2000); see infra Part III (discussing
consolidated tax returns). See generally DOUGLAS A. KAHN & JEFFREY S. LEHMAN,
CORPORATE INCOME TAXATION §§ 10.11-.18 (5th ed. 2001) (discussing acquisition
of tax attributes). In an effort to minimize tax motivated acquisitions, Congress
has enacted provisions that limit the acquiring corporation's ability to make use
of the acquired corporation's tax attributes, such as its net operating losses and
tax credits. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 382 (2000) (imposing limit on net operating losses);
id. § 383 (same as to tax credits); id. § 269 (authorizing disallowance of deduc-
tions, credits and similar benefits in case of certain tax motivated acquisitions);
see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-21(c)(1)(i) (as amended in 2002) (imposing limit on
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primary exception is that corporations that constitute an "affiliated
group" as defined in Section 1504(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (the
"Code") are permitted to file a consolidated tax return.3 In general, an
affiliated group consists of a parent corporation, at least one subsidi-
ary in which the parent holds 80 percent or more of the stock, and any
other subsidiaries at least 80 percent of the stock of which is owned in
the aggregate by the parent and/or other group members.4 By filing a
consolidated return rather than separate returns, the members of the
affiliated group can combine their tax attributes largely as if they
were divisions of a single corporation. One result of this combination
is that the tax liability a member would otherwise be subject to can be
reduced or eliminated by another member's tax attributes, such as its
deductions and credits. For example, if a parent corporation that is
subject to tax at a 34 percent rate has $100 of taxable income and filesits own, separate return, it would have a tax liability of $34. But if the
parent files a consolidated return with a subsidiary that has an oper-
ating loss of $100,5 then the parent, by virtue of the subsidiary's loss,
saves $34 of tax. Of course, the roles in this example could be re-
versed: a subsidiary with $100 of income could save $34 of tax by vir-
tue of its parent's $100 operating loss.
In a number of cases, the issue has arisen whether an affiliated
group member that achieves a tax savings must share the savings
with the members whose tax attributes made the savings possible.6
Stated differently, the question is whether a corporation that utilizes
another's favorable tax attributes through the consolidated return
mechanism must compensate the other for doing so. Neither the Code
nor the Treasury Department's regulations answer this question.7
Therefore, whatever obligation a member has to share tax savings
must arise from an agreement that the members have concerning allo-
cation of savings8 or from areas of law other than the federal tax laws.
These areas of law include any fiduciary duty that one member owes
use of acquired corporation's net operating losses that arose in separate returnlimitation year). See generally KAHN & LEHMAN, supra, §§ 10.19-.23, 11.21 (dis-
cussing limits on acquired tax attributes).
3. See infra Part III. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to a "Section" or
"Sections" are to a section or sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended.
4. See I.R.C. § 1504(a)(1) (2000); infra subsection III.A.1.
5. The term "operating loss" generally refers to the amount by which a taxpayer's
deductions exceed its gross income. See I.R.C. § 172(c) (2000).
6. See infra Part IV.
7. Although the regulations that govern consolidated returns do not require affili-
ated group members to share tax savings, these regulations reflect a policy thattax savings that a member achieves through consolidation should be allocated to
the affiliated group members whose tax attributes produced it. See infra subsec-
tion III.D.2.b.
8. See infra subsection III.D.2.c (discussing tax allocation agreements).
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to other members, 9 the law of unjust enrichment,' 0 federal bank-
ruptcy laws,1 1 and the law concerning fraudulent conveyances.
12 As
this list suggests, whether one member must compensate another for
using its tax attributes should, as a normative matter, depend on the
relationship between the two corporations and on the circumstances of
the particular case. In other words, to determine whether one mem-
ber must share tax savings with another requires a context-specific
approach.
This Article addresses the sharing of tax savings among corpora-
tions filing a consolidated return in one specific context: when the cor-
poration that achieves the tax savings and the corporation that makes
the savings possible have the relationship of parent and subsidiary,
and those challenging the sharing arrangement base their challenge
on the parent's fiduciary duty as a controlling shareholder. In this
context, the early cases typically involved challenges to the sharing
arrangement brought by minority shareholders of partially owned
9. See infra section IV.A.
10. See infra subsection IV.A.2.b.2.
11. Cf. United States v. Shaltry (In re Home America T.V.-Appliance Audio, Inc.), No.
B-89-8322-PHX-RTB, 1994 WL 383197, at *1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Apr. 7, 1994) (hold-
ing that 11 U.S.C. § 549 allows bankruptcy trustee to set aside election by
debtor's parent to waive debtor's ability to carry its net operating losses back to
debtor's previous taxable years in which debtor had filed separate returns, and in
which losses carried back would produce refunds for debtor), vacated on other
grounds, 193 B.R. 929 (D. Ariz. 1995), subsequent appeal, 232 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 39 (2001). See generally W. Bruce Johnson, The
Other Key: Competition Between Shareholders and Creditors for the Tax Benefits
of Bankruptcy, 49 Bus. LAW. 1121, 1126-29 (1994) (arguing that the Bankruptcy
Code does not constitute an independent source of property rights, and therefore
net operating losses of bankrupt subsidiary that joins in consolidated return
should constitute property of the bankruptcy estate only if the subsidiary has a
property interest in them under state law).
12. Although no court has held that a fraudulent conveyance occurs when a corpora-
tion makes its tax attributes available to others through a consolidated return
and fails to receive compensation, some courts have expressed approval of the
concept. See W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 197 F.2d 994, 1010 (9th Cir.
1951) (Fee, D.J., dissenting); Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors v. PSS S.S.
Co., (In re Prudential Lines, Inc.), 107 B.R. 832, 839-40 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989),
affd, 119 B.R. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 928 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1991); Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc. v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc. (In re Koscot Interplane-
tary, Inc.), 1976-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9442, at 84,186-88 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1976). But see Marvel Entm't Group, Inc. v. Mafco Holdings, Inc. (In re Marvel
Entm't Group, Inc.), 273 B.R. 58, 83-85 (D. Del. 2002) (holding that use of debtor's
net operating losses by other members of affiliated group did not constitute
fraudulent conveyance or avoidable transfer because such use does not constitute
a "transfer" of the losses); Nisselson v. Drew Industries, Inc. (In re White Metal
Rolling and Stamping), 222 B.R. 417, 427 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding in
chapter 7 liquidation case that use of debtor's net operating losses by other mem-
bers of affiliated group did not constitute fraudulent conveyance because losses
had no value that could enhance creditors' prospects for recovery).
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subsidiaries.13 In most of the recent cases, however, the challengeshave been brought by or on behalf of creditors of a wholly owned sub-
sidiary that has become insolvent or entered bankruptcy proceed-
ings.14 The subsidiary's shareholders and creditors typically make a
three-part argument: (1) the parent corporation, as a controlling
shareholder, is a fiduciary with respect to the subsidiary, its minority
shareholders and-at least when the subsidiary is insolvent-its cred-itors, (2) the parent's fiduciary duty requires the parent to treat the
subsidiary fairly in transactions between the two corporations, and(3) the parent has breached its fiduciary duty by using the subsidiary's
tax attributes without adequately compensating the subsidiary (i.e.,
not sharing enough of the parent's tax savings), or by charging too
much for the subsidiary's use of the parent's attributes (i.e., taking too
much of the subsidiary's tax savings). Almost uniformly, the courtshave been unreceptive to this argument and have refused to grant
relief.15
The obvious question is why the courts have not been willing to
engage in any meaningful review of what appears to be an obvious
form of self-dealing by the parent. The judicial reluctance expressedin recent cases is attributable primarily to three early, influential de-
cisions in this area: Western Pacific Railroad Corp. v. Western Pacific
Railroad Co.,16 Case v. New York Central Railroad Co.,17 and Meyer-
son v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.'S Specifically, these decisions have,
over time, come to stand for the proposition that a parent's allocation
of tax savings among affiliated group members should not be closely
scrutinized under a fairness standard, but rather should be reviewed
under the deferential business judgment rule.19 Typically, courts ex-press this proposition by stating that a parent's allocation of tax sav-ings will not be set aside absent "gross and palpable overreaching."2o
13. See infra subsection IV.A.1; see also Greenbaum v. Am. Metal Climax, Inc., 278N.Y.S.2d 123, 129 (App. Div. 1967) (rejecting "a most general and 'scatter-gun'
attack" by minority shareholders of partially owned subsidiary to accounting and
bookkeeping practices).
14. See infra subsection IV.A.2.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. 197 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1951).
17. 204 N.E.2d 643 (N.Y. 1965).
18. 246 A.2d 789 (Del. Ch. 1967).
19. See infra subsection II.A.2.b (discussing fairness standard and business judg-
ment rule).
20. E.g., Franklin Sav. Corp. v. Franklin Sav. Ass'n (In re Franklin Sav. Corp.), 159
B.R. 9, 30 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1993), affd, 182 B.R. 859 (D. Kan. 1995); In re CoralPetroleum, Inc., 60 B.R. 377, 389-90 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986); In re All ProductsCo., 32 B.R. 811, 814 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983); cf. Official Comm. Of UnsecuredCreditors v. PSS S.S. Co. (In re Prudential Lines, Inc.), 107 B.R. 832, 835 & n.5(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that, under applicable Delaware law, the court
would not second guess parent corporation's business judgment in taking pro-posed action that would eliminate subsidiary's net operating loss because there
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Not surprisingly, courts adopting this standard of review have never
found gross and palpable overreaching by the parent. The result of
the Western Pacific, Case, and Meyerson decisions is that courts now
appear willing to impose limits on a parent's discretion to allocate tax
savings in only a single, narrow situation: when (i) the affiliated group
does not have an express agreement in place concerning allocation of
tax savings and (ii) a subsidiary's operating loss produces a refund of
tax paid by the subsidiary in a prior year by offsetting the subsidiary's
own income in that year.2 1 In this situation, the courts have awarded
the tax refund to the subsidiary on the theory that to award it to the
parent merely because the two corporations file a consolidated return
would unjustly enrich the parent. 22
One thesis of this Article is that the Western Pacific, Case, and
Meyerson decisions constitute an inappropriate foundation for the con-
struction of a normative rule concerning the sharing of tax savings
between a parent and subsidiary filing a consolidated return. Indeed,
the seminal case, Western Pacific, is best viewed not as a thoughtful
judicial examination of a controlling corporation's fiduciary duties, but
rather as a result-oriented decision that had as its goal the protection
of creditors of a bankrupt subsidiary, which makes it ironic that the
decision is now routinely used to preclude such creditors from recover-
ing. A second thesis is that the concerns that courts have articulated
in refusing to question a parent's allocations of tax savings, such as
the difficulty of establishing the value of a corporation's tax attributes,
could be better addressed, and minority interests better served, by
recognizing allocations of tax savings between parent and subsidiary
as self-dealing transactions and by applying an entire fairness stan-
dard of review in a manner that encourages the arm's-length negotia-
tion of express tax allocation agreements.
After setting forth relevant background concerning fiduciary rela-
tionships and self-dealing by fiduciaries, Part II of this Article dis-
cusses the nature of the parent-subsidiary relationship, a parent
was no gross overreaching by parent), affd, 119 B.R. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), afrd,
928 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1991).
21. When a corporation has a net operating loss for a taxable year, i.e., when its
deductions exceed its gross income, the corporation generally is permitted to
carry the loss back and use it as a deduction in the two previous taxable years
and, to the extent the loss cannot be used in those years, to carry the loss forward
and use it as a deduction in the twenty taxable years following the year in which
the loss arose. I.R.C. § 172(a), (b)(1)(A) (2000). Taxpayers can carry net operat-
ing losses incurred in the years 2001 and 2002 back five years (rather than two),
and then forward twenty years. Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-147, § 102(a), 116 Stat. 21, 25 (to be codified at I.R.C.
§ 172(b)(1)(H)). These same rules apply, in modified form, when two or more cor-
porations file a consolidated tax return. See infra notes 212-16 and accompany-
ing text.
22. See infra subsection IV.A.2.b.2.
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corporation's status as a fiduciary, and the judicial standards of re-
view that apply to transactions between a parent and its subsidiary.
Part III provides an overview of the operation and underlying theory
of consolidated tax returns and, among other things, illustrates how
the regulations that govern consolidated returns reflect a policy di-
rectly contrary to the result of most recent judicial decisions: that tax
savings an affiliated group member achieves through consolidation
should be allocated to the group members whose tax attributes pro-
duced it. In Part IV, the Article discusses the development of state
corporate law on the allocation of tax savings among corporations fil-ing a consolidated return. Specifically, Part IV critically examines the
Western Pacific, Case, and Meyerson decisions and the more recent
cases that constitute the modern legacy of those three decisions. PartIV also summarizes the various approaches to allocating tax savings
that commentators have advocated. Part V argues that, in analyzing
ex post an allocation of tax savings between a parent corporation and
its subsidiary, courts should recognize the allocation as a form of self-
dealing by the parent that requires an entire fairness standard of re-
view. Part V proposes an analytical framework under the entire fair-
ness standard designed to offer at least some protection to minority
interests and simultaneously minimize judicial intrusion into the sub-
stance of corporate decisionmaking.
II. FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS, SELF-DEALING, AND THE
PARENT-SUBSIDIARY RELATIONSHIP
This Part discusses the general nature of the relationship between
a parent corporation and its subsidiary, the parent's status as a fiduci-
ary, and the judicial standards of review that apply to transactions
between a parent and subsidiary. As background, this Part first ex-
amines common fiduciary relationships, the chief obligations of fiduci-
aries, and the manner in which the law has responded to self-dealing
by fiduciaries.
A. Fiduciary Relationships and Self-Dealing by Fiduciaries
1. Fiduciary Relationships and Obligations
In a variety of relationships in which one party is entrusted with
overseeing the assets or welfare of another, the law imposes on the
entrusted party the obligations of a fiduciary.23 These relationships
23. See generally Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of FiduciaryObligation, 1988 DuKE L.J. 879, 880 (discussing historical development of fiduci-
ary obligation in equity and noting that "[t]he term 'fiduciary' itself was adopted
to apply to situations falling short of 'trusts,' but in which one person was none-
theless obliged to act like a trustee"); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduci-
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include those of ward and guardian,24 principal and agent, 25 and cor-
poration and corporate director. 26 A fiduciary's chief obligations in
connection with the beneficiary's affairs are traditionally described as
the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. 27 Because the loyalty aspect
of a fiduciary's obligations is more central to the subject of this Article,
this discussion will focus on the duty of loyalty.
28
In matters connected with the beneficiary's affairs, the fiduciary's
duty of loyalty generally requires the fiduciary to act in the best inter-
ests of the beneficiary and to put the beneficiary's interests above the
ary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1683-87 (1990)
(discussing nature of fiduciary relationships).
24. E.g., Estate of Kay v. Superior Court, 181 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Cal. 1947); Seaboard
Surety Co. v. Boney, 761 A.2d 985, 992 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000); State v. Whita-
ker, 638 S.W.2d 189, 191 (Tex. App. 1982).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1958).
26. E.g., Katz Corp. v. T.H. Canty & Co., Inc., 362 A.2d 975, 978-79 (Conn. 1975);
Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); Pink v. Title Guarantee & Trust
Co., 8 N.E.2d 321, 324 (N.Y. 1937). Courts refer to corporate directors as fiducia-
ries of the corporation, the corporation's shareholders, or both the corporation
and its shareholders. E.g., Heil v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 863 F.2d 546, 547
(7th Cir. 1988) (stating directors' duties owed to shareholders); Edelman v. Frue-
hauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 886 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating directors' duties owed to
corporation and shareholders); Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678,
684 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (stating directors' duties owed to corporation). One explana-
tion for this variation is that a corporation is regarded as an entity with an exis-
tence separate from that of its shareholders and yet, according to the traditional
view of shareholders as the "owners" of the corporation, the interests of the corpo-
ration are identical to the collective interest of its shareholders, at least when
those shareholders all hold the same class of shares. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A
Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Stat-
utes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 586-87 (1992) (noting traditional approach of equating
interests of stockholders and of the corporation); cf. Life Care Centers of Am., Inc.
v. Charles Town Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 79 F.3d 496, 502-06 (6th Cir. 1996) (discuss-
ing whether agent of limited partnership owes fiduciary duties to partnership or
its partners and possible divergence of interests between partnership and its
partners). If a corporation is a separate entity, then it makes sense to say that
directors owe their duties to the corporation itself. To say that directors owe du-
ties to the shareholders is, at least in part, to recognize the identity of interests
between the shareholders as a whole and the corporation.
27. E.g., Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244, 256 (6th Cir. 1985) (discussing duties of
corporate directors); Singleton v. Stegall, 580 So. 2d 1242, 1244-46 (Miss. 1991)
(discussing duties of attorneys); UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404(a)-(c) (1997)
(discussing duties of partners). The duty of care is not distinctively fiduciary in
nature because this same duty (or at least a similar one) applies to many persons
who are not fiduciaries. DeMott, supra note 23, at 915.
28. For discussion of the duty of care of corporate directors, see R. Franklin Balotti &
Joseph Hinsey IV, Director Care, Conduct, and Liability: The Model Business
Corporation Act Solution, 56 Bus. LAW. 35, 39-51 (2000); Michael Bradley &
Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate Gov-
ernance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1, 17-25 (1989); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care
of Corporate Directors and Officers, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 945 (1990).
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interests of all other parties, including those of the fiduciary.29 The
specific requirements imposed on the fiduciary by the duty of loyalty
vary considerably depending on the relationship that gives rise to the
fiduciary's obligation.30 Further, within any specific fiduciary rela-
tionship, the duty of loyalty has myriad applications, so that the fidu-
ciary can be required to take or refrain from taking numerous
actions.3 1 For these reasons, it is difficult to generalize about the pre-
cise content of the fiduciary's obligation of loyalty. Nevertheless, the
basic requirement that fiduciaries place the beneficiary's interests
above their own provides the foundation for a general theme that runs
throughout all fiduciary relationships: fiduciaries generally must
avoid putting themselves in situations in which their interests conflict
with those of the beneficiary.32 The purpose underlying this mandate
is to remove any possible temptation that fiduciaries with a conflict of
interest might have to serve their own interests rather than the
beneficiary's.33
2. Self-Dealing by Fiduciaries
One situation in which a fiduciary's interest conflicts with that of
the beneficiary is when the fiduciary enters into a transaction with
the beneficiary in connection with the subject matter of the fiduciary
relationship. For example, if an agent retained by a principal to
purchase land sells the agent's own land to the principal, the agent
has a clear conflict: as a fiduciary of the principal, the agent's duty is
to purchase at the lowest possible price, but the agent's self-interest
dictates selling at the highest possible price. 34 The agent in this ex-
29. E.g., Guth, 5 A.2d at 510 (addressing duty of corporate director); The Farmers
and Merchants Bank of Highland v. Swiecicki (In re Estate of Swiecicki), 477N.E.2d 488, 490-92 (Ill. 1985) (addressing duty of guardian); Green v. H & R
Block, Inc., 735 A.2d 1039, 1055-56 (Md. 1999) (addressing duty of agent).30. Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV.
595, 595-96, 601 (1997); DeMott, supra note 23, at 909-10.31. Many of the requirements to which a fiduciary is subject, such as the require-
ment that a fiduciary turn over to the beneficiary any profits received in connec-
tion with the beneficiary's affairs, are often referred to as if they were separate
duties when in fact they are simply specific applications of the general duty of
loyalty. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 (1958) (setting forth
duty to account for profits); id. § 387 cmt. a (stating that § 388 is an application of
the general duty of loyalty in § 387).
32. E.g., Litvinko v. Downing, 545 S.W.2d 616, 617 (Ark. 1977) (discussing duty of
agent); Guth, 5 A.2d at 510 (stating regarding corporate director that "[tihe rule
that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that
there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest").
33. See, e.g., In re Bond and Mortgage Guarantee Co., 103 N.E.2d 721, 725 (N.Y.
1952) (noting "human frailty when confronted with conflicting interests, evi-
denced by the centuries-old scriptural passage: 'No man can serve two masters'").34. See, e.g., Desfosses v. Notis, 333 A.2d 83, 85-86 (Me. 1975) (involving similar
facts).
[Vol. 81:170
20021 FIDUCIARY DUTIES, CONSOLIDATED RETURNS 181
ample is engaged in self-dealing in the sense that the agent stands on
both sides of the transaction: the agent is both the seller and, in her
role as representative of the principal, the buyer. 3 5 Obviously, there
are innumerable other examples of situations in which fiduciaries
have conflicts of interest.3 6
a. Self-Dealing by Trustees and Agents
The law's response to self-dealing by fiduciaries has varied accord-
ing to the relationship that gives rise to the fiduciary's obligations.
37
Consistent with the general mandate to avoid conflicts of interest, cer-
tain fiduciaries, most notably trustees and agents, are prohibited from
engaging in self-dealing unless three basic conditions are satisfied:
(1) the fiduciary discloses the conflict of interest and all material facts
concerning the transaction to the beneficiary, 38 (2) the beneficiary
consents to the transaction, 39 and (3) the transaction is fair.40 If chal-
lenged, the burden is on the fiduciary to establish that these condi-
tions are satisfied. 4 1 If the conditions are not satisfied, the beneficiary
can have the transaction set aside, regardless of whether the benefici-
ary suffered any harm.42 Thus, a beneficiary can have a transaction
35. Unless noted otherwise, this Article will use the term "self-dealing" in the sense
discussed in the text. For an expanded and thoughtful definition of self-dealing
in the corporate context, see ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAw § 4.1, at
147 (1986).
36. For example, the agent in the example in the text might purchase on behalf of the
principal land owned by the agent's favorite nephew. This transaction does not
involve self-dealing, but does involve an obvious conflict of interest: the agent's
desire to benefit the nephew conflicts with the agent's obligation to serve the
principal's interest.
37. See generally Brudney, supra note 30, at 601-22 (discussing law's response to self-
dealing in fiduciary relationships); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Judicial Review of Fi-
duciary Decision Making-Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1,
40-43, 47-52 (1985) (same).
38. E.g., Schock v. Nash, 732 A.2d 217, 225, 228-29 (Del. 1999) (involving agent ap-
pointed by durable power of attorney); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 389,
390 (1958); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE app.
§ 170(2) (1992).
39. E.g., Renz v. Beeman, 589 F.2d 735, 744 (2d Cir. 1978); Schock, 732 A.2d at 225,
228-29; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 389 (1958); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE app. § 170(2) (1992); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 216 cmt. b (1959).
40. E.g., Schock, 732 A.2d at 229 & n.56; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 390 &
cmt. c (1958); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE app.
§ 170(2) & cmt. w (1992).
41. E.g., Stegemeier v. Magness, 728 A.2d 557, 563 (Del. 1999); Schock, 732 A.2d at
226; Stephan v. Equitable Say. & Loan Ass'n, 522 P.2d 478, 489-90 (Or. 1974);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 389 cmt. e, 390 cmt. g (1958).
42. E.g., Schock, 732 A.2d at 225-26; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 389 cmts.
a, c (1958); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE app. § 170
cmts. b, w (1992).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
set aside if a trustee or agent engages in unauthorized self-dealing.
Similarly, a beneficiary who authorizes a self-dealing transaction by a
trustee or agent after full disclosure can, at least in some circum-
stances, have the transaction set aside if the transaction was unfair to
the beneficiary.43
If a trustee or agent violates the duty of loyalty by engaging in self-
dealing, then they are liable to the beneficiary for both actual dam-
ages that the beneficiary suffered from the transaction and any profits
or other benefits that the trustee or agent obtained as a result of the
self-dealing, even if the beneficiary is thereby placed in a better posi-
tion than if no self-dealing had occurred.44 Both the beneficiary's abil-
ity to set aside the transaction regardless of harm and the fiduciary's
obligation to account for profits are prophylactics designed to prevent
any temptation for fiduciaries to serve their own interests.45
b. Self-Dealing by Corporate Directors
In the case of corporate directors, the law's response to self-deal-
ing, such as a director's sale of property to the corporation, has taken a
different path. According to a well-known article on the subject,46
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 390 cmt. c (1958) (stating that transac-
tion is not voidable merely because principal receives inadequate price or pays
too great a price if principal not in dependent position and agent fully performs
duty of disclosure); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE
app. § 170 cmt. w (1992) (stating that authorized transaction can be set aside if it
was not "fair and reasonable"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 216(3) & cmt.
n (1959) (same); Victor Brudney, Revisiting the Import of Shareholder Consent for
Corporate Fiduciary Loyalty Obligations, 25 J. CORP. L. 209, 213 (2000) (compar-
ing application of fairness requirement in agency and trust contexts).
44. E.g., Jennette v. Nat'l Cmty. Dev. Servs., Inc., 520 S.E.2d 231, 234-35 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1999); Cook County v. Barrett, 344 N.E.2d 540, 545-48 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975);
Henderson v. Hassur, 594 P.2d 650, 659-60 (Kan. 1979); Desfosses v. Notis, 333
A.2d 83, 87-88 (Me. 1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 401, 403 & cmt.
a (1958); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE app. § 206
cmts. b, c (1992).
45. E.g., Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm'n v. Sample, 702 S.W.2d 535,537-38 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1985); Blaustein v. Pan Am. Petroleum & Transp. Co., 21 N.Y.S.2d 651, 730-
31 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 31 N.Y.S.2d 934 (N.Y. App. Div.
1941), affd, 56 N.E.2d 705 (N.Y. 1944); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 389
cmt. c (1958); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE app.
§ 170 cmt. b (1992); see also Davis, supra note 37, at 43 (discussing rationale for
prohibition on self-dealing).
46. Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees?, Conflict of Interest and Corporate Mo-
rality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35 (1966); see also CLARK, supra note 35, § 5.1, at 160-66
(discussing Professor Marsh's analysis and possible explanations for the law's
evolution in this area). But see Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate Direc-
tor's Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: Understanding the Self-Interested Director
Transaction, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 655, 659-62 (1992) [hereinafter Beveridge, Duty
of Loyalty] (challenging Professor Marsh's analysis); Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr.,
Interested Director Contracts at Common Law: Validation Under the Doctrine of
Constructive Fraud, 33 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 97, 97-104 (1999) (same).
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which appears to represent the prevailing view, 47 the American com-
mon law rule on directors' self-dealing transactions evolved through
three stages: (1) an original precept that such transactions were auto-
matically voidable by the corporation or its shareholders, 48 (2) a later
rule-similar to the one that still applies in the case of trustees and
agents-that courts would uphold a director's self-dealing transaction
provided that the transaction was approved by a disinterested major-
ity of the board of directors4 9 and the court did not find the transac-
tion to be unfair or fraudulent,50 and (3) the modern rule that a
transaction between a corporation and one or more of its directors is
not automatically voidable, regardless of whether the transaction was
approved by a disinterested majority of the board, but rather is subject
to "rigid and careful scrutiny" by the courts, which will invalidate the
transaction or require the director to pay damages if they find the
transaction to be unfair to the corporation.5 1 Thus, in contrast to the
strict insistence on both informed consent and fairness in the case of
self-dealing by trustees and agents, the common law rule on directors'
self-dealing transactions evolved to an inquiry only as to whether the
transaction was fair, with the interested directors having the burden
to prove that the transaction was fair. 52 In most jurisdictions today,
however, one must consider the effect on the common law rule of inter-
ested director statutes, a topic that is briefly discussed below.
5 3
In the corporate context, the courts of Delaware and certain other
states have further refined the concept of fairness. Under the Dela-
ware approach, often referred to as the "entire fairness" or "intrinsic
47. See Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1115 n.48 (Del. Ch. 1999) (stating that
commentators conclude that "Marsh's characterization is most likely still via-
ble"). See generally Park McGinty, The Twilight of Fiduciary Duties: On the Need
for Shareholder Self-Help in an Age of Formalistic Proceduralism, 46 EMORY L.J.
163, 230-32 (1997) (describing debate over Professor Marsh's analysis).
48. Marsh, supra note 46, at 36-39.
49. For discussion of approval by disinterested directors and how such approval re-
lates to the general requirements for valid corporate action, see Kenneth B. Da-
vis, Jr., Approval by Disinterested Directors, 20 J. CORP. L. 215 (1995).
50. Marsh, supra note 46, at 39-43.
51. Id. at 43-44. Although commentators have speculated as to possible reasons un-
derlying this shift in the judicial approach from prohibition to a fairness analysis,
there is no definitive explanation as to why the shift occurred. See, e.g., CLARK,
supra note 35, § 5.1, at 160-66; Davis, supra note 37, at 49-59. This assumes, of
course, that such a shift actually occurred. See Beveridge, Duty of Loyalty, supra
note 46, at 660 (arguing that no explanation for a movement away from the origi-
nal rule of prohibition is necessary because such a rule never existed).
52. E.g., Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 402-05 (Del. 1987); Shlensky v. S. Park-
way Bldg. Corp., 166 N.E.2d 793, 802 (Ill. 1960). A possible argument for elimi-
nating the requirement of consent in the context of publicly held corporations is
the increased cost of obtaining it in contrast to the cost of obtaining the consent of
a principal or trust beneficiary. Brudney, supra note 43, at 216 (noting and ques-
tioning the validity of such an argument).
53. See infra notes 64-82 and accompanying text.
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fairness" test,5 4 courts determine whether a self-dealing transaction
was fair to the corporation by making a two-part inquiry: whether
there was fair dealing, i.e., whether the procedures that led to con-
summation of the transaction were fair, and whether there was a fair
price, i.e., whether the corporation has received or paid a fair price for
what it sold or purchased.55 This definition of fairness is examined
further in subsection II.B.3, which discusses transactions between
parent corporations and their subsidiaries.
The previous discussion of self-dealing transactions by directors
has assumed that the transactions actually involved self-dealing, and
in such cases courts describe their inquiry as close scrutiny of the
transaction to determine whether it was fair to the corporation.5 6 At
the opposite end of the spectrum of judicial review is the business
judgment rule, a very deferential standard of review. At the risk of
understatement, there is a large body of work that discusses the busi-
ness judgment rule.57 For present purposes, it is sufficient to note
three points. First, perhaps the clearest statement that can be made
concerning the business judgment rule is that it represents a policy ofjudicial reluctance to second-guess the good-faith business decisions of
directors who are informed, disinterested, and independent.58 Sec-
ond, a court's decision to apply a business judgment standard of re-
54. See, e.g., Van de Walle v. Unimation, Inc., Civ. A. No. 7046, 1991 WL 36477, at
*9-*10 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 1991) (using terms "intrinsic fairness" and "entire fair-
ness" to describe test).
55. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983); see also Coggins v. New
England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1112, 1117 (Mass. 1986) (noting,
despite disagreement as to requirement of business purpose, that Delaware's en-
tire fairness test is "closely related to the views expressed in our decisions"); Al-
pert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19, 26 (N.Y. 1984) (noting that concept
of fairness has components of fair dealing and fair price); IRA for Benefit of Op-
penheimer v. Brenner Cos., Inc., 419 S.E.2d 354, 358 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (same);
Persinger v. Carmazzi, 441 S.E.2d 646, 652 (W. Va. 1994) (same).
56. E.g., Am. Discount Corp. v. Kaitz, 206 N.E.2d 156, 160 (Mass. 1965); Gries Sports
Enter., Inc. v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., Inc., 496 N.E.2d 959, 963 (Ohio
1986). But see Brudney, supra note 30, at 613-18 (discussing significant judicial
relaxation of restrictions on directors' self-benefiting behavior).
57. Among the works that the author has found most helpful concerning the business
judgment rule are Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of Care: Judicial
Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62
TExAS L. REV. 591 (1983); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule:
Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 287 (1994);
Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 Bus. LAW. 625 (2000).
58. E.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1988)(stating that, "when a court reviews a board action, challenged as a breach of
duty, it should decline to evaluate the wisdom and merits of a business decision
unless sufficient facts are alleged with particularity, or the record otherwise dem-
onstrates, that the decision was not the product of an informed, disinterested,
and independent board").
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view is outcome-determinative: 59 the business judgment rule almost
invariably results in a decision in favor of those defending the transac-
tion.60 Third, the business judgment rule is an inappropriate stan-
dard of review when directors' self-interest might have influenced
their actions;6 1 rather, subject to certain procedural rules, 6 2 courts re-
view such transactions for fairness with the fiduciary having the bur-
den of proving fairness. 6 3
One question that arises is how the common law fairness standard
that courts apply to directors' self-dealing transactions is affected by
the enactment in most states of interested director statutes.
64 Al-
though there is some variation among the statutes, they tend to follow
59. E.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 89 (Del. 2001) (stating that "[tihe
applicable standard of judicial review often controls the outcome of the litigation
on the merits"); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103,
111 (Del. Ch. 1986) (stating that "[because the effect of the proper invocation of
the business judgment rule is so powerful and the standard of entire fairness so
exacting, the determination of the appropriate standard of judicial review fre-
quently is determinative of the outcome of derivative litigation"); see also William
T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function Over Form: A Reassess-
ment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 Bus. LAW. 1287,
1298 (2001) (stating that, if conditions to application of business judgment stan-
dard of review are met, then realistically, cases in which courts will impose liabil-
ity on directors constitute a "null set").
60. Currently, the best-known exception is Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del.
1985), in which directors of the Trans Union Corporation became personally lia-
ble for very large sums as a result of their approval of a proposed merger of the
corporation. The rarity of the decision-which imposed personal liability on di-
rectors for breach of the duty of care-is evident from the outburst of criticism it
engendered and the response of the Delaware legislature, which enacted a provi-
sion that permits corporations to adopt a provision absolving a director from lia-
bility for breach of fiduciary duty, provided that the director has not breached the
duty of loyalty or otherwise received an improper benefit. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102(b)(7) (2001); Leo Herzel & Leo Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business of
Judging Business Judgment, 41 Bus. LAw. 1187, 1188-93 (1986) (criticizing Van
Gorkom decision). For background on Delaware's exculpatory provision, see Em-
erald Partners, 787 A.2d at 90.
61. See, e.g., Thorpe v. Cerbco, Inc., 676 A.2d 436, 443 (Del. 1996); Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); Dennis J. Block, Michael J. Maimone & Steven B.
Ross, The Duty of Loyalty and the Evolution of the Scope of Judicial Review, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 65, 67-69 (1993).
62. See infra notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 52 and accompanying text; see also Solomon v. Armstrong, 747
A.2d 1098, 1112 (Del. Ch. 1999) (stating that "on a motion to dismiss, sufficiently
plead [sic] allegations of . . . disloyalty will invoke entire fairness's strict
scrutiny").
64. For an overview of interested director statutes and their history, see Ahmed
Bulbulia & Arthur R. Pinto, Statutory Responses to Interested Director Transac-
tions: A Watering Down of Fiduciary Standards?, 53 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 201
(1977); Richard W. Holtz, Note, Interested Transactions by Corporate Directors: A
Weakening of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 93 (1994).
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a common pattern, of which the Delaware statute is a good example.65
Under the Delaware statute, a transaction between a corporation and
one or more of its directors or officers (or between the corporation and
another organization in which the director or officer serves as a direc-
tor or officer or holds a financial interest) is not "void or voidable solely
for this reason"66 if one of three conditions is met: (1) the board of
directors or a committee of the board in good faith authorizes the
transaction by a majority vote of the disinterested directors, and the
material facts concerning the transaction and the interested director's
conflict of interest are disclosed or known to the board or committee at
the time it acts,67 (2) the corporation's shareholders in good faith ap-
prove the transaction by voting on it, again assuming that the mate-
rial facts concerning the transaction and the interested director's
conflict of interest are disclosed or known to the shareholders at the
time they vote,68 or (3) the transaction is fair to the corporation at the
time it is approved or ratified by the board, a committee of the board,
or the shareholders.69
Although the Delaware statute and others like it raise several
technical questions,70 the principal issue for present purposes is what
effect the statute has on judicial scrutiny of self-dealing transactions
by directors. More specifically, the issue is what effect courts must or
should give to approval of such a transaction by the board or share-
holders in conformity with one of the first two conditions in the stat-
ute.7 1 Subject to the language of the relevant statute, there are at
least four possible positions that courts might take: (1) no effect-
courts will still scrutinize the transaction to determine whether it was
fair, with the burden of proving fairness on the interested directors;72
65. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2001). For examples of other interested director
statutes, see CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 (West 2002); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 2001-2002); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.35-1 (Vernon Supp.
2002). See generally AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.02 Reporter's Notes 1-2 (1994) (discussing
and listing state interested director statutes); Brudney, supra note 43, at 215
n.27 (describing variations in statutory language and requirements).
66. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 144(a) (2001).
67. § 144(a)(1).
68. § 144(a)(2).
69. § 144(a)(3). By its terms, the third condition in the Delaware statute can be sat-
isfied only if one of the three specified decisionmakers approves or ratifies the
transaction. This condition could apply if a transaction with an interested direc-
tor is approved, but neither of the first two conditions in the statute is satisfied,
e.g., because the board authorized it without the required vote of a majority of
disinterested directors and the matter was not put to a vote of the shareholders.
70. See generally Davis, supra note 49, at 223-43 (discussing issues that arise under
interested director statutes).
71. For further discussion of this issue, see Brudney, supra note 43, at 219-38.
72. Cookies Food Prods., Inc. v. Lakes Warehouse Distrib., Inc., 430 N.W.2d 447, 452-
53 (Iowa 1988).
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(2) some effect-courts will scrutinize the transaction to determine
whether it was fair, but the burden of proof on the issue of fairness
will be shifted to those challenging the transaction, i.e., the challeng-
ers must prove that the transaction was unfair;7 3 (3) even more ef-
fect-courts will analyze the transaction not under a fairness
standard, but instead under the business judgment rule;7 4 or (4) the
ultimate effect-the transaction is insulated from any challenge bared
on the conflict of interest.7 5
To advocate the fourth position is to argue that interested director
statutes were intended to displace the vagaries of the common law
fairness test and to create a bright-line rule on which business plan-
ners can rely as to when self-dealing transactions by directors will be
upheld. The courts, however, generally have viewed such statutes as
displacing only the common law's original rule that directors' self-
dealing transactions were automatically voidable. 76 That is, despite
board or shareholder approval of self-dealing transactions, courts are
willing to give such transactions some level of scrutiny.77 The Dela-
ware courts have expressed approval of the third position described
above, i.e., board or shareholder approval in conformity with the stat-
ute dictates that courts review approved self-dealing by directors
under the business judgment rule.78 The argument in favor of the
73. Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 740-41 (7th Cir. 1979) (applying New York law).
74. E.g., Stegemeier v. Magness, 728 A.2d 557, 562 (Del. 1999) (discussing effect of
disinterested director approval in corporate context and noting contrary rule in
case of self-dealing by trustees); Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del.
1987) (describing effect of director or shareholder approval); Cooke v. Oolie, Civ.
A. No. 11134, 2000 WL 710199, at *13 n.41 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2000) (describing
effect of director approval); Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1115-16 (Del.
Ch. 1999) (describing effect of shareholder approval); In re Wheelabrator Techs.,
Inc. S'holders Litig., 663 A.2d 1194, 1203 (Del. Ch. 1995) (same); see also infra
note 78 (discussing technical issues under Delaware law as to when approval by
shareholders or directors will invoke the business judgment rule).
75. The Texas interested director statute provides that a contract or transaction be-
tween the corporation and one or more of its directors "shall be valid" if it receives
the requisite approval of shareholders or directors. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 2.35-1 (Vernon Supp. 2002). A court might well interpret this language as
precluding judicial review of directors' self-dealing transactions that receive
board or shareholder approval in conformity with the statute. On the other hand,
the Texas statute requires that shareholder or board approval of a self-dealing
transaction be given "in good faith," which a court might interpret as requiring
review of the transaction under the business judgment rule.
76. See, e.g., Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 256 Cal. Rptr. 702, 716 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989);
Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976); Cookies Food Prods., 430
N.W.2d at 452-53.
77. See, e.g., Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d 66, 74 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1952) (interpreting predecessor to current California statute).
78. See cases cited supra note 74. As discussed in the text, the Delaware statute
contemplates that a director's self-dealing transaction might be approved by the
vote of a majority of the disinterested directors or by vote of the corporation's
shareholders. Both forms of approval give rise to certain issues. With respect to
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first two positions described above-a fairness standard of review ap-
plies despite board or shareholder approval of the transaction-is that
approval by disinterested directors or shareholders by itself does not
adequately protect the interests of the corporation and its sharehold-
ers. To apply a fairness standard in this context is consistent with the
rule that applies in the case of self-dealing by trustees and agents. 79
Indeed, in the public corporation context, the tendency of disinterested
directors to identify with their self-dealing colleagues on the board8O
approval by a majority of the disinterested directors, it is unclear whether the
Delaware courts will (or should) review a director's self-dealing transaction under
the business judgment rule, rather than the entire fairness standard, when the
disinterested directors who consider the transaction do not constitute a majority
of the board and do not function as a special committee appointed by the board,
i.e., when the presence or vote of the interested directors is necessary in order for
the corporation to take action under state law. Symposium, Judicial Standards
of Review of Corporate Fiduciary Action, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 995, 1042, 1051-56(2001) (setting forth colloquy discussing issue). An example of this situation
would be when only two members of a five-member board are disinterested and
independent, and all five members meet and vote unanimously to approve the
transaction. With respect to approval by shareholders, the Delaware statute does
not require that the shareholders who approve a director's self-dealing transac-
tion be disinterested, but the Delaware courts have held that only approval by a
majority of disinterested shareholders will invoke judicial review under the busi-
ness judgment rule. Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221 (1976); Mary A.
Jacobson, Note, Interested Director Transactions and the (Equivocal) Effects of
Shareholder Ratification, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 981, 994-95 (1996).
The Delaware courts sometimes describe the effect of director or shareholder
approval of a director's self-dealing transaction as changing the standard of re-
view to one of waste, a standard under which a transaction will not be set aside or
liability imposed unless it constitutes a waste of corporate assets. E.g., Solomon,
747 A.2d at 1115-16; Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997); Or-
ban v. Field, Civ. A. No. 12820, 1997 WL 153831, at *10 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1997).
Generally, to say that a transaction constitutes a waste of corporate assets is to
assert that corporate assets were exchanged "for consideration so disproportion-
ately small as to lie beyond the range at which any reasonable person might be
willing to trade." Vogelstein, 699 A.2d at 336. The concept of waste focuses more
on the degree of injury to the corporation, whereas the concept of business judg-
ment focuses on the behavior of managers. Brudney, supra note 43, at 224-25.
The concepts are similar in that they both "function as standards of the propriety
of managerial ... conduct of corporate affairs that limit strictly, if they do not
effectively preclude, judicial review of such conduct." Id.
79. See supra subsection II.A.2.a.
80. See, e.g., James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psycholog-
ical Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1985, at 83, 85-108 (describing causes of bias on the part of di-
rectors asked to pass judgment on conduct of board colleagues); Peter E. Kay,
Note & Comment, Director Conflicts of Interest Under the Model Business Corpo-
ration Act: A Model for All States?, 69 WASH. L. REV. 207, 227-29 (1994) (describ-
ing structural bias of disinterested directors); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV.
1, 31-32 (2002) (describing phenomenon of"groupthink" and how boardroom cul-
ture encourages it); cf. Curtis v. Nevens, 31 P.3d 146, 152 (Colo. 2001) (describing
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and the inability of widely dispersed shareholders to give informed
consents1 have led some to argue that shareholders are more in need
of judicial protection through a fairness standard than the typical
trust beneficiary or commercial principal.8 2
B. The Parent-Subsidiary Relationship
1. In General
The term "parent corporation" generally refers to a corporation
that has effective control through majority or complete stock owner-
ship of one or more subsidiary corporations.8 3 Parent-subsidiary rela-
tionships range from the relatively simple structure of a parent and
one subsidiary to the large, multinational enterprise in which a parent
may hold, either directly or through other subsidiaries, the stock of
hundreds of subsidiaries operating in countries throughout the
world.8 4
concern for structural bias of special litigation committee appointed by board to
consider merits of shareholder derivative action).
81. Individual shareholders in a publicly held corporation often vote without famil-
iarizing themselves with the details of matters that are submitted for their ap-
proval. There are a variety of explanations for this phenomenon, such as the lack
of incentive for any one shareholder to invest the time necessary to understand
the matters submitted and the assumption of shareholders that others who will
vote on the matter are taking the time to become familiar with it. See CLARK,
supra note 35, § 9.5, at 389-94 (discussing rational apathy and free rider
problems). The cost and effort required to communicate with other shareholders
also make it unlikely in the typical case that any organized shareholder effort
will arise to challenge a director's self-dealing transaction. For these reasons,
shareholders in a publicly held corporation have difficulty in serving as effective
monitors of corporate management, an impediment often referred to as the "col-
lective action problem." The extent to which the presence of institutional inves-
tors, such as mutual funds and pension funds that hold large blocks of stock,
helps overcome the collective action problem is an issue that has generated a
great deal of discussion. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain)
Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991);
Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable
Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174 (2001).
82. Brudney, supra note 43, at 219.
83. Culcal Stylco, Inc. v. Vornado, Inc., 103 Cal. Rptr. 419, 421 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App.
1972); Schnoor v. Deitchler, 482 N.W.2d 913, 915 (Iowa 1992). See generally
PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: SUBSTANTIVE LAW §§ 3.01-
.02.1 (1987 & Supp. 2002) [hereinafter BLUMBERG, SUBSTANTIVE LAW] (discussing
rise of corporate groups in America).
84. See generally PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDU-
RAL LAW §§ 2.01-.07 (1983 & Supp. 2002) [hereinafter BLUMBERG, PROCEDURAL
LAW] (discussing structure of large American corporate enterprise); id. app. at
463-71 (providing data on subsidiaries owned by United States parents); Eric J.
Gouvin, Resolving the Subsidiary Director's Dilemma, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 287, 287
& n.2 (1996) (stating that, in 1995, each of the ten largest Fortune 500 companies
owned an average of 62 subsidiaries).
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From an economic perspective, parent and subsidiary corporations
typically constitute a single enterprise.8 5 Although their business
lines may or may not be related to each other, the corporations are in
many real senses integrated. The parent normally makes major policy
decisions that affect the enterprise as a whole, such as the sources of
financing to which its subsidiaries will have access and the allocation
of capital among its subsidiaries.86 Parent and subsidiary corpora-
tions often conduct their business from the same office space, share
employees, and perform a host of administrative functions on an inte-
grated basis. For example, employees of the parent and subsidiary
may participate in a single retirement plan8 7 and staff accountants or
attorneys employed by the parent or subsidiary may perform services
for the enterprise as a whole.88 As this last example suggests, it is
quite common for parent and subsidiary corporations to conduct a
large number of transactions with each other. Employees of one rou-
tinely perform services for the other, and the parent or subsidiary
often serves as the major or sole source of supply for goods that the
other uses. For a variety of purposes, such as financial, tax, and regu-
latory reporting, the corporations must keep track of these transac-
tions and allocate the costs associated with conducting business
among the corporations in the enterprise. It is common for large
amounts of cash to flow between a parent and its subsidiaries, and the
85. The integration of parent and subsidiary corporations has been recognized in sev-
eral contexts. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S.
752, 771, 777 (1984) (holding that parent corporation and its wholly owned sub-
sidiary are not legally capable of conspiring with each other under section 1 of the
Sherman Act because their "coordinated activity.., must be viewed as that of a
single enterprise"); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op.
95-390 (1995) (Lawrence J. Fox, dissenting) (arguing that, because "corporate
families are financially totally inter-dependent and ... the sole purpose for [their]
existence.., is economic success," majority incorrectly concludes that lawyer who
represents corporate client is not necessarily required to obtain client's consent
before undertaking representation adverse to corporate affiliate of that client in
unrelated matter). See generally Phillip I. Blumberg, The Increasing Recognition
of Enterprise Principles in Determining Parent and Subsidiary Corporation Lia-
bilities, 28 CONN. L. REV. 295 (1996) (discussing areas of law in which enterprise
principles have prevailed over the separate entity concept). But see infra note 95
(discussing separate entity view reflected in the ABA's Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct).
86. BLUMBERG, PROCEDURAL LAW, supra note 84, § 2.05.2.
87. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 81-141, 1981-1 C.B. 204 (ruling on situation in which employ-
ees of parent and subsidiary participated in single retirement plan).
88. See, e.g., Tex. Comm. on Profl Ethics, Op. 343 (1968) (concluding that, subject to
certain conditions, attorney employed by parent can render services to subsidiary
when parent charges subsidiary for costs of such services); see also Tex. Comm.
on Profl Ethics, Op. 531 (1999) (concluding that corporation cannot charge
wholly owned or partially owned subsidiaries market-based fees for legal services
rendered by corporate legal staff).
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parent often maintains a centralized cash management system for all
of its subsidiaries.89
A parent corporation typically has the power to control its subsidi-
ary.90 As the majority or sole shareholder of the subsidiary (whether
directly or indirectly), the parent selects the members of the subsidi-
ary's board of directors. The board of the subsidiary commonly con-
sists largely, and in many cases entirely, of persons who serve as
officers and/or directors of the parent. 9 1 In addition, senior officers of
the subsidiary who are not board members often are officers or other
employees of the parent as well.92 The parent's selection of the sub-
sidiary's board and senior management allows the parent to monitor
and keep control over the subsidiary's operations. The degree of con-
trol that a parent corporation actually exercises over a subsidiary var-
ies. At one end of the spectrum, a parent may dictate only major
policy decisions and allow the subsidiary to act more or less indepen-
dently with respect to day-to-day operations.9 3 At the other end, the
parent may dominate the subsidiary entirely and treat it merely as a
division of the parent rather than a separate corporation. For exam-
ple, the parent may require that the subsidiary seek approval of rou-
tine operational matters, use the subsidiary's assets or services
without paying for them, or fail to follow normal corporate formalities,
such as holding meetings of the subsidiary's board of directors.9 4
89. See generally Derek E. Feagans, Comment, Concentration Accounts and Bank-
ruptcy: "Where 0' Where Did the Bankruptcy Estate Go?", 67 UMKC L. REV. 145,
145-46 (1998) (discussing cash management systems).
90. See generally Deborah A. DeMott, The Mechanisms of Control, 13 CONN. J. INT'L
L. 233, 236-37 (1999) (discussing mechanisms through which incorporated share-
holders that hold a majority of shares exercise control).
91. See, e.g., Obabueki v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 99 CIV. 11262 (AGS), 2001 WL
921172, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2001); Warren v. Century Bankcorporation, Inc.,
741 P.2d 846, 847 (Okla. 1987).
92. See, e.g., Luckett v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 618 F.2d 1373, 1378 (10th Cir. 1980).
93. See, e.g., Goss Graphic Sys., Inc. v. MAN Roland Druckmaschinen Aktiengesell-
schaft, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1067-68 (N.D. Iowa 2001).
94. Such domination can lead to several adverse consequences for the parent. The
most common is that courts sometimes use the parent's domination as a rationale
for disregarding the separate existence of parent and subsidiary and making the
parent liable for obligations of the subsidiary, commonly referred to as "piercing
the corporate veil." See, e.g., United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61-64
(1998). See generally BLUMBERG, SUBSTANTIVE LAW, supra note 83, §§ 6.01-.10
(discussing piercing in parent-subsidiary context); William J. Rands, Domination
of a Subsidiary by a Parent, 32 IND. L. REV. 421 (1999) (same). Similarly, the
parent's domination may persuade a court to view the parent as subject to juris-
diction in a location in which only its subsidiary does business. See, e.g., Volks-
wagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 751 F.2d 117, 120-23 (2d
Cir. 1984). Or a court might be willing to require a parent who dominates its
subsidiary to participate in discovery in litigation brought against or pursued by
its subsidiary. See, e.g., Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., Civ.
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Although economically a parent and subsidiary corporation might
constitute a single integrated enterprise, state corporate law generally
treats each corporation as a separate legal entity.95 Thus, from a cor-
porate law perspective, a parent corporation and its subsidiary are
separate legal persons, each with its own rights and obligations. If a
parent does not respect the separate existence of its subsidiary, there
can be several adverse consequences for the parent.9 6
2. Parent Corporations as Fiduciaries
A parent corporation is a controlling shareholder of its subsidiar-
ies. State corporate law treats controlling shareholders, including
parent corporations, as fiduciaries of the corporation, its minority
shareholders and, at least in some circumstances, it creditors. 97 This
section examines the meaning of the term "controlling shareholder,"
the rationale for treating such shareholders as fiduciaries, and the cir-
cumstances in which controlling shareholders owe fiduciary duties to
the corporation's creditors.
As the term suggests, a controlling shareholder is a shareholder
that has the power to exercise control over the corporation's business
affairs. The courts generally treat a person as having such power, and
therefore as a controlling shareholder, in two situations: (1) when the
person owns a majority of the corporation's outstanding voting stock,
and (2) when the person does not own a majority interest but never-
A. No. 89C-SE-35, 1995 WL 411795, at *1-*3 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 1995) (dis-
cussing issue).
95. E.g., Schnoor v. Deitchler, 482 N.W.2d 913, 915 (Iowa 1992); Hoover Universal,
Inc. v. Limbach, 575 N.E.2d 811, 814 (Ohio 1991); Macan v. Scandinavia Belting
Co., 107 A. 750, 752 (Pa. 1919). Parent and subsidiary corporations are recog-
nized as separate entities in many contexts. For example, under the ABA's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer who represents a corporation does
not, by virtue of that representation, also represent the corporation's parent or
subsidiary. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 34 (2002). Therefore,
subject to certain conditions, a lawyer who represents a corporation "is not barred
from accepting representation adverse to an affiliate [of the client] in an unre-
lated matter." Id.
96. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
97. E.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1919) (discussing duties to corpo-
ration and minority shareholders); In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Delaware, 274 B.R.
71, 89-90 (D. Del. 2002) (discussing duties to creditors); In re High Strength Steel,
Inc., 269 B.R. 560, 569 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001) (same); In re MAXXAM, Inc./Feder-
ated Dev. S'holders Litig., 659 A.2d 760, 771 (Del. Ch. 1995) (discussing duties to
corporation and minority shareholders); Loy v. Lorm Corp., 278 S.E.2d 897, 901
(N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (same). There is some authority for the proposition that a
parent corporation owes no fiduciary duty to its wholly owned subsidiary. See
Dana Brakman Reiser, Decision-Makers Without Duties: Defining the Duties of
Parent Corporations Acting as Sole Corporate Members in Nonprofit Health Care
Systems, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 979, 1005-09 (2001) (discussing issue).
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theless exercises effective control over the corporation's business. 98
Although it is often unstated in the cases, the rationale for treating a
majority shareholder as a controlling shareholder is that such a share-
holder normally has the power to elect and remove the corporation's
board of directors, who will, it is assumed, show allegiance to the in-
terests of the shareholder who elected them. 99 If a shareholder holds
less than a majority of the corporation's voting stock, the shareholder
might still have effective control over the corporation in a number of
ways.1 00 A parent corporation is a controlling shareholder because, by
definition, it owns at least a majority of its subsidiary's stock.lOl
The basis for treating a controlling shareholder as a fiduciary is
not as clear as in the case of other fiduciaries. 10 2 Traditionally, a per-
son's obligations as a fiduciary are said to arise from the person's vol-
untarily undertaking to act on behalf of another.10 3 This theory helps
explain why persons such as trustees, agents, and even corporate di-
rectors are treated as fiduciaries. But those acquiring a controlling
98. E.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del.
1987); Locati v. Johnson, 980 P.2d 173, 176 (Or. Ct. App. 1999); Am. LAW INST.,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 1.10(a) (1994).
99. See Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 927 F.2d 263, 268 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating
that majority shareholder can control corporation for its own benefit through
election of directors who favor its interests), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 502 U.S. 801 (1991).
100. For example, the shareholder could have the effective ability to determine who
serves on the board because the shareholder owns a significant portion of the
corporation's stock and the remaining ownership of the corporation is widely dis-
persed. E.g., Gottesman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 279 F. Supp. 361,367-68 (S.D.N.Y.
1967), remanded on other grounds, 414 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1969); see also AM. LAw
INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 1.10(b) (1994) (stating that one who owns or has power to vote more than 25
percent of corporation's outstanding voting equity securities is presumed a con-
trolling shareholder unless another person owns or has power to vote a greater
percentage of such securities). A minority shareholder also might have effective
control by acting in concert with another shareholder or small group of share-
holders whose combined holdings constitute a majority of the corporation's
shares. See, e.g., In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., Litig., 634 A.2d 319, 328-29 (Del.
1993); Locati, 980 P.2d at 174, 176. A minority shareholder might also exercise
direct control, e.g., by ignoring corporate formalities and personally exercising
control over the corporation's assets and affairs. McLaughlin v. Beeghly, 617
N.E.2d 703, 705-06 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
101. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing meaning of term "parent
corporation").
102. See DeMott, supra note 23, at 911.
103. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 cmt. a (1958) (stating that "[tlhe
agreement to act on behalf of the principal causes the agent to be a fiduciary");
Block, Maimone & Ross, supra note 61, at 71 (stating that "[b]y assuming his
office, the corporate director commits allegiance to the enterprise and acknowl-
edges that the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders must prevail
over any individual interest of his own").
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interest in a corporation normally do not indicate by doing so that they
are undertaking to act on behalf of the corporation and others who
hold a residual interest in it. The traditional rationale that courts of-
fer for treating a controlling shareholder as a fiduciary is that, by ex-
ercising control over the corporation, the shareholder assumes the
duties of a fiduciary. 104 For example, if a shareholder controls the cor-
poration's directors and officers, who make decisions for the corpora-
tion in a fiduciary capacity, then the shareholder is, in a sense,
vicariously serving as the corporation's management and should be
held to the same fiduciary obligations to which they are subject. 10 5
If a shareholder controls the corporation's directors and officers,
then the shareholder has the ability to engage in self-dealing transac-
tions with the corporation. In determining whether a shareholder is
engaged in self-dealing, it thus becomes important to determine
whether corporate management is subject to the shareholder's control.
One area of uncertainty is the extent to which courts are willing to
presume such control merely from the shareholder's status as a major-
ity shareholder, i.e., from the shareholder's election of the board mem-
bers. In some decisions, courts appear willing to make this
104. Harriman v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 372 F. Supp. 101, 105-06 (D. Del.
1974); Tri-Star Pictures, 634 A.2d at 328.
105. See, e.g., Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 176 (2d Cir. 1955); Zahn v. Tran-
samerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 46 (3d Cir. 1947); Graham v. Mimms, 444 N.E.2d
549, 558 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Linge v. Ralston Purina Co., 293 N.W.2d 191, 193-94
(Iowa 1980); J.A.C. Hetherington, Defining the Scope of Controlling Shareholders'
Fiduciary Responsibilities, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 9, 12 (1987). The rationale
for treating controlling shareholders as fiduciaries is more difficult to explain
when they do not use their control over corporate management to cause the cor-
poration to take action, but rather act primarily in their capacity as shareholders.
For discussion of this issue, see FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 7.1
(2000) (discussing shareholder sales of control); John C. Carter, The Fiduciary
Rights of Shareholders, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823, 831-37 (1988) (discussing
cases in which fiduciary duty arose not because of actual exercise of corporate
power, but because of status as controlling shareholder).
In closely held corporations, somewhat different considerations apply. Specif-
ically, because the owners of such corporations often operate and view themselves
as partners, some courts regard controlling shareholders in closely held corpora-
tions-and in some instances even minority shareholders-as owing to other
shareholders the heightened fiduciary duties of partners. Compare Donahue v.
Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 514-15 & n.17 (Mass.
1975) (recognizing duty), and Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353
N.E.2d 657, 663-64 (Mass. 1976) (same), and Estate of Schroer v. Stamco Supply,
Inc., 482 N.E.2d 975, 978-81 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (same), with Nixon v.
Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379-81 (Del. 1993) (refusing to recognize special rules
for protection of minority interests in closely held corporations). See generally
GEVURTZ, supra, § 5.1.1 (discussing issue); Carter, supra, at 836-40 (same); A.
Richard M. Blaiklock, Note, Fiduciary Duties Owed by Frozen-Out Minority
Shareholders in Close Corporations, 30 IND. L. REV. 763, 770-74 (1997) (discuss-
ing duties of minority shareholders).
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presumption.1 0 6 In at least some contexts, however, courts have sug-
gested that, in order for directors to be considered subject to a major-
ity shareholder's control, there must be "such facts as would
demonstrate that through personal or other relationships the direc-
tors are beholden to the controlling person."1o 7 In the parent-subsidi-
ary context, a subsidiary's board and senior management typically
consist largely, and sometimes entirely, of persons who also serve as
directors, officers or other employees of the parent.1os For this reason,
in the reported cases there is normally little issue concerning the par-
ent's control over the subsidiary's board.l09
As discussed earlier, a corporation's directors owe their fiduciary
obligation of loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders.1 1 0 By vir-
tue of their control, this same duty is imposed on controlling share-
holders. But directors and controlling shareholders traditionally are
not regarded as owing fiduciary obligations to the corporation's credi-
tors, whose rights and protections are established primarily by con-
tract."1 ' In special circumstances, however, directors and controlling
106. See In re W. Nat'l Corp. S'holders Litig., Consol. Civ. A. No. 15927, 2000 WL
710192, at *6 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2000) (stating that "[i]n the absence of majority
stock ownership, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the minority shareholder held
a dominant position and actually controlled the corporation's conduct"); Kaplan v.
Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 122-23 (Del. Ch. 1971) (stating that stock ownership
alone does not demonstrate domination of the board or control of the corporation's
affairs, "at least when it amounts to less than a majority"); see also GEVURTZ,
supra note 105, § 4.2, at 349 (stating that courts generally "appear to equate ma-
jority ownership with control over the board").
107. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000).
108. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719 (Del. 1971) (involving
parent conceding issue of control over subsidiary's board). There are several rea-
sons why directors and officers of a subsidiary who also serve the parent typically
are regarded as subject to the parent's control. Most obviously, they remain in
their positions with the subsidiary only at the pleasure of the parent. Further,
such individuals likely hold stock of the parent or options to purchase the par-
ent's stock and, at least in the case of a partially owned subsidiary, have a greater
personal interest in the welfare of the parent relative to that of the subsidiary.
Directors and officers of a subsidiary who also serve as officers or other employ-
ees of the parent have the additional motivating factor of retaining their employ-
ment with the parent. Even nominally "independent" directors of the subsidiary
may be regarded as subject to the parent's control if they have consulting con-
tracts or other favorable economic arrangements over which the parent has influ-
ence. See, e.g., In re MAXXAM, Inc.IFederated Dev. S'holders Litig., 659 A.2d
760, 774 (Del. Ch. 1995).
110. See supra note 26.
111. E.g., In re Kingston Square Assocs., 214 B.R. 713, 735 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997);
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1524-25 (S.D.N.Y.
1989); Macaluso v. Jenkins, 420 N.E.2d 251, 258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); see also Katz
v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (discussing contractual
nature of relationship between creditors and corporation). In addition to their
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shareholders also become fiduciaries of the corporation's creditors.112
For purposes of this discussion, the relevant special circumstance that
gives rise to fiduciary duties to creditors is the corporation's
insolvency.
It is widely recognized that, when a corporation becomes insolvent,
its directors and controlling shareholders owe fiduciary duties not
only to the corporation and its shareholders, but also to its credi-
tors.1 13 Such fiduciary duties clearly exist when a bankruptcy peti-
tion is filed by or against a corporation.114 But the courts generally
view fiduciary duties to creditors as first arising when the corporation
actually becomes insolvent, even if insolvency occurs before statutory
bankruptcy proceedings commence or if such proceedings never take
place.1 1 5 In fact, at least some courts accept the proposition that di-
rectors and controlling shareholders become fiduciaries of creditors
when the corporation is not yet insolvent but is approaching insol-
contractually negotiated rights and protections, the law provides creditors with
certain other forms of protection, such as the ability to prevent or recover fraudu-
lent conveyances of the corporation's assets. See generally Helen B. Jenkins,
Rights of Unsecured Estate Creditors Under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
in Property Transferred Prior to Death, 45 OKLA. L. REV. 275, 276-84 (1992) (dis-
cussing state Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking
a Corporation's Obligations to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 647, 653-54 (1996)
(discussing laws protecting creditors' rights). The discussion in the text focuses
primarily on voluntary creditors. Involuntary creditors such as tort claimants do
not have contractually negotiated protections.
112. E.g., Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992) (stating
that, in the absence of special circumstances such as fraud, insolvency or a viola-
tion of statute, directors do not owe fiduciary duties to creditors); Connolly v.
Agostino's Ristorante, Inc., 775 So. 2d 387, 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (same);
see also Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 824-25 (N.J. 1981) (holding
that directors of reinsurance corporation owed fiduciary duty to creditors because
relationship between creditors and corporation involved trust and confidence
analogous to that between bank and its depositors).
113. Kingston Square Assocs., 214 B.R. at 735 (stating that "it is universally agreed
that when a corporation approaches insolvency or actually becomes insolvent, di-
rectors' fiduciary duties expand to include general creditors"); see, e.g., Collie v.
Becknell, 762 P.2d 727; 730-31 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); St. James Capital Corp. v.
Pallet Recycling Assocs. of N. Am., Inc., 589 N.W.2d 511, 514-15 (Minn. Ct. App.
1999); AYR Composition, Inc. v. Rosenberg, 619 A.2d 592, 597 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1993).
114. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07, 310-11 (1939); In re Sal Caruso
Cheese, Inc., 107 B.R. 808, 816-17 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989). See generally C.R.
Bowles, Jr. & Nancy B. Rapoport, Has the DIP's Attorney Become the Ultimate
Creditors' Lawyer in Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases?, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 47, 52-57 (1997) (discussing nature of fiduciary duties of debtor in posses-
sion in chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings).
115. E.g., Geyer, 621 A.2d at 787-90; see also Fed. Dep. Ins. Corp. v. Sea Pines, Co.,
692 F.2d 973, 977 (4th Cir. 1982).
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vency.11 6 Because the interests and objectives of shareholders and
creditors can be in sharp conflict as a corporation approaches or exists
in a state of insolvency, the willingness of courts to recognize fiduciary
obligations to both creditors and shareholders at that stage puts direc-
tors and controlling shareholders in a difficult position. 17 Even if fi-
duciary duties arise only upon actual insolvency, it may be difficult for
those in control to know precisely when the corporation becomes insol-
vent and, therefore, when their duties to creditors arise.
For purposes of determining the existence of fiduciary duties to
creditors, the courts appear willing to use either of two traditional
tests to determine whether a corporation is insolvent.1 l8 Some courts
use the "equity" insolvency test, which defines insolvency as the corpo-
ration's inability to pay its debts as they become due.1 19 Others use
the "bankruptcy" or "balance sheet" test, which treats insolvency as
occurring when the corporation's liabilities exceed the value of its as-
sets.120 Still others seem to view the two tests as having the same
meaning.121
The rationale for extending fiduciary duties to creditors of an insol-
vent corporation is that such creditors are in a position analogous to
that of shareholders. 122 When a corporation is insolvent, its creditors'
contractual rights to repayment are imperiled. If those in control of
the corporation do not increase the value of the business's assets to
116. Sea Pines, 692 F.2d at 977; Weaver v. Kellogg, 216 B.R. 563, 583-84 (S.D. Tex.
1997); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp.,
Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 & n.55 (Del. Ch. 1991).
117. For discussion of the conflicts of interest between creditors and shareholders and
the manner in which the conflicts increase as the corporation's financial condition
deteriorates, see Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency:
Proper Scope of Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1488-96
(1993).
118. See generally Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co., Inc. (In re Healthco Int'l, Inc.), 208
B.R. 288, 301-02 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (discussing these traditional tests);
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.40 cmts. 2-4 (1999) (discussing insolvency tests in con-
text of state law restrictions on corporate distributions); Harvey R. Miller, Corpo-
rate Governance in Chapter 11: The Fiduciary Relationship Between Directors
and Stockholders of Solvent and Insolvent Corporations, 23 SETON HALL L. REV.
1467, 1479-82 (1993) (discussing different definitions of insolvency).
119. LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Perelman, 82 F. Supp. 2d 279, 290-91 (D. Del. 2000).
120. See Sea Pines, 692 F.2d at 974; Pereira v. Cogan, No. 00 Civ. 619 (RWS), 2001 WL
243537, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2001).
121. See Geyer, 621 A.2d at 789 (stating that "[an entity is insolvent when it is unable
to pay its debts as they fall due in the usual course of business.... That is, an
entity is insolvent when it has liabilities in excess of a reasonable market value of
assets held.").
122. For further discussion of this rationale, see Schwarcz, supra note 111, at 665-68;
see also Andrew D. Shaffer, Corporate Fiduciary - Insolvent: The Fiduciary Rela-
tionship Your Corporate Law Professor (Should Have) Warned You About, 8 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 479, 511-35 (2000) (discussing when fiduciary duties to cred-
itors arise and traditional rationales for imposing such duties).
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allow the corporation to fully pay its liabilities, then the creditors will
receive what assets the corporation does have and the shareholders
will receive nothing.123 Thus, to the extent that a corporation is in a
condition of insolvency, its directors, officers, and controlling share-
holders manage its assets primarily for the benefit of creditors. As
residual claimants who rely on the expertise of others to maximize
value for their benefit, creditors of an insolvent corporation find them-
selves in a position much like that of shareholders.
In summary, a parent corporation is a controlling shareholder of
its subsidiary and therefore is a fiduciary of the subsidiary, the sub-
sidiary's minority shareholders and, when the subsidiary is insolvent,
the subsidiary's creditors. As a result, the parent, like other fiducia-
ries, is restricted in its ability to engage in self-dealing transactions
with the subsidiary. These restrictions are the subject of the next
section.
3. The Judicial Standards of Review Applied to Transactions
Between Parent and Subsidiary
a. In General
As discussed earlier, the law's response to self-dealing by fiducia-
ries has varied according to the nature of the fiduciary relationship.
In the case of corporate directors, courts review alleged self-dealing to
determine whether the transaction was "entirely fair," with the bur-
den of proving fairness on the fiduciary.124 If shareholders or disin-
terested and independent directors approve the transaction after full
disclosure, however, then the level of judicial scrutiny varies. Some
courts still engage in a fairness analysis with the burden of proof on
the interested directors; others use a fairness analysis but, in recogni-
tion of the approval by disinterested parties, shift the burden of proof
on the issue of fairness to those challenging the transaction; and
others, including the courts of Delaware, no longer engage in a fair-
ness analysis but instead apply the deferential business judgment
rule.125 Whether a court applies a fairness or a business judgment
standard of review in this context is a function of the degree to which
the court views approval by directors or shareholders as an effective
monitor of self-dealing transactions.
Judicial review of alleged self-dealing by parent corporations and
other controlling shareholders follows a similar pattern. If the chal-
lengers establish that a transaction between the parent and subsidi-
ary involved self-dealing by the parent, an important condition that is
123. For discussion of the relationship between shareholders and creditors, see BAY-
LESS MANNING & JAMES J. HANKS, JR., LEGAL CAPITAL 5-19 (3d ed. 1990).
124. See supra notes 52, 56 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 71-82 and accompanying text.
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discussed in some detail below, then the court will inquire whether
the transaction was entirely fair to the subsidiary, with the burden of
proving fairness on the parent.126 A shift in the burden of proof occurs
if the parent establishes that minority shareholders or disinterested
and independent directors of the subsidiary approved the transaction
after receiving full disclosure of all material facts concerning the
transaction. In that case, the courts of Delaware and others following
Delaware's lead still apply an entire fairness analysis, but shift the
burden of proof on the issue of fairness, i.e., the challengers must
prove that the transaction was unfair to the subsidiary.12 7 In order
for a parent or other controlling shareholder to shift the burden of
proof on fairness, it must establish that it accurately disclosed all ma-
terial facts and, in the case of approval by an independent committee
of the subsidiary's directors, that the committee engaged with the con-
trolling shareholder in the sort of arm's-length bargaining that would
take place between unrelated parties and adequately represented the
minority shareholders' interests. 128
Thus, in contrast to the approach when directors engage in self-
dealing, even the Delaware courts do not review self-dealing transac-
tions by parent corporations and other controlling shareholders under
the more deferential business judgment standard when such transac-
tions have been approved by disinterested and independent deci-
sionmakers. The reason for this adherence to a stricter level of
scrutiny despite independent approval is that a parent or other con-
trolling shareholder, in contrast to a director, controls the corporation
and therefore may influence the vote of shareholders or independent
directors in ways that are difficult to detect.12 9 The approval of mi-
nority shareholders could be influenced by their fear of retaliation by
126. E.g., Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 1994);
Loy v. Lorm, 278 S.E.2d 897, 901 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981); Warren v. Century
Bankcorporation, Inc., 741 P.2d 846, 849 (Okla. 1987). State statutes commonly
provide that, if a parent owns a sufficient percentage of a subsidiary's stock, e.g.,
90 percent, then the parent can merge the subsidiary into itself and cash out the
subsidiary's minority shareholders without seeking the minority shareholders'
approval. E.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 11.05(a) (1999). Such mergers are re-
ferred to as 'short-form" mergers. Although short-form mergers involve obvious
self-dealing by a parent corporation, the Delaware Supreme Court has held that,
"absent fraud or illegality," statutory appraisal proceedings are the exclusive
remedy of dissatisfied minority shareholders and the parent does not have to es-
tablish the entire fairness of the transaction. Glassman v. Unocal Exploration
Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 243, 248 (Del. 2001).
127. E.g., Lynch Communications, 638 A.2d at 1117; Strassburger v. Earley, 752 A.2d
557, 570-71 (Del. Ch. 2000); Casey v. Brennan, 780 A.2d 553, 569 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2001).
128. E.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1222-23 (Del. 1999); Lynch Com-
munications, 638 A.2d at 1120-21.
129. Lynch Communications, 638 A.2d at 1116-17; see also Kahn v. Tremont Corp.,
694 A.2d 422, 428-29 (Del. 1997).
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the controlling shareholder should they refuse to approve the transac-
tion in question.130 In the case of independent directors on a subsidi-
ary's board, their ability to ensure that the transaction is in the best
interests of the subsidiary and its minority shareholders is compro-
mised by the same type of bias that exists when such directors review
self-dealing transactions by their fellow directors.131 Indeed, there is
a good case to be made that the ability of a parent corporation and its
representatives on the subsidiary's board to influence the subsidiary's
independent directors is greater than that of boardroom colleagues
who do not represent a controlling shareholder.132 To protect minor-
ity shareholders from such potential influences, the Delaware courts
continue to review self-dealing transactions by controlling sharehold-
ers under an entire fairness standard despite independent approval of
the transaction. 133 This practice is consistent with the rule that ap-
plies in the case of self-dealing by trustees and agents, i.e., courts re-
view such transactions for fairness despite the beneficiary's consent to
the transaction.134
b. The Meaning of "Entire Fairness"
As noted earlier, under the entire fairness test courts inquire into
two aspects of fairness: fair dealing and fair price.1 35 In Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc.,136 a case in which minority shareholders of a corporation
received cash for their stock when the corporation was merged into its
controlling shareholder, commonly referred to as a cash-out merger,
the Delaware Supreme Court offered guidance on the inquiry in which
courts should engage. The court stated that the inquiry regarding fair
dealing "embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how
it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and
how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were ob-
130. Lynch Communications, 638 A.2d at 1116; GEVURTZ, supra note 105, § 4.2, at 344.
In the case of publicly traded minority shares, shareholder approval also is not an
effective monitor of parent-subsidiary transactions because of the collective ac-
tion problem previously discussed. See supra note 81 (discussing collective action
problem); Victor Brudney & Robert Charles Clark, A New Look at Corporate Op-
portunities, 94 HARv. L. REV. 997, 1046 (1981) (stating that "[a] parent can no
more extract a volitional, meaningful consent from the public investors in its sub-
sidiary than can an officer or executive of a publicly held company from its public
investors").
131. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
132. See Brudney, supra note 43, at 212 n.12.
133. This practice is not without its critics. See Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 59,
at 1306-09 (arguing that business judgment standard of review should apply if
transaction is approved by minority shareholders or committee of disinterested
and independent directors).
134. See supra subsection II.A.2.a.
135. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
136. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
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tained."'137 In contrast, the inquiry regarding fair price "relates to the
economic and financial considerations" of the transaction, and must
include an examination of "all relevant factors." 138 Although courts
must inquire into two aspects of fairness, "the test for fairness is not a
bifurcated one as between fair dealing and price. All aspects of the
issue must be examined as a whole since the question is one of entire
fairness."139
The precise relationship between the fair dealing and fair price in-
quiries-not bifurcated but "examined as a whole"-has been percep-
tively described as "approach[ing] the transcendental."140
Nevertheless, it seems clear that, to meet their burden of proving the
entire fairness of a self-dealing transaction, directors or controlling
shareholders who have the burden of proof must prove the existence of
both fair dealing and fair price.141 Thus, in a self-dealing transaction
between a parent and subsidiary, even if the parent proves that the
subsidiary received or paid a fair price, the parent would not meet its
burden of proving the entire fairness of the transaction unless it also
proves that there was fair dealing.142 In such a case, even though the
subsidiary has not been injured in the sense of receiving an unfair
price, the parent has breached its duty of loyalty. As a remedy for this
breach, those challenging the transaction can seek to have the trans-
action rescinded or, if that is not possible, to obtain rescissory dam-
ages and any necessary equitable relief, i.e., damages and equitable
137. Id. at 711.
138. Id. In assessing whether a subsidiary or its minority shareholders received fair
value, the courts typically consider evidence presented by experts that the parties
and/or the court have retained. The courts are often called upon to consider and
compare a large amount of information relating to intricate and complex valua-
tion methodologies. See, e.g., Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156,
1177-78 & n.33 (1995) (commenting that court of chancery heard twenty-six days
of expert testimony on valuation); MacLane Gas Co., Ltd. P'ship v. Enserch Corp.,
Civ. A. No. 10760, 1992 WL 368614, at *1-*3, *13-*22 (Del. Ch. Jun. 26, 1992)
(setting forth various complex valuation methodologies), affd, 633 A.2d 369 (Del.
1993) (unpublished table decision).
139. 457 A.2d at 711.
140. Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate
Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1237 (2001).
141. E.g., Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 432 (Del. 1997); Cede & Co. v. Techni-
color, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
142. See Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d at 432 (stating that "a finding that the price negoti-
ated by the Special Committee might have been fair does not save the result");
Strassburger v. Earley, 752 A.2d 557, 576-77 (Del. Ch. 2000) (holding entire fair-
ness standard not satisfied because of lack of fair dealing when corporation re-
deemed controlling stockholder's shares at fair price); cf. Howington v.
Ghourdjian, No. 00 C 7394, 2002 WL 48056, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2002) (find-
ing breach of duty of loyalty because of lack of fair dealing, despite fact that fair
price was not in question, because of actions taken by directors in arranging for
organization in which they held financial interest to provide services to
corporation).
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relief intended to put the parties, as far as possible, in the same posi-
tion as if the self-dealing transaction had never taken place.143 As an
example, if a controlling shareholder purchases an asset from the cor-
poration for $100,000 and breaches the duty of loyalty in doing so, mi-
nority shareholders could seek to have the transaction rescinded,
which would require the shareholder to return the asset to the corpo-
ration and the corporation to return the $100,000 to the shareholder.
If rescission is not possible because the shareholder later sold the as-
set to a third party for $150,000, the shareholder could be compelled to
pay to the corporation the amount of the shareholder's $50,000
profit. 144
c. Delaware's Threshold Test for Parent-Subsidiary
Transactions
When minority shareholders or creditors to whom a parent owes
fiduciary duties challenge a parent's transaction with its subsidiary,
the standard of review that a court applies is important because it
tends to control the outcome of the challenge.145 A court's application
of the business judgment rule heavily favors the parent, and its appli-
cation of the entire fairness standard tends to favor the challengers.
For this same reason, the method of analysis by which a court chooses
which standard to apply is significant. The Delaware Supreme Court
has adopted a specific threshold test that determines which standard
of review will apply to parent-subsidiary transactions. To understand
this threshold test, it will be helpful first to consider two cases from
other jurisdictions that address the fiduciary obligations of controlling
shareholders.
The first is Case v. New York Central Railroad Co.,146 a case that is
discussed in more detail in Part IV. 147 In Case, minority shareholders
of a subsidiary brought suit against the parent and asserted that the
parent had breached its fiduciary duty by extracting from the subsidi-
ary too large a portion of the subsidiary's federal tax savings, which
143. In re MAXXAM, Inc./Federated Dev. S'holders Litig., 659 A.2d 760, 775 & n.15
(Del. Ch. 1995). See generally Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134,
1144-47 (Del. Ch. 1994) (discussing nature of rescissory damages), affd, 663 A.2d
1156 (Del. 1995).
144. For cases analogous to the example in the text, see Strassburger, 752 A.2d at 577-
82 (ordering partial rescission of corporation's redemption of controlling stock-
holder's shares and payment of rescissory damages); Howington v. Ghourdjian,
No. 00 C 7394, 2002 WL 265179, at *2-*3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2002) (ordering re-
scissory damages equal to revenue that breaching organization received from cor-
poration less costs that organization incurred in producing it).
145. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing outcome-determinative na-
ture of standard of review).
146. 204 N.E.2d 643 (N.Y. 1965).
147. See infra subsection IV.A.1.b.
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the subsidiary had achieved by offsetting its income with the parent's
operating losses, an offset made possible by the subsidiary's joining
with the parent in a consolidated tax return. 148 After trial, the trial
court concluded that the agreement requiring the subsidiary to pay a
portion of its tax savings to the parent was not unfair. 149 In reviewing
the minority shareholders' claim on appeal, the New York Court of
Appeals recognized the parent's status as a fiduciary and the conse-
quent restrictions on the parent's actions:
Exercising, as it did by its majority stock ownership, effective control over
[the subsidiary's] affairs, [the parent] was required to follow a course of fair
dealing toward minority holders in the way it managed the corporation's busi-
ness. It could not use its power to gain undue advantage to itself at the ex-
pense of the minority.
1 5 0
The court concluded that, although the parent had received a bene-
fit as a result of receiving cash payments from the subsidiary equal to
a portion of the subsidiary's tax savings, the subsidiary and its minor-
ity shareholders had not suffered any disadvantage from the arrange-
ment because, if the subsidiary had filed its own separate tax return,
it would have owed an even larger amount to the government in the
form of taxes. 15 1 Putting aside for the moment the merits of the
court's decision, the purpose of introducing Case at this point is to il-
lustrate that the court, in asking whether the parent had received an
advantage at the expense of the minority, was conducting a fairness
analysis. That is, if the challenged agreement had allowed the parent
to receive something at the expense of the minority, then its actions
would have been unfair and the parent would have been held
accountable.
The second case is Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co. 152 In Ahman-
son, holders of stock in a savings and loan association had only a lim-
ited market for their shares because only a small number of shares
were outstanding and, consequently, the price per share was rela-
tively high.153 One solution to this problem would have been to in-
crease the number of outstanding shares through a stock split. But a
stock split never occurred. Instead, certain of the association's con-
trolling shareholders, who held approximately 85 percent of the stock,
formed a holding corporation and transferred to it their shares in the
savings and loan. 154 In exchange, the holding corporation, which then
held a controlling interest in the savings and loan, issued a far larger
number of shares to the former controlling shareholders of the savings
148. 204 N.E.2d at 644-45; see infra Part III (discussing consolidated tax returns).
149. 204 N.E.2d at 645.
150. Id. at 645-46.
151. Id. at 647.
152. 460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969).
153. Id. at 466-67.
154. Id. at 467.
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and loan.155 The recipients then sold a portion of their holding corpo-
ration shares to public investors, but retained a sufficient number to
maintain control over the holding corporation and, through it, of the
savings and loan. 156 Thus, the controlling shareholders of the savings
and loan effectively created a market for their shares. The minority
shareholders of the savings and loan were not offered the opportunity
to participate in the initial formation of the holding corporation.157 As
a result, their shares in the savings and loan became even less mar-
ketable than they were before because investors who wished to ac-
quire an interest in the savings and loan could more readily do so by
acquiring shares of the holding corporation. The holding corporation
later offered to acquire the savings and loan shares held by minority
shareholders at a price that allegedly was below their fair market
value. 158
A minority shareholder brought suit and asserted that the control-
ling shareholders of the savings and loan had breached their fiduciary
duty to the minority. The California Supreme Court concluded that
the plaintiff had stated a valid cause of action.159 Justice Traynor,
writing for the court, first set forth the applicable rule of law:
Majority shareholders may not use their power to control corporate activities
to benefit themselves alone or in a manner detrimental to the minority. Any
use to which they put the corporation or their power to control the corporation
must benefit all shareholders proportionately and must not conflict with the
proper conduct of the corporation's business. 160
Justice Traynor returned to this rule in other portions of the opin-
ion and again emphasized that controlling shareholders cannot use
their control to gain an advantage to the exclusion or detriment of the
minority.161 If the allegations in the complaint were true, he con-
cluded, then the defendants had violated this standard and therefore
had breached their fiduciary duty to the minority.162
The court's decision in Ahmanson is best known for its decree that
controlling shareholders must use their power only in a manner that
155. See id.
156. Id. at 468.
157. Id. at 467.
158. Id. at 468-69.
159. Id. at 476.
160. Id. at 471.
161. Id. at 472 (stating that power to control "'is at all times subject to the equitable
limitation that it may not be exercised for the aggrandizement, preference, or
advantage of the fiduciary to the exclusion or detriment of the cestuis'") (quoting
Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d 66, 75 (Cal. Ct. App.
1952)); id. at 476 (stating that controlling shareholders had used their power to
"obtain an advantage not made available to all stockholders... without regard to
the resulting detriment to the minority stockholders").
162. Id. at 476, 478. It is not entirely clear from the court's opinion in Ahmanson how
the actions of the controlling shareholders constituted a misuse of their power to
control the corporation. Carter, supra note 105, at 835-36.
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benefits all shareholders proportionately. For present purposes, how-
ever, the important point is that, in saying that it was impermissible
for a controlling shareholder to use its power to receive an advantage
to the exclusion or detriment of the minority, the court was, like the
court in Case, setting forth a substantive standard of fairness. If the
controlling shareholders in Ahmanson had received such an advan-
tage, then they had acted unfairly.
The Delaware Supreme Court subsequently adopted this same ad-
vantage/disadvantage concept as a basis for evaluating transactions
between parent and subsidiary corporations, but used it in a slightly
different manner. In Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 16 3 a minority share-
holder of a subsidiary asserted that the parent had breached its fiduci-
ary duties as a controlling shareholder in three respects: (1) by
causing the subsidiary to pay excessive dividends to satisfy the par-
ent's need for cash, (2) by restricting the subsidiary's ability to develop
through a combination of having the subsidiary declare excessive divi-
dends and diverting corporate opportunities to other subsidiaries, and
(3) by causing the subsidiary not to enforce the terms of a contract
under which the subsidiary was entitled to sell a fixed, minimum
amount of certain petroleum products to another, wholly owned sub-
sidiary of the parent. 16
4
In assessing these claims, the court first addressed whether it
would review the transactions under the business judgment rule or
instead under a fairness standard: "When the situation involves a par-
ent and a subsidiary, with the parent controlling the transaction and
fixing the terms, the test of intrinsic fairness, with its resulting shift-
ing of the burden of proof, is applied."165 So far, the court's analysis is
unremarkable. Its reference to a parent controlling the terms of a
transaction with its subsidiary describes what is traditionally referred
to as "self-dealing."1 66 The court itself seemed to acknowledge this
when it added that it would apply a fairness standard to transactions
between parent and subsidiary "only when the [parent's] fiduciary
duty is accompanied by self-dealing-the situation when a parent is
on both sides of a transaction with its subsidiary."16 7 But the court
then added an important qualification: "Self-dealing occurs when the
parent, by virtue of its domination of the subsidiary, causes the sub-
sidiary to act in such a way that the parent receives something from
the subsidiary to the exclusion of, and detriment to, the minority
stockholders of the subsidiary."1
68
163. 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
164. Id. at 719.
165. Id. at 720.
166. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (discussing self-dealing).
167. 280 A.2d at 720.
168. Id.
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The court in Sinclair thus created a threshold test that plaintiffs
must satisfy in order to have a court assess the fairness of a transac-
tion between parent and subsidiary: the plaintiffs must establish that
the parent engaged in "self-dealing," defined by the court to mean that
the parent has received something to the exclusion of, and detriment
to, the minority.169 The problem in adopting this as a threshold test is
that the test is, itself, a fairness test, strikingly similar to the fairness
tests that the courts in Case and Ahmanson previously had used. The
court's decision in Sinclair thus seemingly requires a plaintiff to es-
tablish that a transaction was unfair, and if the plaintiff meets thisburden, then the court will examine the transaction to determine
whether it was fair.17o Not surprisingly, therefore, the threshold test
tends to be outcome-determinative: if a plaintiff satisfies the threshold
test, the Delaware courts typically find that the challenged transac-
tion was unfair.171
The outcome-determinative nature of Delaware's threshold test is
evident from the manner in which the court applied it to the three
claims in Sinclair. With respect to the claim that the parent had
caused the subsidiary to declare excessive dividends, the court held
that the parent had not engaged in self-dealing because it had not re-
ceived anything to the exclusion of the minority shareholders: all
shareholders received their proportionate share of the dividends.172
Accordingly, the business judgment rule applied and the plaintiff lost
on this claim.173 The plaintiffs second claim-that the parent haddiverted corporate opportunities-shared a similar fate: because theplaintiffs could not identify specific opportunities that belonged to the
subsidiary, the parent had not received any opportunities from the
subsidiary and therefore was entitled to the protection of the businessjudgment rule.174 The plaintiffs third claim, however, succeeded.
169. Courts in other jurisdictions have referred approvingly to Sinclair's definition of
self-dealing. See, e.g., Koos v Central Ohio Cellular, Inc., 641 N.E.2d 265, 276(Ohio Ct. App. 1994); Warren v. Century Bankcorporation, Inc., 741 P.2d 846, 849
n.6 (Okla. 1987).
170. Other commentators have noted this same apparent circularity problem. See
GEVURTZ, supra note 105, § 4.2, at 352-53 (describing problem and offering inter-
pretation to avoid it).
171. E.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Summa Corp., 374 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. Ch. 1977);
see also Mary E. Siegel, The Erosion of the Law of Controlling Shareholders, 24
DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 78 (1999) (arguing that Delaware courts should apply theSinclair threshold test to corporation's ordinary business transactions with con-
trolling shareholder and noting that, if the threshold test is satisfied, "a court
would be unlikely to find that the transaction was nevertheless fair"); Note, The
Fiduciary Duty of Parent to Subsidiary Corporation, 57 VA. L. REV. 1223, 1240(1971) (arguing that, if threshold test is satisfied, "it is difficult to see how a
transaction could be intrinsically fair").
172. 280 A.2d at 721-22.
173. Id. at 722.
174. Id.
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The court held that, by causing the subsidiary not to enforce the terms
of the contract with another wholly owned subsidiary of the parent,
the parent had engaged in self-dealing: the parent had received
(through its wholly owned subsidiary) petroleum products that the mi-
nority shareholders did not receive, and the minority shareholders
had suffered a detriment because the subsidiary had not insisted on
selling all of the petroleum products that it was entitled to sell under
the contract and had tolerated late payments for its products without
charging interest. 175 Accordingly, the court applied the intrinsic fair-
ness standard and concluded that the parent had treated the minority
unfairly.1 76
There may be good policy reasons for having a threshold test that
plaintiffs must satisfy before a court will place the burden on a parent
corporation to establish the fairness of its transactions with a subsidi-
ary. For example, it is common for a parent to engage in large num-
bers of transactions with its subsidiaries, 17 7 and therefore it could be
excessively disruptive if courts were willing to inquire into every
transaction and require the parent to establish its entire fairness.'7 8
On the other hand, there's a strong case to be made that, if the parent
stands on both sides of a transaction with its subsidiary in the sense
that it controls the subsidiary's board, then a court should on that ba-
sis alone review transactions between the two corporations for fair-
ness. If a parent is concerned about excessive judicial intrusion into
these intercompany transactions, it could eliminate minority interests
in its subsidiaries through a cash-out merger, or install an indepen-
dent board at the subsidiary level, or at least have significant and re-
curring transactions with subsidiaries reviewed by a committee of the
subsidiary's independent directors, which under Delaware law would
shift the burden of proof to those challenging the transaction.
Whatever its merits, the Sinclair threshold test has given rise to con-
175. Id. at 722-23.
176. Id.
177. See supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text (discussing nature of parent-sub-
sidiary relationship).
178. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DuKE L.J.
425, 441 (1993) (stating that mere fact of parent's financial interest in subsidiary
cannot trigger application of fairness test "without significantly damaging the
efficacy of our existing model of the corporation," and that courts therefore have
developed contextual rules as to when fairness test applies); Siegel, supra note
171, at 29-31, 51 (setting forth similar argument as likely rationale for Sinclair's
adoption of threshold test to determine whether business judgment rule or entire
fairness standard applies).
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fusion179 and, according to one commentator, has either been ignored
or adapted by more recent Delaware decisions.180
III. A PRIMER ON CONSOLIDATED TAX RETURNS
For federal income tax purposes,' 8 ' a corporation generally is
treated as an entity that is separate from its shareholders. A corpora-
tion is subject to income tax on its taxable income182 and must file its
own income tax return. 8 3 This remains true even if the corporation's
sole or controlling shareholder is another corporation. Thus, if P Cor-
poration owns all of the stock of S Corporation, each corporation must
separately determine its taxable income and file its own return. Since
1921, however, Congress has permitted certain closely affiliated cor-porations to elect to determine and report their income tax liability on
one, consolidated return.18 4 To a very large extent, corporations that
elect to file a consolidated return are permitted to treat themselves forincome tax purposes as divisions of a single corporation. For example,
179. Compare, e.g., Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1113 n.36 (Del. Ch. 1999)(citing Sinclair for proposition that "[s]elf-dealing attacks on the business judg-
ment rule require that there be something more than a simple transaction be-
tween a parent and its subsidiary, there must be some cognizable allegation ofwrongdoing"), with, e.g., Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490,500 n.13 (Del. Ch. 1990) (stating that circumstances under which entire fairness
standard applies to parent-subsidiary transactions in Delaware are not entirely
clear and that, contrary to Sinclair, Weinberger and other cases suggest "that toinvoke that exacting review standard, all that is required is that the parent cor-
poration have stood on both sides of the transaction").
180. Siegel, supra note 171, at 31, 51-70.
181. Corporations are subject to federal taxes other than the income tax, such as the
alternative minimum tax. I.R.C. § 55(a), (b)(1)(B) (2000). Although the determi-
nation of these other taxes can be influenced by whether a corporation joins in a
consolidated return, this Article will confine its discussion of consolidated returns
to the context of the income tax.182. I.R.C. § 11 (2000). There are exceptions to the general rule that corporations are
subject to income tax. For example, a corporation that has not more than sev-
enty-five shareholders and that meets certain other requirements can elect sta-tus as an "S corporation" that is not subject to the income tax. Id. §§ 1361(a)(1),
(b)(1), 1363(a).
183. Id. § 6012(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2(a)(1) (as amended in 1982).184. I.R.C. § 1501 (2000). Congress first permitted corporations to elect to report theirincome tax liability on a consolidated return in 1921. See Revenue Act of 1921,
ch. 136, § 240(a), 42 Stat. 227, 255. Certain affiliated corporations were required
to report excess profits tax liability on a consolidated basis beginning in 1917 and
to report income tax liability on a consolidated basis beginning in 1918. See gen-
erally United States v. Cleveland, Painesville & E.R. Co., 42 F.2d 413, 415-16(6th Cir. 1930) (discussing origin of consolidated return provisions); Regal, Inc. v.Commissioner, 53 T.C. 261, 264 & n.2, 266 & n.3 (1969) (same), affd, 435 F.2d922 (2d Cir. 1970); 1 ANDREW J. DUBROFF ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS FILING CONSOLIDATED RETURNS § 1.02 (2d ed. 1997) (same). Be-ginning with the Revenue Act of 1921, consolidated reporting of income tax liabil-
ity became elective rather than mandatory.
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if P and S file a consolidated return, then the operating loss of one
corporation can offset income of the otherl8 5 and transfers of assets
between the corporations generally are not taxable events.
1 8 6
This Part provides an overview of four topics related to consoli-
dated returns: (1) the corporations that are eligible to file a consoli-
dated return and how eligible corporations elect to file on a
consolidated basis, (2) the manner in which corporations that file a
consolidated return determine their combined income tax liability,
(3) the adjustments that are required to the stock basis and earnings
and profits of corporations that file a consolidated return, and (4) how
the combined income tax liability of corporations that file a consoli-
dated return is allocated for federal tax purposes among the corpora-
tions that join in the return.
A. Eligibility and Election to File a Consolidated Return
1. Eligibility to File a Consolidated Return
To file a consolidated return, corporations must bear a sufficiently
close relationship to each other and meet certain other requirements.
Specifically, two or more corporations can file a consolidated return
only if they constitute an "affiliated group" of corporations.
187
The term "affiliated group" is defined as one or more chains of "in-
cludible corporations" that are connected through specified amounts of
stock ownership with a common parent that is itself an includible cor-
poration.' 8 8 An "includible corporation" is any corporation other than
one of several specifically enumerated corporations.'
8 9 The corpora-
tions that are not includible corporations generally are either exempt
from tax or subject to special taxing regimes. 190
To constitute an affiliated group, a chain of includible corporations
must meet two stock ownership requirements. First, the common par-
ent must own directly stock in at least one of the other corporations
that possesses at least 80 percent of the total voting power of the other
corporation's stock and has a value equal to at least 80 percent of the
total value of the other corporation's stock. 19 1 Second, at least 80 per-
185. See infra section III.B.
186. See infra section III.B.
187. I.R.C. § 1501 (2000).
188. Id. § 1504(a)(1).
189. Id. § 1504(b).
190. See id. For example, a subchapter S corporation, which is subject to the pass-
through tax regime of subchapter S of the Code, is not an includible corporation.
Id. § 1504(b)(8); see supra note 182 (noting that S corporations are not subject to
the income tax).
191. I.R.C. § 1504(a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(2) (2000). Certain nonvoting preferred stock is not
treated as "stock" for purposes of applying the stock ownership requirements. Id.
§ 1504(a)(4). This rule permits corporations to raise capital by issuing preferred
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cent (again measured by both vote and value) of the stock of each cor-
poration in the chain (other than that of the common parent) must be
owned directly by one or more of the other corporations in the
chain.192 Thus, provided that they are both includible corporations, if
P Corporation owns 80 percent of the only class of stock of S Corpora-
tion, then the two corporations would constitute an affiliated group of
corporations. Similarly, provided that they are all includible corpora-
tions, if P owns all of the stock of both S1 and S2, and S1 and S2 each
own 40 percent of the only class of stock of S3, then P, S1, S2 and S3
would constitute an affiliated group of corporations that is eligible to
file a consolidated return.
2. Election to File a Consolidated Return
An affiliated group of corporations exercises its privilege of filing a
consolidated return simply by filing the return. 193 The form used is
the standard income tax return used by corporations, Form 1120,194
which the parent files for the group along with certain attach-
ments. 195 For example, the return must be accompanied by an affilia-
tions schedule that lists the members of the group and indicates how
they are related to each other196 and by other schedules that permit
the Internal Revenue Service (the "Service") to determine to which
member specific items of income and deduction are attributable.197
The consolidated return must be filed based on the taxable year of the
common parent, and each member of the group must adopt the par-
ent's taxable year.198
stock to third parties and yet continue to meet the levels of stock ownership re-
quired for filing a consolidated return.192. Id. § 1504(a)(1)(B)(ii), (a)(2).
193. If an affiliated group desires to file a consolidated return, and the group did not
file a consolidated return in the preceding taxable year, then each member must
consent to the regulations under Section 1502 of the Code by joining in the filing
of the return, which the member generally does by executing IRS Form 1122 and
attaching it to the group's consolidated return. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-75(a)(1),(b)(1), (h)(2) (as amended in 2001). If an affiliated group filed a consolidated re-
turn in the previous taxable year, then-as discussed in the text-the group gen-
erally must continue to do so for future taxable years in which the group remains
in existence. If a subsidiary becomes part of an affiliated group that filed a con-
solidated return in the previous year because group members acquired the requi-
site 80 percent of the subsidiary's stock, then the subsidiary need not give formal
consent on Form 1122. Id. § 1.1502-75(h)(2). In effect, the subsidiary is deemed
to consent to the consolidated return regulations. 1 DUBROFF, supra note 184,
§ 13.02[1] [a] [ii].
194. Treas. Reg. § 1.6 012-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1982).
195. Id. § 1.1502-75(h)(1) (as amended in 2001).
196. See id. (referring to required affiliations schedule on Form 851).
197. See id. § 1.1502-75(j).
198. Id. § 1.1502-76(a)(1).
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An affiliated group that elects to file a consolidated return must
continue to do so for all future taxable years unless the group receives
the Service's permission to discontinue filing on a consolidated ba-
sis.199 In general, the Service will grant a group permission to discon-
tinue filing consolidated returns only "for good cause shown."
2 00 One
situation in which the Service normally grants such permission is
when changes to the federal tax law have a substantial adverse effect
on the group's tax liability relative to what the aggregate tax liability
of the members would be if they each filed separate returns.
2 0 1 The
election to file a consolidated return thus is a decision with which the
group's members may have to live for an extended period of time even
if the election turns out to be disadvantageous for one or more
members.
Subject to very limited exceptions, a group's common parent acts
as the sole agent for each subsidiary in the group in connection with
all matters that relate to the group's federal tax liability.
2 02 A subsid-
iary in the group generally has no ability to act for or represent itself
in these matters.2 03 For example, the common parent files the group's
return,20 4 generally makes any elections that affect the computation
of a subsidiary's taxable income, 20 5 and carries on all correspondence
with the Service concerning the group's tax liability.20 6 If the group
seeks a refund of tax previously paid, the common parent must file the
claim for refund. 20 7 The Service generally will pay any refund to the
common parent, regardless of which group members actually paid the
tax or made the refund possible by contributing deductions or credits,
and the Service's payment to the common parent discharges the gov-
ernment's liability for the refund to any subsidiary.20 8 The Code au-
199. Id. § 1.1502-75(a)(2), (c)(1)(i).
200. Id. § 1.1502-75(c)(1)(i).
201. Id. § 1.1502-75(c)(1)(ii).
202. Id. § 1.1502-77(a)(1)(i) (2002). See generally 1 DUBROFF, supra note 184, § 14.01
(discussing common parent's role as agent for the group).
203. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-77(a)(3) (2002). The Service can choose, however, to deal
directly with a subsidiary within the group, in which case the subsidiary acquires
the ability to act for itself rather than through the common parent. See id.
§ 1.1502-77(a)(6)(i).
204. Id. § 1.1502-75(h)(1) (as amended in 2001).
205. Id. § 1.1502-77(a)(2)(i) (2002). For example, if any subsidiary in the group holds
stock in a passive foreign investment company ("PFIC"), then only the common
parent can make for the subsidiary the election under Section 1295(a) to treat the
PFIC as a qualified electing fund, which causes the subsidiary to be taxed cur-
rently on its pro rata share of the PFIC's ordinary earnings and net capital gain.
Id. § 1.1295-1(d)(4) (as amended in 2000); see also I.R.C. § 1293(a) (2000) (provid-
ing for tax treatment of qualified electing funds); id. § 1295(a) (providing for
treatment of PFICs as qualified electing funds).
206. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-77(a)(2)(ii) (2002).
207. Id. § 1.1502-77(a)(2)(v).
208. Id.
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thorizes the Service, however, to pay a refund to a statutory or court-
appointed fiduciary of an insolvent member of an affiliated group to
the extent that the refund is attributable to losses or credits of the
insolvent member.2O9 Pursuant to this authority, the Service has is-
sued regulations that authorize payment of an affiliated group's re-
fund to the fiduciary of an insolvent financial institution within the
group. 2 10 This rule is procedural and does not determine ownership of
the refund as among the members of the group.2 11
B. The Determination of a Consolidated Group's Tax
Liability
An affiliated group of corporations that elects to file a consolidated
return (a "consolidated group")2 12 will have income tax liability only if
the group considered as a whole has taxable income. A consolidated
group's taxable income is referred to as its "consolidated taxable in-
come."213 The group's liability for income tax is determined by apply-
ing the corporate income tax rates to its consolidated taxable
income.214 On the other hand, a consolidated group could have a net
operating loss for the year, which is referred to as its "consolidated net
operating loss."215 If the group has a consolidated net operating loss,
then it will have no income tax liability for the year and, subject to
certain limitations, can use the loss to offset income in prior or future
taxable years. 2 16 This section explains how a group determines its
consolidated taxable income (or loss) and illustrates the application of
the corporate income tax rates.
209. I.R.C. § 6402(j) (2000). See generally 2 DUBROFF, supra note 184, § 41.0419][b]
(discussing Section 6402(j)).
210. Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-7(a) (as amended in 1999).
211. Id. § 301.6402-7(j); see also T.D. 8446, 1992-2 C.B. 306, 308 (stating that common
parent can seek to recover any refund paid to the fiduciary of an insolvent subsid-
iary under principles of state law).
212. The regulations that govern the tax treatment of corporations that file a consoli-
dated return use the term "consolidated group" to refer to an affiliated group that
files or is required to file a consolidated return. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-1(a), (h) (as
amended in 1999).
213. See id. § 1.1502-11(a).
214. Id. § 1.1502-2(a).
215. Id. § 1.1502-21(e) (as amended in 2002).
216. See I.R.C. § 172(a), (b)(1)(A) (2000) (permitting net operating loss to be carried
back two years and forward twenty years); Job Creation and Worker Assistance
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, § 102(a), 116 Stat. 21, 25 (to be codified at I.R.C.
§ 172(b)(1)(H)) (permitting losses incurred in 2001 and 2002 to be carried back
five years, rather than two); Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-21(a), (b)(1) (as amended in
2002) (stating that consolidated net operating loss can be carried to other years
subject to principles of Section 172). See generally 2 DUBROFF, supra note 184,
§ 41.04[1].
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1. Consolidated Taxable Income
The process of determining consolidated taxable income can be bro-
ken down into three basic steps: (1) each member's separate taxable
income must be determined, (2) certain items that are determined on
a group basis, known as "consolidated items," must be calculated, and
(3) the members' separate taxable incomes and the group's consoli-
dated items are aggregated. Each of these steps is discussed below.
a. The Determination of Each Member's Separate Taxable
Income
(1) In General
Subject to certain adjustments, 2 17 each member of a consolidated
group must determine its separate taxable income in accordance with
the provisions of the Code that normally apply in determining a corpo-
ration's taxable income.2 18 A corporation's taxable income is gener-
ally defined as its gross income less any deductions to which it is
entitled. 2 19 Accordingly, each member of a consolidated group must
identify its items of gross income, such as its normal business prof-
its,220 and subtract its items of deduction, such as depreciation on
equipment used in the corporation's business. 22 1 Each member's sep-
arate taxable income could be either a positive or a negative figure,
which will depend on whether the member's aggregate items of gross
income exceed its aggregate deductions or whether the converse is
true.2 22 If a member has a negative separate taxable income, it has
not necessarily incurred an "operating loss" in the traditional tax
sense of that term22 3 because, as discussed below, a corporation must
determine its separate taxable income by omitting several items that
a corporation normally would take into account in determining taxa-
ble income, such as capital gains. 22 4 That is, a member's separate tax-
able income is not necessarily equivalent to the taxable income or loss
that the corporation would have if it filed a separate return.22 5 Sepa-
rate taxable income "is merely an accounting construct devised as an
interim step in computing a group's [consolidated taxable income]."226
217. See infra notes 226-41 and accompanying text.
218. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-12 (as amended in 1999).
219. I.R.C. § 63(a) (2000).
220. Id. § 61(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-3(a) (as amended in 1992).
221. See I.R.C. § 167(a) (2000).
222. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-12 (as amended in 1999) (stating that separate taxable
income of member includes "a case in which deductions exceed gross income").
223. See I.R.C. § 172(c) (2000) (defining "net operating loss" as the amount by which
deductions exceed gross income).
224. See infra notes 242-52 and accompanying text.
225. United Dominion Indus., Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 832 (2001).
226. Id. at 835.
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(2) Special Adjustments in Determining Separate Taxable
Income
Although the separate taxable income of each member of a consoli-
dated group is determined in accordance with generally applicable
provisions of the Code, several special adjustments are required. In
general, these adjustments take into account the fact that the group's
tax liability is being determined as if the group were a single taxpay-
ing unit. This section will discuss two of the more significant adjust-
ments: (1) the adjustments for transactions between members, known
as "intercompany transactions," and (2) the omission of consolidated
items, which are items that are determined on a group rather than an
individual basis.
(a) Intercompany Transactions
In determining its separate taxable income, each member of a con-
solidated group must take into account transactions with other group
members in accordance with the rules for intercompany transac-
tions. 22 7 An intercompany transaction is broadly defined as "a trans-
action between corporations that are members of the same
consolidated group immediately after the transaction."2 28 Some of the
more common transactions that constitute intercompany transactions
when they occur between group members are a member's sale of prop-
erty, 2 2 9 performance of services, 23 0 payment of interest on a loan,231
and distribution of cash or property with respect to the member's
stock.232 The general effect of the intercompany transaction rules is
to treat the group members that are parties to a transaction as if they
were a single entity, i.e., divisions of a single corporation. Neverthe-
less, as illustrated below, in certain ways the members continue to be
recognized as separate entities.
A sale of property from one member of a consolidated group to an-
other provides a good illustration of the general effect of the intercom-
pany transaction rules. When one member sells property to another,
the sale has no immediate effect on the separate taxable income of
either corporation. If the selling member realizes a gain or loss from
the sale, that gain or loss generally is deferred until the property is
227. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-12(a) (as amended in 1999) (requiring transactions between
members to be reflected according to the provisions of § 1.1502-13); id. § 1.1502-
13(a)(1) (as amended in 2000) (setting forth rules for taking into account in-
tercompany transactions).
228. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-13(b)(1)(i) (as amended in 2000).
229. Id. § 1.1502-13(b)(1)(i)(A), (c)(7) (example 1).
230. Id. § 1.1502-13(b)(1)(i)(B), (c)(7) (example 7).
231. Id. § 1.1502-13(b)(1)(i)(C), (g)(5) (example 1).
232. Id. § 1.1502-13(b)(1)(i)(D), (M(7) (example 1).
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transferred to a non-member. 23 3 The selling and buying members
thus are treated as a single entity with respect to the timing of their
recognition of gain or loss. If the buying member later sells the prop-
erty to a non-member, then the original selling member and the buy-
ing member each must take into account in determining their
separate taxable incomes any gain or loss from the property that ac-
crued while they held it. Thus, with respect to the amount and loca-
tion of the gain or loss within the group, the two corporations are
recognized as separate entities. The character of the gain or loss that
each corporation takes into account is determined by reference to the
dominant purpose for which the selling and buying members held the
property, e.g., as investment property or as inventory,23 4 and each
member is treated as holding the property for the aggregate period
that the two members held it.235 These rules as to character and hold-
ing period reflect a single entity theory. In summary, with respect to a
sale of property, the two corporations are treated as a single entity
with one exception: the amount and location of the gain or loss within
the group are determined on a separate entity basis. 23 6 Even this sep-
arate entity treatment is, in a sense, temporary, because the separate
taxable incomes of the two corporations ultimately are combined to
determine consolidated taxable income.2 37
To illustrate, assume that P Corporation and its wholly owned sub-
sidiary, S Corporation, are members of a consolidated group. In year
1, S purchases a parcel of unimproved land as an investment for
$60,000. Nine months later, in year 2, S sells the land to P for cash
equal to the land's current fair market value, $90,000. In year 3, P,
who also holds the land as an investment, sells the land to an unre-
lated third party for $100,000. If P's method of accounting requires P
to recognize gain from the sale in year 3, then in year 3 P will include
gain of $10,000 in determining its separate taxable income and S will
include gain of $30,000 in determining its separate taxable income. 238
233. Id. § 1.1502-13(a)(2). Certain other events, such as the buying member's recovery
of the cost of the property through depreciation deductions or the buying or sell-
ing member's ceasing to be a member of the consolidated group also can cause the
selling member to recognize gain or loss. See id. § 1.1502-13(c)(7) (example 4)
(involving intercompany sale of depreciable property); id. § 1.1502-13(d)(3) (ex-
ample 1) (involving selling or buying member ceasing to be group member).
234. See id. § 1.1502-13(b)(6) (as amended in 2000) (treating character of gain or loss
as an "attribute"); id. § 1.1502-13(c)(1)(i) (requiring that attributes be determined
so as to produce the effect of treating selling and buying members as divisions of
single corporation); see also id. § 1.1502-13(c)(7)(ii) (example 2) (illustrating de-
termination of character).
235. Id. § 1.1502-13(c)(1)(ii).
236. Id. § 1.1502-13(a)(2) (discussing single and separate entity treatment).
237. See infra subsection III.B.l.c.
238. The regulations implement this treatment through three defined terms. In the
example in the text, the $30,000 gain that accrued while S held the property is
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Because the dominant purpose for which the two corporations held the
land was as an investment, and because each corporation is treated as
holding the land for the aggregate period that they both held it, each
corporation's gain will be long-term capital gain.23 9
(b) The Omission of Consolidated Items from Separate
Taxable Income
Each member of a consolidated group must determine its separate
taxable income by omitting certain items that a corporation normally
would take into account in determining its taxable income. 240 As an
example, a member must determine its separate taxable income by
omitting any capital gains and losses.241 The tax consequences of
these items, known as "consolidated items," are taken into account on
a group rather than an individual basis. These items are the subject
of the next section.
S's "intercompany item." See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-13(b)(2)(i) (as amended in
2000). The $10,000 gain that accrued while P held the property is P's "corre-
sponding item." Id. § 1.1502-13(b)(3)(i). The "recomputed corresponding item" is
the corresponding item that P would take into account if P and S were divisions
of a single corporation. Id. § 1.1502-13(b)(4). Here, because a transfer of prop-
erty from one division to another is not a taxable event, the recomputed corre-
sponding item would be $40,000, the aggregate gain that accrued while P and S
held the land. The regulations require P to take its corresponding item ($10,000
of gain) into account under its normal method of accounting. See id. § 1.1502-
13(c)(2)(i). S must take its intercompany item (gain of $30,000) into account to
reflect the difference between the corresponding item that P takes into account
for the year (gain of $10,000) and the recomputed corresponding item (gain of
$40,000). Thus, S's gain recognition (as well as P's) is deferred until P transfers
the land outside the consolidated group. See id. § 1.1502-13(c)(7)(ii) (example
1(a)-(d)) (illustrating intercompany sale of property). If the property had declined
in value while P held it, say to $50,000, then when P sold the land in year 3 its
corresponding item would have been a $40,000 loss (P paid $90,000 for the land
and sold it for $50,000) and the recomputed corresponding item would have been
a $10,000 loss (S's original purchase price of $60,000 less $50,000 realized from
the sale in year 3). In year 3, if P's method of accounting required it to take into
account its $40,000 loss, then S would take into account its intercompany item to
reflect the difference between P's $40,000 loss (the corresponding item) and a
$10,000 loss (the recomputed corresponding item), or a $30,000 gain. On a net
basis (P's $40,000 loss and S's $30,000 gain), the two corporations would have
taken into account a $10,000 loss. See id. § 1.1502-13(c)(7)(ii) (example 1(f)) (il-
lustrating intercompany gain followed by sale to nonmember at a loss).
239. See I.R.C. §§ 1221(a), 1222(3) (2000). If S and P had held the land for different
purposes, e.g., if S had held the land as an investment but the land had consti-
tuted inventory in the hands of P, then the character of the gain recognized in
year 3 by one of the corporations would have to be redetermined to produce the
effect of treating S and P as divisions of a single corporation. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1502-13(c)(1)(i) (as amended in 2000). For example, the $30,000 gain that S
recognizes might be treated as ordinary income even though S held the land as
an investment. Id.; see also id. § 1.1502-13(c)(7)(ii) (example 2).
240. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-12(h)-(n) (as amended in 1999).
241. Id. § 1.1502-12(j).
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b. The Determination of Consolidated Items
The second step in determining a group's consolidated taxable in-
come is to calculate the group's consolidated items. As mentioned ear-
lier, these are items that a corporation normally would take into
account in determining its taxable income but that each group mem-
ber must omit in determining its separate taxable income. 24 2 The
purpose of this omission is to permit the group to determine the tax
consequences of these items on an aggregate basis. In general, consol-
idated items are items that are subject to limitations or special tax
treatment. Aggregate treatment of these items permits the limita-
tions or special tax treatment to be determined on a group-wide basis.
The goal of this aggregate treatment is to reflect the tax liability of the
group as a whole more accurately than would be the case if each mem-
ber took these consolidated items into account individually.
Several items are subject to aggregate, or consolidated treatment.
These include deductions for net operating losses,243 capital gains and
losses,2 44 Section 1231 gains and losses,24 5 deductions for charitable
contributions, 24 6 and certain deductions for dividends received.
24 7
As an example, assume that P Corporation and its wholly owned
subsidiary, S Corporation, are members of a consolidated group and
that the group's only capital or section 1231 items for the year are P's
$100,000 long-term capital gain and S's $80,000 long-term capital
loss. In determining their separate taxable incomes, P would exclude
242. See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
243. See I.R.C. § 172(a) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-12(h) (as amended in 1999) (re-
quiring net operating loss deduction to be omitted from a member's separate tax-
able income); id. § 1.1502-21 (as amended in 2002) (setting forth rules for
determining consolidated net operating loss deduction). A net operating loss de-
duction is a deduction for an operating loss that arose not in the current taxable
year, but rather in a different taxable year.
244. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-12(j) (as amended in 1999) (requiring capital gains and
losses to be omitted from a member's separate taxable income); id. § 1.1502-22
(1999) (setting forth rules for determining consolidated capital gain net income).
245. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-12(k) (as amended in 1999) (requiring Section 1231
gains and losses to be omitted from a member's separate taxable income); id.
§ 1.1502-23 (1999) (setting forth rules for determining consolidated net Section
1231 gain or loss).
246. See I.R.C. § 170(a), (b)(2) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-12(1) (as amended in 1999)
(requiring deductions for charitable contributions to be omitted from a member's
separate taxable income); id. § 1.1502-24 (as amended in 1966) (setting forth
rules for determining consolidated charitable contribution deduction).
247. See I.R.C. §§ 243(a)(1), 244(a), 245, 247 (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-12(n) (as
amended in 1999) (requiring deductions for dividends received to be omitted from
a member's separate taxable income); Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-26 (as amended in
1999) (setting forth rules for determining consolidated dividends received deduc-
tion); id. § 1.1502-27 (as amended in 1980) (setting forth rules for determining
consolidated Section 247 deduction).
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the gain from its gross income and S would not deduct the loss. 248
Instead, P and S would aggregate the two items, which would result in
a net gain of $20,000.249 This net gain-referred to as the group's
"consolidated capital gain net income"2 5 O-would be added to the com-
bined separate taxable incomes of the two corporations. 25 1 In this ex-
ample, the effect of treating these items on an aggregate basis is to
permit S's $80,000 deduction to offset P's $100,000 of income. In con-
trast, if P and S each were required to take these items into account in
determining their separate taxable incomes, P's separate taxable in-
come would be $100,000 higher and, unless S had capital gains of its
own, S's deduction would go unused because corporations are permit-
ted to deduct capital losses only to the extent of their capital gains. 252
Permitting P and S to aggregate their capital gain and loss thus
reduces the group's consolidated taxable income and, consequently,
the tax liability of the group as a whole.
c. The Members' Separate Taxable Incomes and Consolidated
Items are Combined
The third and final step in determining a group's consolidated tax-
able income is to aggregate the two categories of items previously dis-
cussed: (1) the members' separate taxable incomes (or losses), and
(2) the group's consolidated items. The result is the group's consoli-
dated taxable income.253
As an illustration, assume that P Corporation and its wholly
owned subsidiary, S Corporation, are members of a consolidated group
and have the following tax items for the year:
P S
Separate Taxable Income (Loss): $ 1,200,000 $(200,000)
Capital Gain: $ 100,000
Capital Loss: $ (80,000)
Charitable Contribution Deduction: $ (20,000)
Based on these figures, the P-S group has two consolidated items:
consolidated capital gain net income of $20,000 (P's capital gain less
S's capital loss) 2 54 and a consolidated charitable contribution deduc-
248. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-12(j) (as amended in 1999).
249. See id. § 1.1502-22(a)(1) (1999).
250. Id. § 1.1502-22(a).
251. See infra subsection III.B.l.c.
252. I.R.C. § 1211(a) (2000).
253. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-11(a) (as amended in 1999) (stating that consolidated
taxable income is determined by taking into account each member's separate tax-
able income and all consolidated items).
254. See id. § 1.1502-22(a) (1999).
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tion of $20,000.255 The group's consolidated taxable income is the sum
of each member's separate taxable income or loss and the two consoli-
dated items, as follows:
P-S Group
Combined Separate Taxable Incomes (Losses): $1,000,000
Consolidated Capital Gain Net Income: 20,000
Consolidated Charitable Contribution Deduction: (20,000)
Consolidated Taxable Income: $1,000,000
2. Application of the Corporate Income Tax Rates
Once a group has determined its consolidated taxable income, it
determines its liability for income tax256 by applying the normal cor-
porate income tax rates and then subtracting any tax credits to which
the group is entitled. 2 57 In the previous example, the P-S group's con-
solidated taxable income was $1,000,000. Under the rate structure
set forth in Section 11, the P-S group's consolidated taxable income
would be subject to tax at a flat rate of 34 percent and the group's
income tax liability therefore would be $340,000.258 Any tax credits to
which the group is entitled, such as the foreign tax credit,2 59 would
reduce its income tax liability.
C. Adjustments to Stock Basis and Earnings and Profits
Although the members of a consolidated group of corporations con-
stitute a collection of separate entities, the consolidated return rules
generally strive to treat the group as a single entity. Two required
adjustments help implement single entity treatment: (1) the adjust-
ments to the basis of stock that one member holds in another, and
255. See id. § 1.1502-24(a) (as amended in 1966).
256. As previously mentioned, a consolidated group is subject to federal taxes other
than the income tax, such as the alternative minimum tax, but this Article's dis-
cussion of a consolidated group's tax liability is limited to the income tax. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-2(b)-(h) (as amended in 1999) (listing other taxes to which
consolidated group is subject).
257. See I.R.C. § 11 (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-2 (as amended in 1999).
258. The rates of tax imposed by Section 11 range from 15 percent to 35 percent. See
I.R.C. § 11(b) (2000). In the example in the text, the highest rate of tax that
would apply to the P-S group's consolidated taxable income of $1,000,000 is 34
percent. Although Section 11 appears to impose tax at the rates of 15 percent
and 25 percent on the P-S group's first $75,000 of consolidated taxable income,
the statute eliminates the benefit of these two lower rates by requiring that,
when a corporation's taxable income exceeds $100,000, its tax liability is in-
creased by the lesser of (i) 5 percent of the amount by which taxable income ex-
ceeds $100,000, or (ii) $11,750. See id.
259. See I.R.C. § 901 (2000). The group's tax credits generally are determined on a
consolidated basis. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-4 (as amended in 2000) (setting
forth rules for computation of consolidated foreign tax credit).
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(2) the adjustments to each member's earnings and profits. Each of
these adjustments is discussed below.
1. Stock Basis Adjustments
When one member of a consolidated group of corporations holds
stock of another member, the holder must adjust its basis in the stock
to reflect certain income, expenses, and distributions of the other
member. 260 Without these adjustments, the two corporations would
be treated as separate taxable entities. For example, assume that P
Corporation forms S Corporation and contributes $1,000,000 to S in
exchange for all of S's stock. P would have a basis in S's stock of
$1,000,000.261 IfS has taxable income for the year of $100,000, and if
the value of S's stock correspondingly rises by $100,000, then the in-
come effectively could be taxed twice: once when S earns it and a sec-
ond time if and when P sells the stock of S for $1,100,000. The
mechanism that the consolidated return rules use to avoid this result
is to permit P to increase its basis in S's stock by $100,000.262
The required adjustments to stock basis under the consolidated re-
turn rules derive from, and are quite similar to, the adjustments re-
quired for shareholders of a subchapter S corporation and partners in
a partnership. 26 3 Specifically, if P holds stock of S and the two corpo-
rations are members of the same consolidated group, then P must ad-
just its basis in the stock of S to reflect four items: (1) S's taxable
income or loss, (2) S's tax-exempt income, (3) S's noncapital, nonde-
ductible expenses, and (4) distributions that S makes to P in P's capac-
ity as a shareholder. 2 64 Each adjustment merits a brief explanation.
P must make a positive adjustment to its basis in S's stock for S's
taxable income and a negative adjustment for S's taxable loss. 26 5 For
260. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-12(o) (as amended in 1999); id. § 1.1502-32(a)(1) (as
amended in 2002).
261. See I.R.C. § 1012 (2000); cf. id. § 358(a)(1) (stating that, subject to certain adjust-
ments, shareholder's basis in stock received in exchange for asset shareholder
transferred to corporation in nonrecognition transaction under Section 351 is ba-
sis of property transferred to corporation).
262. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32(b)(2)(i) (as amended in 2002); see also id. § 1.1502-
32(a)(1) (describing purpose of the basis adjustment mechanism).
263. See I.R.C. § 1367(a) (2000) (setting forth adjustments for shareholder of sub-
chapter S corporation); id. § 705(a) (setting forth adjustments for partner in a
partnership); T.D. 8560, 1994-2 C.B. 200, 202 (stating that stock basis adjust-
ments under consolidated return rules are similar to rules that apply to partner-
ships and S corporations). The current basis adjustment rules became effective
in 1995. For a discussion of the pre-1995 basis adjustment system and the rea-
sons for its revision, see 2 DUBROFF, supra note 184, § 51.02; James L. Dahlberg,
Aggregate vs. Entity: Adjusting the Basis of Stock in a Subsidiary Filing a Con-
solidated Return, 42 TAX L. REV. 547, 553-63 (1987).
264. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32(b)(2) (as amended in 2002).
265. Id. § 1.1502-32(b)(5)(ii) (examples 1(a) and 2(a)).
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this purpose, S's taxable income or loss is determined by including S's
items of income, gain, deduction and loss that are taken into account
in determining the group's consolidated taxable income or lOSS. 2 6 6 S's
tax-exempt income gives rise to a positive adjustment to P's stock ba-
sis in order to preserve the tax-exempt nature of the income, i.e., the
benefit of the exemption would be lost if the income increased the
value of S's stock and P were not permitted to increase its stock basis
accordingly. 26 7 S's noncapital, nondeductible expenses generally are
nondeductible expenses that decrease the basis of S's assets. 268 Ex-
amples of such expenses include fines and penalties that S pays to a
governmental entity26 9 and S's share of the group's federal income tax
liability. 270 P is required to reduce its basis in S's stock for these ex-
penses in order to preserve their nondeductible nature.2 7 1 Absent a
negative adjustment, the expenses effectively would provide P with a
potential loss deduction by reducing the value of S's stock.272 Distri-
butions that S makes to P in P's capacity as a shareholder reduces P's
basis in S's stock to reflect the fact that P effectively is withdrawing
some of its investment in S.273
The reductions that P must make to its basis in the stock of S could
exceed P's basis. For example, assume that P's basis in the stock of S
is $1,000,000. During the current taxable year, S might incur a taxa-
ble loss of $1,100,000 or make a cash distribution to P of the same
amount. This situation can arise only when S's loss or distribution is
funded with capital that is not reflected in P's basis, such as funds
that S has borrowed from creditors or that S has received as contribu-
tions to capital from minority shareholders. In analogous situations
outside the consolidated return context, in order to avoid the "tax ta-
266. Id. § 1.1502-32(b)(3)(i). S's deductions and losses are treated as taken into ac-
count in determining consolidated taxable income to the extent that they are ab-
sorbed by S or by any other group member. Id.
267. See Preamble to Proposed Investment Adjustment Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg.
53,634, 53,637 (Nov. 12, 1992) (discussing basis adjustments for tax-exempt
income).
268. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32(b)(3)(iii)(A) (as amended in 2002).
269. See I.R.C. § 162(f) (2000).
270. See id. § 275(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32(b)(3)(iii)(A) (as amended in 2002).
271. Preamble to Proposed Investment Adjustment Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 53,634,
53,637 (Nov. 12, 1992) (discussing basis adjustments for noncapital, nondeduct-
ible expenses).
272. There are limitations on P's ability to recognize a loss from the sale of S's stock.
See Rite Aid Corp. v. United States, 255 F.3d 1357, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding
that Treasury Department's regulation disallowing loss on sale of subsidiary's
stock by member of consolidated group is invalid); T.D. 8984, 2002-13 I.R.B. 668
(revising regulations in response to Rite Aid decision); T.D. 8998, 2002-26 I.R.B. 1
(same).
273. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32(b)(5) (example 5(a), (b)) (as amended in 2002).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
boo" of having a negative basis,274 P would be required to reduce its
basis to zero and either (i) hold the $100,000 excess loss in suspense
(i.e., defer taking it into account for federal income tax purposes), if it
is S's loss that would drive P's basis below zero,2 75 or (ii) recognize
gain of $100,000, if it is S's distribution that would create a negative
basis.276 In the consolidated return context, however, P is required
neither to suspend a portion of S's loss nor to recognize gain. Instead,
P would have the equivalent of a $100,000 negative basis in S's stock.
In technical terms, the $100,000 negative adjustment that would re-
duce P's basis below zero would give rise to a $100,000 "excess loss
account."277 An excess loss account is treated as a negative basis. 278
Thus, assuming no further adjustments, if P were to sell the stock of S
the following year for $50,000, P would recognize a gain of
$150,000.279
Adjustments to stock basis are required as of the close of each taxa-
ble year and at any other time that an adjustment is necessary to de-
termine the tax liability of any person. 28O Thus, in the previous
example, P would have to determine its basis in the stock of S as of the
close of each taxable year and also at other times when P's basis is
relevant, such as P's mid-year sale of the stock of S. The specific ad-
justments that P makes to its basis in S's stock must be reflected in
permanent records that are sufficiently detailed so as to facilitate the
group's application of the basis adjustment rules and the Service's
ability to examine the adjustments made. 281
In furtherance of the goal of treating the members of a consolidated
group as a single entity, any adjustments that a member makes to its
basis in the stock of a lower-tier member must be reflected in the basis
of the member's own stock in the hands of a higher-tier member. 28 2
This requirement commonly is referred to as the "tiering up" of basis
adjustments. For example, assume that P holds all of the stock of S, S
holds all of the stock of S2, and all three corporations are members of
the same consolidated group. Also assume that S and S2 have taxable
274. See STEPHEN A. LIND, STEPHEN SCHWARZ, DANIEL J. LATHROPE & JOSHUA D. Ro-
SENBERG, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE TAXATION 73 (5th ed. 2002) (referring to
negative basis as a "tax taboo"); see, e.g., I.R.C. § 733 (2000) (requiring basis of
partner's interest in partnership to be reduced for specified items "but not below
zero"); id. § 1367(a)(2) (providing same rule as to shareholder's basis in stock of S
corporation).
275. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 704(d), 1366(d)(1)-(2) (2000).
276. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 301(c)(3)(A), 357(c)(1), 731(a)(1), 1368(b)(2) (2000).
277. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-19(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 1997).
278. Id. § 1.1502-19(a)(2)(ii).
279. See id. § 1.1502-19(b)(1).
280. Id. § 1.1502-32(b)(1)(i) (as amended in 2002).
281. Id. § 1.1502-32(g); T.D. 8560, 1994-2 C.B. 200, 205 (discussing requirement of
permanent records of basis adjustments).
282. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32(a)(3)(iii) (as amended in 2002).
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incomes for the current year of $100,000 and $50,000 respectively, and
that there are no other items that would give rise to basis adjust-
ments. As of the end of the taxable year, S and P each must determine
their basis in the stock of other members. S would increase its basis
in the stock of S2 by $50,000, and P would increase its basis in the
stock of S by both $50,000 to reflect S2"s taxable income and $100,000
to reflect S's taxable income. 28 3 These adjustments ensure that the
taxable incomes of S and S2 will not effectively be taxed a second time
if S sells the stock of S2 or if P sells the stock of S.
The previous discussion and examples of stock basis adjustments
have assumed that one member of a consolidated group, P, holds all of
the stock of a second member, S. If P holds less than all of S's stock,
then P must adjust its basis in the stock of S to reflect only the portion
of S's adjustment-producing items that are attributable to the stock
that P holds.284 For example, assume that S has one class of common
stock outstanding, of which P owns 80 percent and nonmembers own
the remaining 20 percent. If S has taxable income for the year of
$100,000, then P must increase its basis in the stock of S by the por-
tion of S's taxable income that is allocable to the stock owned by P, or
$80,000.285 The nonmembers would make no adjustment to their ba-
sis in the stock of S.286
2. Adjustments to Earnings and Profits
The second required adjustment that helps implement single en-
tity treatment of a consolidated group of corporations is the adjust-
ment to each member's earnings and profits.
The term "earnings and profits" is not defined in the Code or in the
Treasury Department's regulations. Nevertheless, the function and
underlying concept of the term are fairly clear. In concept, a corpora-
tion's earnings and profits account represents its economic profit or
loss. The concept is analogous to, but in some respects quite different
from, the accounting concept of retained earnings. In terms of func-
tion, the earnings and profits account serves as a device for distin-
guishing between the corporation's distribution of earnings and its
return of the shareholders' invested capital. This distinction is neces-
sary from a federal tax perspective in order to determine the tax con-
sequences to the shareholders of corporate distributions.
Distributions of earnings are taxable to shareholders, but returns of
capital are not. More specifically, when a shareholder receives a dis-
tribution, the shareholder must include the distribution in gross in-
283. See id. § 1.1502-32(b)(5) (example 7).
284. See id. § 1.1502-32(c)(1).
285. See id. § 1.1502-32(c)(2)(i), (c)(5) (example l(a)-(b)).
286. See id.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
come to the extent that it constitutes a dividend,287 and a distribution
constitutes a dividend to the extent that it is treated as coming from
the corporation's current or accumulated earnings and profits. 288
Thus, the earnings and profits account represents a corporation's eco-
nomic profit or loss and serves as a measurement of the corporation's
dividend paying capacity.
A corporation's earnings and profits, rather than its taxable in-
come, serves as the touchstone for determining a corporation's divi-
dend paying capacity because taxable income is not an accurate
measurement of the corporation's economic profit or loss. For exam-
ple, in determining taxable income, a corporation is entitled to exclude
items that constitute an economic gain, such as interest received on
municipal bonds,289 and is entitled to depreciate assets used in the
business quite rapidly,290 so that the depreciation the corporation de-
ducts may exceed the actual economic cost resulting from the asset's
decline in value. Accordingly, the customary method of determining a
corporation's earnings and profits for the year is to start with its taxa-
ble income and make adjustments to reach a more accurate measure-
ment of the corporation's economic profit or loss. These adjustments
include (i) adding to taxable income amounts that were previously ex-
cluded but that represent an economic gain, such as municipal bond
interest,291 (ii) recalculating depreciation under an alternative system
under which assets are depreciated at a slower pace, 29 2 and
(iii) subtracting from taxable income amounts that represent a true
economic cost to the corporation but that were not deductible in deter-
mining taxable income, such as federal income taxes that the corpora-
tion paid. 293
287. I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(7), 301(c)(1) (2000).
288. Id. § 316(a). A distribution that exceeds the corporation's current and accumu-
lated earnings and profits is treated as a nontaxable return of the shareholder's
capital to the extent of the shareholder's basis in her stock. Id. § 301(c)(2). If the
distribution exceeds both the corporation's earnings and profits and the share-
holder's basis in her stock, the excess portion of the distribution constitutes a
taxable gain to the shareholder. Id. § 301(c)(3).
289. I.R.C. § 103(a) (2000).
290. For example, if a corporation purchases a car for use in its business, it generally
can deduct the cost of the car using an accelerated method of depreciation (the
200 percent declining balance method) over a period of five years. See id.
§ 168(b)(1), (c), (e)(3)(B)(i).
291. See Treas. Reg. § 1.312-6(b) (1960) (including in earnings and profits "income ex-
empted by statute").
292. See I.R.C. § 168(g)(2) (2000) (setting forth alternative depreciation system); id.
§ 312(k)(3)(A) (requiring corporation to use alternative depreciation system for
tangible property in determining earnings and profits).
293. Taxpayers, including corporations, cannot deduct federal income taxes in deter-
mining their taxable incomes. Id. § 275(a)(1). Because federal income taxes that
a taxpayer pays represent an economic cost, such taxes must be subtracted from
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When corporations are members of the same consolidated group,
each corporation generally must determine its own earnings and prof-
its under the normal rules for doing so, but the earnings and profits of
each member (whether positive or negative) also must be reflected in
the earnings and profits of any group member that holds stock in that
member. 29 4 The purpose of this "tiering up" of earnings and profits is
to treat the group members as if they were a single entity.29 5 This
treatment ensures that any distributions that the common parent
makes to its nonmember shareholders will be treated as taxable divi-
dends to the extent that the group considered as a whole has earnings
and profits.29 6 As in the case of stock basis adjustments, adjustments
to earnings and profits are required as of the close of each taxable year
and at any other time that an adjustment is necessary to determine
the earnings and profits of any person. 29 7
To illustrate, assume that P holds all of the stock of S, S holds all of
the stock of S2, and all three corporations are members of the same
consolidated group. Also assume that P, S and S2 have earnings and
profits for the current year of $20,000, $30,000 and $50,000, respec-
tively. S2's earnings and profits must be reflected in S's earnings and
profits, and S therefore would have earnings and profits for the year of
$80,000.298 S's $80,000 of earnings and profits similarly must be re-
flected in P's earnings and profits. P therefore would be treated as
having earnings and profits for the year of $100,000. Accordingly, if P
made a cash distribution during the year to its nonmember sharehold-
ers of $70,000, the distribution would be fully taxable to the share-
holders as a dividend. 29 9
If P holds less than all of S's stock, then P must adjust its earnings
and profits to reflect only a proportionate part of the change in S's
earnings and profits. In the previous example, if P held only 80 per-
cent of S's only class of stock and nonmembers held the remaining 20
taxable income in determining a corporation's earnings and profits. See, e.g.,
Rev. Rul. 70-609, 1970-2 C.B. 78.
294. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-33(a)(1) (as amended in 1995).
295. Id.
296. See Preamble to Proposed Investment Adjustment Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg.
53,634, 53,642 (Nov. 12, 1992) (stating that earnings and profits must be consoli-
dated in the common parent "to determine whether distributions to nonmembers
should be characterized as dividends").
297. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-33(b)(1) (as amended in 1995).
298. See id. § 1.1502-33(b)(1), (b)(3)(ii) (example 1(a)-(b)).
299. P would be treated as if it had $100,000 of current earnings and profits for the
year. Id. § 1.1502-33(b)(1). Under the normal rules that apply to corporate dis-
tributions, P's $70,000 distribution would be treated as coming first from P's
$100,000 of current earnings and profits. Id. § 1.316-2(a) (1960). Therefore, as-
suming that P does not have a deficit in its accumulated earnings and profits, the
distribution would constitute a dividend that P's shareholders must include in
gross income. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(7), 301(c)(1), 316(a) (2000).
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percent, then P would increase its earnings and profits for the year to
reflect only 80 percent of S's $80,000 of earnings and profits, or
$64,000.300
D. Allocation of Tax Liability Under the Consolidated
Return Rules
1. Liability of the Members to the Government
The members of a consolidated group are severally liable for the
group's tax liability.30 1 Accordingly, the Service can collect the entire
tax that the group owes from a single member or from any combina-
tion of members. Any agreement that the members have entered into
concerning the allocation of tax liability among them has no effect on
the nature of each member's liability to the government. 30 2
2. The Members' Allocation of Tax Liability Among Themselves
The income tax liability of a consolidated group is determined on a
group basis by applying the normal corporate income tax rates to the
group's consolidated taxable income.3 03 Nevertheless, for a variety of
reasons, each member must be able to ascertain its share of the
group's tax liability.304 For example, an accurate determination of a
member's share of the tax liability is necessary to assess the member's
economic performance, which is likely to be an issue of significance to
several constituencies, including managers, creditors, minority share-
holders, and potential purchasers. Similarly, a member's share will
influence the member's liability for state taxes in those jurisdictions
where federal income taxes are deductible for state tax purposes.
From a federal tax perspective, a member must know its share of the
group's tax liability principally because a member's share will affect
both its earnings and profits and the basis that another member has
in the stock of that member. Specifically, the portion of the group's
tax liability that is allocated to a member will reduce that member's
earnings and profits3 0 5 and will reduce the basis of the member's
stock in the hands of another member. 30 6
300. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-33(b)(1) (stating that earnings and profits are allocated
under the principles of section 1.1502-32(c)), (b)(3)(ii) (example 3) (as amended in
1995); see also supra notes 284-86 and accompanying text (discussing allocations
under section 1.1502-32(c) to determine P's stock basis adjustments).
301. Id. § 1.1502-6(a) (as amended in 1966).
302. Id. § 1.1502-6(c).
303. See supra section III.B.
304. See generally 2 DUBROFF, supra note 184, § 54.01 (discussing areas in which
member's share of tax liability has significance).
305. See supra note 293 and accompanying text (discussing adjustments to earnings
and profits for federal income taxes paid).
306. See supra notes 268-72 and accompanying text (discussing reductions in stock
basis for noncapital, nondeductible items).
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In addition, members of a consolidated group often enter into a tax
sharing agreement pursuant to which members who experience a tax
savings through consolidation transfer all or a portion of the savings
to the members whose deductions or other tax attributes produced it.
Neither the Code nor the Treasury Department's regulations require
such compensatory payments, but the regulations on adjustments to
earnings and profits and stock basis contain detailed rules on the ap-
propriate tax treatment of such payments. 30 7 Further, as discussed
below, the regulations on adjustments to stock basis reflect a policy
that members who experience a tax savings should transfer the entire
savings to the members whose tax attributes produced it.
This section discusses the prescribed methods of allocating tax lia-
bility among group members for purposes of determining earnings and
profits and stock basis, including the rules concerning the tax treat-
ment of compensatory payments of tax savings, and then briefly dis-
cusses tax sharing agreements.
a. Allocation of Tax Liability for Determining Earnings and
Profits
(1) Permissible Methods Under Section 1552
As discussed earlier, each member of a consolidated group must
determine its earnings and profits, which is an account that repre-
sents the corporation's economic profit or loss and serves as a mea-
surement of the corporation's dividend paying capacity. 30 8 Because
federal income taxes constitute an economic cost, a member must re-
duce its earnings and profits by the member's share of the group's fed-
eral income tax liability.30 9 The permissible methods for allocating
tax liability among group members for purposes of determining earn-
ings and profits are set forth in Section 1552 of the Code and in the
Treasury Department's regulations issued under that provision.
Section 1552 permits a consolidated group to elect any one of three
specific methods for allocating tax liability and also permits the group
to elect any other method that is approved by the Secretary of the
Treasury.3 10 Under the first method, a member's share of the group's
307. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-33(d) (as amended in 1995); id. § 1.1502-32(b)(3)(iv)(D)
(as amended in 2002).
308. See supra notes 287-93 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
310. See I.R.C. § 1552(a) (2000). A group can elect any of the three specific methods
authorized by Section 1552 by attaching a statement to the group's consolidated
return. Treas. Reg. § 1.1552-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1996). The group's common
parent is charged with the responsibility of making the statement, which is bind-
ing on all of the group members. Id. If the group fails to elect one of the three
methods, then it will be treated as having elected to use the first of the three
methods. Id. § 1.1552-1(d). Once a group has elected a method of allocating tax
liability under Section 1552, the group generally is not permitted to change its
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tax liability is based on the portion of the group's consolidated taxable
income that the member contributed.311 For example, assume that
the P-S group has consolidated taxable income of $100,000, of which
$60,000 is attributable to P and $40,000 to S. The group's tax liability
would be $22,250,312 of which 40 percent ($40,000/$100,000), or
$8,900, would be allocated to S under this first method. S would re-
duce its earnings and profits by $8,900.
The second method specified in Section 1552 allocates the group's
tax liability based on the tax liability that each member would have if
it filed a separate return for the year.3 1 3 Under this second method,
each member's tax liability must be determined as if it had filed a
separate return (with certain adjustments to take into account the
fact that the member is part of a consolidated group), and its separate
return tax liability then must be compared to the sum of the members'
separate return tax liabilities. 3 14 To illustrate, return to the previous
example, in which the P-S group had consolidated taxable income of
$100,000 and an income tax liability of $22,250. If P's separate return
taxable income were $60,000 and S's were $40,000, then they would
have separate return tax liability of $10,000 and $6,000, respec-
method without prior approval by the Service. See id. § 1.1552-1(c)(1). Under
certain circumstances, however, a group can change its method of allocating tax
liability without seeking the Service's advance approval. See Rev. Proc. 90-39,
1990-2 C.B. 365; see also Rev. Proc. 90-39A, 1990-2 C.B. 367 (clarifying Rev. Proc.
90-39).
311. See I.R.C. § 1552(a)(1) (2000). Each member's contribution to consolidated taxa-
ble income is determined by first calculating each member's separate taxable in-
come (under the rules for doing so in section 1.1502-12 of the regulations) and
adding to it the member's share of the group's consolidated items. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.1552-1(a)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1996); supra section III.B (discussing cal-
culation of separate taxable income and consolidated items). That is, the group's
consolidated taxable income is unbundled, a process that the Supreme Court re-
cently referred to in an analogous context as "unbak[ing] the cake." United Do-
minion Indus., Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 833 (2001) (analyzing similar
process required to determine member's separate net operating loss). The figure
determined for an individual member is compared to the sum of the figures deter-
mined for all of the members to determine what percentage of the group's taxable
income that a member contributed. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1552-1(a)(1)(ii) (as
amended in 1996). If the figure determined for a member is negative (because its
deductions exceed its gross income), then the member is treated as not having
contributed to consolidated taxable income. Id. In that case, none of the group's
tax liability would be allocated to the member.
312. See I.R.C. § 11(b) (2000); supra subsection III.B.2 (discussing rates of tax that
apply to consolidated taxable income).
313. See I.R.C. § 1552(a)(2) (2000).
314. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1552-1(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1996). If a member would not
have a positive tax liability if it filed a separate return, it is treated as having a
tax liability of zero. Id. As a result, none of the group's tax liability would be
allocated to that member.
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tively.31 5 Therefore, under this second method, of the group's actual
tax liability of $22,250, 37.5 percent ($6,000/$16,000), or $8,344,
would be allocated to S. S would reduce its earnings and profits by
$8,344.
The third method3 16 generally seeks to allocate any tax increases
that result from filing on a consolidated basis in an equitable manner.
Under this third method, each member's share of the group's tax lia-
bility as determined under the first method is compared to the mem-
ber's separate return tax liability as determined under the second
method. To the extent that a member's share under the first method
exceeds the member's separate return tax liability, the excess is real-
located to those members for whom filing on a consolidated basis re-
sults in a reduction in tax liability, to the extent that they have
experienced such a reduction. Any remaining excess tax liability is
allocated among the group members under the first method.
3 17 This
third method of allocating tax liability was designed to take into ac-
count tax increases that formerly resulted from filing on a consoli-
dated basis. Because these tax increases no longer exist, this third
method, according to one commentator, is now rarely used.
3 18
As an illustration of the third method, consider the previous exam-
ples involving the P-S consolidated group. The first method resulted
in S having a share of the group's tax liability of $8,900 and S's sepa-
rate return tax liability, as determined under the second method, was
$6,000. S experienced a $2,900 increase in tax liability as a result of
filing on a consolidated basis. Under the third method, this $2,900
excess tax liability would be allocated to any group members for whom
consolidation produced a reduction in tax liability, i.e., those members
whose separate return tax liability exceeds their share of the group's
tax liability determined under the first method, but only to the extent
that those members have experienced a reduction in tax liability. If
any portion of the $2,900 excess tax liability remains after being allo-
cated to other members, the remaining portion is allocated among the
members under the first method.
A member's share of the group's tax liability, as determined under
any of the permissible methods, reduces the member's earnings and
profits regardless of which group member pays the liability.
31 9 The
member's share of the group's tax liability is treated for tax purposes
as an actual liability of the member. 320 If a member does not pay its
315. See I.R.C. § 11(b) (2000); supra subsection III.B.2 (discussing rates of tax that
apply to consolidated taxable income).
316. See I.R.C. § 1552(a)(3) (2000).
317. See id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.1552-1(a)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1996).
318. 2 DUBROFF, supra note 184, § 54.04[3].
319. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1552-1(b)(2) (as amended in 1996).
320. Id.
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share, then the amount that the member does not pay is treated as a
distribution that the member receives from another member, as a con-
tribution to the member's capital by another member, or as a combina-
tion of the two, depending on the relationship between the member
paying the tax liability and the member whose liability is paid.321 For
example, in the previous discussion of the first method of allocating
tax liability within the P-S consolidated group, the group's tax liability
was $22,250 and S's share of this liability was $8,900. The remaining
$13,350 is necessarily P's share. If P pays the full $22,250 and S does
not reimburse P for S's $8,900 share, then S will be treated as if it had
paid its share and, to account for the fact that S's assets are not dimin-
ished by $8,900, P will be treated as having made a contribution to the
capital of S of $8,900.322 (This assumes that P's payment of S's share
of the tax liability does not constitute a loan from P to S.) Conversely,
if S pays the full $22,250 tax liability without reimbursement from P
for P's $13,350 share, then P will be treated as if it had paid its share
and, assuming S has not made a loan to P, S will be treated as having
made a distribution to P in P's capacity as a shareholder of $13,350.
(2) Optional Allocations to Reflect Absorption of Tax
Attributes
One of the major benefits of filing a consolidated return is that de-
ductions of one member of the consolidated group can offset another
member's income. This results in a tax savings for the member whose
income is offset. A member also can experience a tax savings by virtue
of another member's tax credits, which reduce tax liability dollar-for-
dollar. Members of a consolidated group often enter into a tax sharing
agreement pursuant to which the members who experience a tax sav-
ings compensate the members whose tax attributes produced it by
transferring to them all or a portion of the savings. 32 3 For example, if
P has $100 of separate taxable income for the year and saves $34 of
tax by offsetting its income with the $100 operating loss 324 of its sub-
sidiary, S, then a tax sharing agreement between P and S might re-
quire P to pay all or a portion of the $34 to S in order to compensate S
for the use of its tax loss. The federal tax treatment of such compensa-
321. Id.
322. See id. § 1.1552-1(f) (example).
323. See infra notes 374-77 and accompanying text (discussing tax sharing
agreements).
324. For convenience, this discussion will use the terms "operating loss" and "loss" to
refer to a member's negative separate taxable income, i.e., to the amount by
which a member's deductions exceed its income, taking into account the consoli-
dated return rules for determining separate taxable income. Further, unless oth-
erwise noted, this discussion will make the simplifying assumption that a
member's separate taxable income (whether positive or negative) is equal to the
taxable income or loss it would have if it filed a separate return.
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tory payments depends on whether the consolidated group has made
the election specified in section 1.1502-33(d) of the Treasury Depart-
ment's regulations (the "election" or "earnings and profits election"),
which allows the group to treat the payments as allocations of addi-
tional tax liability.32 5
If a consolidated group has not made the earnings and profits elec-
tion, then a compensatory payment of tax savings is treated for federal
tax purposes as a contribution to capital or as a distribution, depend-
ing on the relationship between the members making and receiving
the payment. 32 6 In the previous example, where P saved $34 of tax by
offsetting its income with S's $100 operating loss, if P transfers all of
the tax savings to S and the P-S group has not made the earnings and
profits election, then P would be treated as contributing $34 to S's cap-
ital. Because a contribution to a corporation's capital does not affect
its earnings and profits, S's earnings and profits would remain un-
changed. Conversely, if S transferred $34 to P because S had saved
tax by using P's operating loss, S would be treated as distributing $34
to P in P's capacity as a shareholder. This distribution would decrease
S's earnings and profits to the extent that S has earnings and prof-
its.327 Because P's earnings and profits must be adjusted to reflect
changes in S's earnings and profits, P's earnings and profits would not
325. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-33(d) (as amended in 1995) (describing election and its
effect). The election, which was effective for consolidated return years beginning
after December 31, 1965, first appeared in 1968. See T.D. 6962, 1968-2 C.B. 396;
see also 2 DUBROFF, supra note 184, § 54.02[3] (noting that it was "widely as-
sumed that the [regulations authorizing the election] . . . were issued primarily
for their influence on regulatory and other non-tax issues"); Richard M. Horwood
& Ronald Hindin, Two Keys to the Treasure: Allocating Tax Advantages Within
an Affiliated Group, 2 J. CORP. TAX'N 501, 512 (1975-76) (discussing history of
earnings and profits election). In 1994, when the consolidated return regulations
on earnings and profits and adjustments to stock basis were substantially re-
vised, the Treasury Department retained the election despite its apparent uncer-
tainty regarding whether doing so was desirable. See Preamble to Proposed
Investment Adjustment Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 53,634, 53,642 (Nov. 12, 1992)
(stating that "[a]lthough these rules are the most complex feature of the current
E&P rules, they are retained because the Treasury Department and the Service
understand that groups rely on them for non-tax purposes, such as ratemaking
for public utilities"); Comments of American Institute of Certified Public Account-
ants on Proposed Consolidated Return Regulations (March 1, 1993) (suggesting,
in response to IRS inquiry, that "wait-and-see" method of earnings and profits
election be retained in regulations because consolidated groups use the concept
for non-tax purposes), reprinted in TAx NOTES TODAY, Mar. 5, 1993 (Doc. No. 93-
2873), available at LEXIS, Fedtax library, TNT file.
326. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. United States, 392 F.2d 241, 246-47 (Ct. Cl. 1968);
Beneficial Corp. v. Comm'r, 18 T.C. 396, 399-400 (1952), affd per curiam, 202
F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1953); Rev. Rul. 73-605, 1973-2 C.B. 109; see also Singleton v.
Comm'r, 569 F.2d 863, 866-68 (5th Cir. 1978) (analyzing dividends declared to
compensate for use of tax losses); Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,430 (August 7, 1973) (re-
viewing Rev. Rul. 73-605).
327. I.R.C. § 312(a) (2000).
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be affected.328 Implicit in this treatment of compensatory payments
of tax savings is the conclusion that the paying member is not receiv-
ing anything of value in exchange for the payment. 329 That is, if the
losses or other tax attributes for which the payment is made consti-
tute something of value that the paying member obtains in exchange
for the payment, then it would be inappropriate to treat the payment
as a contribution to capital or a distribution.
In contrast, if a consolidated group makes an earnings and profits
election,330 then members of the group can make a compensatory pay-
ment of tax savings without having the payment treated as a contribu-
tion or distribution to another member. Instead, the payment is
treated as an additional tax liability of the paying member that
reduces its earnings and profits and, in effect, as a negative tax liabil-
ity of the receiving member that increases the receiving member's
earnings and profits.331 The main tax effect of this election is to real-
locate earnings and profits among the members of the consolidated
group. If all members of the group are wholly owned by other mem-
bers, then the election will not affect the earnings and profits of the
common parent because the earnings and profits of all group members
would be consolidated in the common parent. 332 But if one or more
members have minority shareholders, then the election might affect
the earnings and profits of the common parent because only a propor-
tionate part of the earnings and profits of a partially owned member is
consolidated in the parent. In turn, if one or more members have mi-
nority shareholders, then the election might affect the tax conse-
quences of distributions to either the common parent's shareholders or
the minority shareholders of a lower tier member because the conse-
328. See supra notes 294-300 and accompanying text (discussing tiering up of earn-
ings and profits). In the example in the text, P would increase its earnings and
profits by $34 to reflect the distribution received from S and would decrease its
earnings and profits by $34 to reflect the reduction in S's earnings and profits.
329. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,367 (Dec. 31, 1984) (suggesting that courts have not
treated compensatory payments of tax savings as transfers for value because
"consolidated tax benefits do not derive from members of the group but from the
taxing authority that confers on the group the privilege of filing consolidated
returns").
330. Generally, a group must make the earnings and profits election by attaching a
separate statement to its first consolidated return. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-
33(d)(5)(i) (as amended in 1995). A group generally can make the election for alater year, or change the allocation method that it uses pursuant to the election,
only with the Service's prior approval. Id. § 1.1502-33(d)(5)(ii)(A). Under certain
circumstances, however, a group can make the earnings and profits election or
change its allocation method without seeking the Service's advance approval. See
Rev. Proc. 90-39, 1990-2 C.B. 365; see also Rev. Proc. 90-39A, 1990-2 C.B. 367(clarifying Rev. Proc. 90-39).
331. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-33(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1995).
332. See supra notes 294-300 and accompanying text (discussing tiering up of earn-
ings and profits).
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quences depend on the amount of the distributing member's earnings
and profits.3 33
The earnings and profits election permits a consolidated group to
choose either of two specific methods by which the group can allocate
tax liability among its members to reflect compensatory payments of
tax savings, and also permits the group to select any other method
with the Service's approval. 3 34 One of the two specific methods, the
percentage method,3 35 directs the group first to allocate its consoli-
dated tax liability among its members in accordance with its chosen
method for doing so under Section 1552.336 Each member then deter-
mines its tax liability as if it had filed a separate return (with certain
adjustments to take into account the fact that the member is part of a
consolidated group).3 37 To the extent that a member's separate return
tax liability exceeds its share of the group's tax liability as determined
under Section 1552 (i.e., to the extent a member has experienced a tax
savings through consolidation), the member's share of the group's tax
liability is increased by a fixed percentage, selected by the group, of
the excess. 3 38 The group must make corresponding decreases in the
shares of tax liability of those members whose tax attributes produced
the tax savings "in a manner that reasonably reflects the absorption of
the tax attributes."3 39 The additional allocation of tax liability to the
member who experienced the tax savings decreases that member's
earnings and profits, and the corresponding reductions in tax liability
of other members increase their earnings and profits.
34 o
As an illustration of the percentage method, assume that P and its
wholly owned subsidiary, S, are the only members of a newly formed
consolidated group that has chosen the first method for allocating tax
liability under Section 1552.34 1 Also assume that the applicable tax
rate is 34 percent and that, if their taxable incomes were calculated as
333. See supra notes 287-88 and accompanying text (discussing tax consequences of
corporate distributions).
334. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-33(d)(2)-(4) (as amended in 1995).
335. Id. § 1.1502-33(d)(3).
336. See supra notes 308-22 and accompanying text (discussing allocation methods
under Section 1552).
337. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-33(d)(3)(i)(A) (as amended in 1995). For this purpose, a
member's separate return tax liability is calculated in the same manner as under
the second method for allocating tax liability pursuant to Section 1552. See supra
notes 313-15 and accompanying text (discussing second method under Section
1552).
338. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-33(d)(3)(i) (as amended in 1995). The fixed percentage can-
not exceed 100 percent. Id.
339. Id. § 1.1502-33(d)(3)(ii).
340. Id. § 1.1502-33(d)(3)(i)-(ii).
341. See I.R.C. § 1552(a)(1) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.1552-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1996));
supra notes 311-12 and accompanying text (discussing first method).
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if they had filed separate returns, 34 2 P would have $1,000 of taxable
income and S would have an operating loss of $1,000. The P-S group
would have zero consolidated tax liability because S's loss would fully
offset P's income. Therefore, no tax would be allocated to either P or S
under Section 1552.343 If the group elects to use the percentage
method and selects a fixed percentage of 100 percent, then the portion
of the group's tax liability allocated to P under Section 1552 is in-
creased by the excess of P's separate return tax liability over the
amount allocated to P under Section 1552. Because P's separate re-
turn tax liability would be $340, and no tax liability was allocated to P
under Section 1552, P would be allocated $340 of tax liability. P's
earnings and profits therefore would be reduced by $340. P would be
treated as indebted to S in the amount of $340,344 and the earnings
and profits of S, whose tax attributes produced the tax savings, would
be increased by $340. If P transfers $340 to S to compensate S for the
use of its tax loss, the payment would not be treated as a contribution
to S's capital, but rather would have no further tax consequences. 3 45
The second specific method that a group can elect is the "wait-and-
see" method.346 Under this method, a group member who experiences
a tax savings through consolidation compensates the member whose
tax attributes produced the savings not in the year when the savings
is achieved, but rather only if and when the member whose tax attri-
bute was utilized could have used the attribute itself if it filed sepa-
rate returns.3 47 In the year in which a member could have used its
attribute on its own separate return, an appropriate portion of that
member's share of the group's tax liability is reallocated to the mem-
bers who previously benefited from the attribute. 348  According to
342. That is, calculated in accordance with the second method for allocating tax liabil-
ity under Section 1552, which is what the percentage method requires. See supra
notes 313-15, 337 and accompanying text.
343. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-33(d)(1)(i) (as amended in 1995).
344. Id. § 1.1502-33(d)(1)(ii).
345. See id. § 1.1502-33(d)(6) (example 2(c)).
346. Id. § 1.1502-33(d)(2). The wait-and-see method "was derived from Rule 45(b)(6)
of the General Rules and Regulations under the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935, adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 C.F.R.
250.45(b)(6)." 2 DUBROFF, supra note 184, § 54.0511] at n. 56; see also Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1502-33(d)(2) (as amended in 1995) (noting derivation of rule).
347. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-33(d)(2) (as amended in 1995).
348. See id. The wait-and-see method requires a consolidated group to keep track of
two figures on a cumulative basis for each member: (1) the tax liability of the
member, determined as if the member had filed separate returns, and (2) the
amounts of the group's consolidated tax liability allocated to the member under
Section 1552. When the group allocates its consolidated tax liability for the cur-
rent year, the amount allocated to a member under Section 1552 is limited to the
amount by which the member's cumulative separate return tax liability for all
years (including the current year) exceeds the cumulative amounts allocated to
the member under Section 1552 for all years (except the current year). Id.
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comments filed by the American Institute of Certified Public Account-
ants on the 1994 revisions of the consolidated return regulations, con-
solidated groups do not commonly use the wait-and-see method for
purposes of determining earnings and profits, but do use it for other
purposes.3 49
As an example of the wait-and-see method, consider the previous
illustration where P's $1,000 of separate taxable income was fully off-
set by S's $1,000 operating loss. Because the P-S group's consolidated
tax liability is zero, no tax liability would be allocated to either P or S
under Section 1552. If the group had elected the wait-and-see method,
then there would be no additional allocations of tax liability in this
first year. Assume that, in the group's second consolidated return
year, P and S each have $1,000 of separate taxable income. The
group's consolidated taxable income in the second year would be
$2,000 and, assuming that the applicable tax rate is 34 percent, its
consolidated tax liability would be $680. The group's chosen method
under Section 1552 would require the group to allocate one-half of this
tax liability, or $340, to each member. The wait-and-see method, how-
ever, would require that a portion of the tax liability allocated to S be
reallocated to P to reflect P's absorption of S's loss in the previous
year. On these facts, all $340 of S's share of the group's tax liability
would be reallocated to P to reflect the fact that P achieved a tax sav-
ings of $340 in the first year by using S's loss and that, absent a reallo-
cation, S would be allocated $340 more of tax liability in the second
year than would be the case if S had filed separate returns.3 50 Accord-
§ 1.1502-33(d)(2)(i). If the member's share of the group's tax liability under Sec-
tion 1552 exceeds this limit, then the excess amount must be reallocated to those
members whose cumulative allocations of the group's tax liability under Section
1552 for all years (including the current year) are less than their cumulative sep-
arate return tax liability for all years (including the current year), i.e., the excess
must be reallocated to those members who have experienced a tax savings
through consolidation to the extent that they have experienced a tax savings. Id.
§ 1.1502-33(d)(2)(ii). Any portion of the excess that cannot be reallocated to other
members is allocated among all the members in accordance with the group's
method under Section 1552. See id. § 1.1502-33(d)(2)(iii).
349. Comments of American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, supra note 325
(suggesting that wait-and-see method be retained in final regulations because,
"while elections of the 'wait-and-see' method for earnings and profits purposes
are not particularly common, use of the concept for management reporting pur-
poses is relatively common, especially where minority shareholders are
involved").
350. S's cumulative separate return tax liability for the two years would be zero be-
cause S could have carried its operating loss forward from the first to the second
year to offset its income. See I.R.C. § 172(a), (b)(1)(A) (2000). Accordingly, under
the wait-and-see method, none of the group's $640 tax liability in the second year
can be allocated to S. See supra note 348. All $640 must be allocated to P be-
cause P's cumulative separate return tax liability for the two years would be
$640. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-33(d)(6) (example 1) (as amended in 1995) (illus-
trating wait-and-see method).
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ingly, in the second year, P's earnings and profits would be reduced by
$680 and S's earnings and profits would be unaffected. If P pays $680
to the government, then P's payment of S's share of the group's tax
liability would not be treated as a contribution to S's capital, but
rather would have no further tax effect.
A consolidated group might enter into a tax sharing agreement or
adopt tax sharing practices that provide for compensatory payments
of tax savings that differ from the payments contemplated by its earn-
ings and profits election under section 1.1502-33(d) of the regula-
tions.3 5 1 To the extent that a member fails to pay its tax liability as
determined under the group's earnings and profits election, the mem-
ber will be treated as making a distribution or a contribution to capi-
tal, depending on the relationship between that member and the
member to whom the payment is due. 352 For example, in the previous
illustration where the P-S group had elected the percentage method, P
received an additional allocation of tax liability of $340 (which de-
creased P's earnings and profits) and was treated as indebted to S for
this amount (which increased S's earnings and profits). If P transfers
$340 to S, the payment would not be treated as a contribution to S's
capital, but rather would have no further tax consequences. 3 53 If P
does not transfer any funds to S, the group's failure to share tax sav-
ings in the manner contemplated by their election would not invali-
date their election and would not affect the earnings and profits
adjustments that their election requires. 35 4 Rather, the amount that
P does not pay would be treated as a distribution from S to P.355 Simi-
lar results would occur in the previous illustration of the wait-and-see
method if P did not pay all $640 of the group's consolidated tax liabil-
ity in the second year, i.e., to the extent that P does not pay the liabil-
ity (and S does), S would be treated as making a distribution to p.356
b. Allocation of Tax Liability for Determining Stock Basis
As discussed earlier, if P Corporation holds stock of S Corporation
and the two are members of the same consolidated group, then P must
reduce its basis in S's stock by a proportionate amount of S's noncapi-
tal, nondeductible expenses. 35 7 P is required to reduce its basis in S's
351. See infra note 377 and accompanying text (discussing possible reasons for differ-
ent allocation methods).
352. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-33(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1995).
353. See id. § 1.1502-33(d)(6) (example 1(c)).
354. Rev. Rul. 76-302, 1976-2 C.B. 257; see also Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,698 (Apr. 9,
1976) (analyzing Rev. Rul. 76-302).
355. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-33(d)(6) (example 2(c)) (as amended in 1995); Rev. Rul. 76-
302, 1976-2 C.B. 257; Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,698 (Apr. 9, 1976) (analyzing Rev.
Rul. 76-302).
356. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-33(d)(6) (example 1(c)) (as amended in 1995).
357. See supra notes 268-72, 284-86 and accompanying text.
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stock for these expenses in order to preserve their nondeductible na-
ture.3 58 Absent a negative adjustment, the expenses effectively would
provide P with a potential loss deduction by reducing the value of S's
stock. Because corporations cannot deduct federal income taxes in de-
termining their income tax liability,3 59 a member's share of a group's
tax liability is a noncapital, nondeductible expense that reduces the
basis of that member's stock in the hands of another member.
3 60
For purposes of determining adjustments to stock basis, a mem-
ber's share of the group's federal income tax liability generally is de-
termined in accordance with the group's chosen method for allocating
tax liability under Section 1552.361 But the group is treated as if it
had a tax sharing agreement in effect pursuant to which the group
uses the percentage method discussed earlier to allocate 100 percent
of any tax savings to the members whose tax attributes produced it.362
That is, regardless of whether the group actually has such a tax shar-
ing agreement in effect, members must make adjustments to the basis
of stock that they hold in another member as if such an agreement
were in effect. Generally, this mandatory tax sharing rule will not
affect a member's basis in the stock of a wholly owned subsidiary, but
will affect a member's basis in the stock of a subsidiary with minority
shareholders. The Treasury Department implemented this rule to en-
sure that "tax savings or burdens that should be borne by or benefit
minority shareholders are taken into account."3 63 The Treasury De-
partment's position reflects a normative rule that members who expe-
rience a tax savings should transfer the entire savings to the members
whose tax attributes produced it.
If, as required by the basis adjustment rules, a consolidated group
uses the percentage method with a fixed percentage of 100 percent,
then a member who experiences a tax savings through consolidation is
treated as having an obligation to pay all of the tax savings to those
members whose tax attributes produced it.364 From the perspective of
the member that has the obligation to pay, the obligation is treated as
additional tax liability that decreases the basis of that member's stock
358. Preamble to Proposed Investment Adjustment Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 53,634,
53,637 (Nov. 12, 1992) (discussing basis adjustments for noncapital, nondeduct-
ible expenses).
359. I.R.C. § 275(a)(1) (2000).
360. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32(b)(3)(iii)(A) (as amended in 2002).
361. Id. § 1.1502-32(b)(3)(iv)(D); supra notes 308-22 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing allocation methods under Section 1552).
362. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32(b)(3)(iv)(D) (as amended in 2002); see also supra notes
335-45 and accompanying text (discussing percentage method).
363. Preamble to Proposed Investment Adjustment Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 53,634,
53,639 (Nov. 12, 1992).
364. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-33(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1995).
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in the hands of another member.365 From the perspective of the mem-ber that has the right to receive payment, the right to receive is
treated as tax-exempt income that increases the basis of that mem-ber's stock in the hands of another member.366 If a member that has
an obligation to pay tax savings fails to do so, then to the extent that
the member fails to pay, the member is treated as receiving a distribu-
tion or a contribution to capital, depending on the relationship be-
tween that member and the member to whom the obligation is
owed.367
The effect of the mandatory tax sharing adjustment is best illus-
trated through a series of examples. In each example, S is a newlyformed corporation, P and S are the only members of a consolidated
group, and the applicable tax rate is 34 percent.
Example 1-A Wholly Owned Subsidiary with a Loss: P acquires
all of the stock of S by transferring to S cash of $300. P therefore has
an initial basis in S's stock of $300. During the year, P has $100 of
taxable income and S has a $100 loss. 3 68 P thus achieves a $34 tax
savings through consolidation. Because of the parties' deemed tax
sharing agreement, P is treated as obligated to transfer $34 to S, andS is treated as having the right to receive $34. P fails to transfer the$34 tax savings to S. Because P failed to transfer the tax savings to S,P would be treated as if it had transferred the tax savings and, to
account for the fact that S does not have the funds, S would be treated
as making a $34 distribution to P. The adjustments to P's basis in the
stock of S would be as follows:
P's Initial Basis: $ 300
S's Loss: $(100)
S's Right to Receive Tax Savings: $ 34
Deemed Distribution by S: $ (34)
P's Adjusted Basis: $200
This example illustrates that a member's basis in the stock of a
wholly owned subsidiary is unaffected by the mandatory tax sharing
adjustment. If the rule did not exist, the only adjustment to P's basis
365. See id. § 1.1502-32(b)(3)(iv)(D) (as amended in 2002) (stating that "the obligationto make payment is treated as a negative adjustment under paragraph(b)(3)(iii)").
366. See id. (stating that "[t]he right to receive payment is treated as a positive adjust-
ment under paragraph (b)(3)(ii)").
367. Id.
368. For purposes of the basis adjustment rules, a member's taxable income or loss isdetermined by including the member's items of income, gain, deduction and loss
that are taken into account in determining the group's consolidated taxable in-
come or loss. Id. § 1.1502-32(b)(3)(i).
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would be a $100 reduction to reflect S's loss, which would result in P
having a $200 basis in the stock of S.
Example 2-A Partially Owned Subsidiary with a Loss: P acquires
80 percent of the stock of S by transferring to S cash of $240. P there-
fore has an initial basis in S's stock of $240. Several individuals ac-
quire the remaining 20 percent of S's stock by transferring to S a total
of $60 in cash. During the year, P has $100 of taxable income and S
has a $100 loss. P thus achieves a $34 tax savings through consolida-
tion. Because of the parties' deemed tax sharing agreement, P is
treated as obligated to transfer $34 to S, and S is treated as having
the right to receive $34. P fails to transfer the $34 tax savings to S.
Because P failed to transfer the tax savings to S, P would be treated as
if it had transferred the tax savings and, to account for the fact that S
does not have the funds, S would be treated as making a $34 distribu-
tion to P. The adjustments to P's basis in the stock of S would be as
follows:
P's Initial Basis: $ 240.00
80% of S's Loss: $ (80.00)369
80% of S's Right to Receive Tax Savings: $ 27.20370
Deemed Distribution by S: $ (34.00)
P's Adjusted Basis: $153.20
P's basis in S's stock thus is reduced by $86.80. If the mandatory
tax sharing adjustment did not exist, P's basis would be reduced by
only P's proportionate share of S's loss, or $80. By requiring P to re-
duce its basis instead by $86.80, the regulations recognize that, by
failing to transfer the tax savings to S, P has received more than its
proportionate share of the tax savings. That is, under a normative
rule that tax savings should be allocated to the member whose tax
attributes produced it, the minority shareholders of S should have re-
ceived the benefit of 20 percent of the $34 of tax savings, or $6.80. The
basis adjustment rules recognize that P has appropriated the minor-
ity's share: P's gain from a subsequent sale of S's stock will be $6.80
greater (or its loss $6.80 less) with the tax sharing adjustment than
without it.37 1
369. If P holds less than all of S's stock, then P must adjust its basis in the stock of S
to reflect only the portion of S's adjustment-producing items that are attributable
to the stock that P holds. See id. § 1.1502-32(c)(1).
370. Because S's right to receive the tax savings is treated as tax-exempt income, P's
basis in the stock of S can be increased only by a proportionate part of S's right to
receive payment. See id.
371. See Fred W. Peel, Jr., William F. Huber & Dennis J. Lubozynski, Consolidated
Return Prop. Regs. Revamp Concepts for Basis Adjustments and E&P, 78 J. TAX'N
86, 89 (1993) (noting that tax sharing adjustment "is a way of redressing, at least
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Example 3-A Wholly Owned Subsidiary with Income: P acquires
all of the stock of S by transferring to S cash of $300. P therefore has
an initial basis in S's stock of $300. During the year, P has a $100 loss
and S has $100 of taxable income. S thus achieves a $34 tax savings
through consolidation. Because of the parties' deemed tax sharing
agreement, S is treated as obligated to transfer $34 to P, and P is
treated as having the right to receive $34. S fails to transfer the $34
tax savings to P. Because S failed to transfer the tax savings to P, S
would be treated as if it had transferred the tax savings and, to ac-
count for the fact that P does not have the funds, P would be treated as
making a $34 contribution to S's capital. The adjustments to P's basis
in the stock of S would be as follows:
P's Initial Basis: $ 300
S's Income: $100
S's Obligation to Pay Tax Savings: $ (34)
Deemed Contribution by P: $ 34
P's Adjusted Basis: $ 400
This example again illustrates that a member's basis in the stock
of a wholly owned subsidiary is unaffected by the mandatory tax shar-
ing adjustment. If the rule did not exist, the only adjustment to P's
basis would be a $100 increase to reflect S's income, which would re-
sult in P having a $400 basis in the stock of S.
Example 4-A Partially Owned Subsidiary with Income: P ac-
quires 80 percent of the stock of S by transferring to S cash of $240. P
therefore has an initial basis in S's stock of $240. Several individuals
acquire the remaining 20 percent of S's stock by transferring to S a
total of $60 in cash. During the year, P has a $100 loss and S has $100
of taxable income. S thus achieves a $34 tax savings through consoli-
dation. Because of the parties' deemed tax sharing agreement, S is
treated as obligated to transfer $34 to P, and P is treated as having
the right to receive $34. S fails to transfer the $34 tax savings to P.
Because S failed to transfer the tax savings to P, S would be treated as
if it had transferred the tax savings and, to account for the fact that P
does not have the funds, P would be treated as making a $34 contribu-
tion to S's capital. The adjustments to P's basis in the stock of S would
be as follows:
in part, the present inconsistency by which P, with 80% of S's stock, can use 100%
of S's loss while reducing basis by only 80% of the loss so used").
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P's Initial Basis: $ 240.00
80% of S's Income: $ 80.00372
80% of S's Obligation to Pay Tax Savings: $ (27.20)
3 73
Deemed Contribution by P: $ 34.00
P's Adjusted Basis: $ 326.80
If the tax sharing adjustment did not exist, the only adjustment to
P's basis would be an $80 increase to reflect P's proportionate share of
S's income, which would result in P having a $320 basis in S's stock.
Instead, the tax sharing adjustment provides P with a basis of
$326.80. This difference reflects a normative rule that P should have
received all $34 of S's tax savings. Because S failed to transfer the tax
savings to P, P participates in only 80 percent of S's tax savings, or
$27.20. P does not have the benefit of the remaining $6.80 of savings.
The basis adjustment rules recognize P's lack of compensation. P's
loss from a subsequent sale of S's stock will be $6.80 greater (or its
gain $6.80 less) with the tax sharing adjustment than without it.
c. Tax Sharing Agreements
Members of a consolidated group of corporations commonly enter
into a tax sharing agreement that governs the manner in which fed-
eral tax burdens and benefits are allocated among the members.
374
Tax sharing agreements can address a number of issues,
3 75 including
the following: (1) the method for allocating the group's federal income
tax liability among the members, including the obligation, if any, of
members who experience a tax savings through consolidation to share
the savings with other group members, (2) the method for allocating
the group's federal income tax liability among the members for pur-
poses of determining earnings and profits, (3) when and to whom
members must make payments of tax savings and tax liability, e.g.,
the agreement might require each member to make regular payments
to the common parent to allow the parent to make the group's esti-
mated tax payments throughout the year, (4) procedures for making
372. If P holds less than all of S's stock, then P must adjust its basis in the stock of S
to reflect only the portion of S's adjustment-producing items that are attributable
to the stock that P holds. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32(c)(1) (as amended in 2002).
373. Because S's obligation to pay tax savings is treated as an additional tax liability
of S, it is a noncapital, nondeductible expense of S and P's basis in the stock of S
can be reduced only by a proportionate part of S's expense. See id.
374. See, e.g., In re Foster Mortgage Corp., 68 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1995); Dynamics
Corp. of Am. v. United States, 183 Ct. Cl. 101, 104-05 (1968); Rev. Rul. 76-302,
1976-2 C.B. 257; Rev. Rul. 73-605, 1973-2 C.B. 109.
375. See generally 3 DUBROFF, supra note 184, § 71.0214] [a]; Peter L. Faber, Tax Shar-
ing Agreements Among Members of an Affiliated Group Filing Consolidated Re-
turns, in 2 CONSOLIDATED TAX RETURN REGULATIONS (ALIIABA Course of Study
1996), LEXIS, Secondary Library, ALIABA File; Kenneth N. Sacks, Intercom-
pany Federal Income Tax Allocation Agreements, 13 J. CORP. TAX'N 40 (1986).
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determinations under the agreement, e.g., the person who is to deter-
mine how much tax liability is allocated to each member, and proce-
dures for resolving any disputes that arise, (5) how subsequent
adjustments to the group's tax liability will be taken into account,
such as a refund or an additional assessment of tax, and (6) the mem-
bers' rights and obligations when a member ceases to be a member of
the group, e.g., the party entitled to any refund that might arise after
a member's disaffiliation.376
The manner in which the members of a group allocate tax liability
among themselves under a tax sharing agreement might differ from
the method they use for purposes of determining each member's earn-
ings and profits and the method they are required to use for purposes
of determining adjustments to stock basis. There are several possible
reasons for this difference. For example, the prescribed allocation
methods for determining earnings and profits and stock basis adjust-
ments require allocation among corporations, but the group might
choose instead to allocate tax liability first among operational lines
and then among the corporations conducting those lines of busi-
ness. 37 7 Because a consolidated group can seek the Service's consent
to an alternative allocation method for earnings and profits purposes,
the group could seek to conform its earnings and profits allocation
method to the method it adopts in a tax sharing agreement. But the
group might not be able to obtain the Service's consent or might con-
clude that seeking the Service's consent is not worth the cost because
the tax consequences of the difference in methods are acceptable.
IV. THE ALLOCATION OF TAX SAVINGS AS A MATTER OF
STATE CORPORATE LAW
In a number of cases, the issue has arisen whether a consolidated
group member that achieves a tax savings through the consolidated
return mechanism must share the savings with the members whose
376. See, e.g., Abex, Inc. v. Koll Real Estate Group, Inc., Civ. A. No. 13462, 1994 WL
728827, at *2-*3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 22, 1994) (describing tax sharing agreement en-
tered into in connection with breakup of consolidated group). A common reason
for a member leaving a consolidated group is that the member is acquired by
outside interests. When the member is acquired through a stock acquisition,
many complex issues arise, such as the continuing effect, if any, of the selling
group's tax sharing agreement and the parties' rights with respect to tax benefits
and liabilities that arise in the future. These issues generally are dealt with in
the acquisition agreement or in a separate agreement that deals only with tax
matters. See generally Stuart J. Offer, Buying a Member Out of a Consolidated
Group: Drafting and Negotiating the Tax Provisions of the Acquisition Agree-
ment, in 2 CONSOLIDATED TAX RETURN REGULATIONS (ALI/ABA Course of Study1996), LEXIS, Secondary Library, ALIABA File; John F. Prusiecki, Income Tax
Sharing Agreement for a Stock Acquisition of a Seller's Subsidiary, 18 J. CORP.
TAX'N 299 (1992).
377. See Rev. Rul. 57-392, 1957-2 C.B. 615.
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tax attributes made the savings possible. For example, if a parent cor-
poration achieves a $34 tax savings by offsetting its income with its
subsidiary's operating lOSS, 3 78 does the parent have an obligation to
share the savings with the subsidiary, and if so, what portion of the
savings? Conversely, if a subsidiary achieves a $34 tax savings by off-
setting its income with the parent's operating loss, does the parent
have the right to share in the subsidiary's savings and, if so, what
portion?379
This issue has been raised by minority shareholders of partially
owned subsidiaries and, in more recent cases, by or on behalf of credi-
tors of wholly owned subsidiaries that are insolvent or in bankruptcy
proceedings. These parties have argued in litigation that the parent
breached its fiduciary duty by using the subsidiary's tax attributes
without adequately compensating the subsidiary (i.e., not sharing
enough of the parent's tax savings), or by charging too much for the
subsidiary's use of the parent's attributes (i.e., taking too much of the
subsidiary's tax savings).380 Almost uniformly, the courts have been
unreceptive to this argument. With limited exceptions, 38
1 judicial de-
378. As noted earlier, for convenience this discussion uses the terms "operating loss"
and "loss" to refer to a member's negative separate taxable income, i.e., to the
amount by which a member's deductions exceed its income, taking into account
the consolidated return rules for determining separate taxable income. See supra
note 324; see also supra subsection III.B.l.a (discussing computation of member's
separate taxable income).
379. As discussed infra in this Part, most of the litigated challenges to tax sharing
arrangements have focused on how tax savings produced by a parent's or subsidi-
ary's net operating losses should be divided. For discussion of other possible con-
flicts between parent and subsidiary arising from filing consolidated returns, see
Arnold C. Johnson, Minority Stockholders in Affiliated and Related Corporations,
23 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX'N 321, 328-34 (1965).
380. As discussed earlier, a parent corporation is treated under state corporate law as
a fiduciary of the subsidiary, its minority shareholders and, when the subsidiary
is insolvent or in bankruptcy proceedings, its creditors. See supra subsection
II.B.2.
381. The most notable exception is Smith v. Tele-Communication, Inc., 184 Cal. Rptr.
571 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982). See infra subsection IV.A.2.a (discussing Smith deci-
sion). There is also a line of cases in which the courts have awarded to subsidiar-
ies, rather than to their parent corporations, a consolidated group's tax refund
when the group obtained the refund by carrying back a consolidated loss attribu-
table to the subsidiary to a prior taxable year and using the loss in the prior year
to offset consolidated taxable income attributable to the subsidiary. See infra
notes 535-47 and accompanying text (discussing these cases).
In one other case, minority shareholders of a partially owned subsidiary suc-
cessfully forced a parent to return to the subsidiary all of the tax savings that the
subsidiary had paid to the parent, which savings the subsidiary had achieved by
offsetting its income with the parent's operating losses. See Alliegro v. Pan Am.
Bank of Miami, 136 So. 2d 656, 665 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962), affd mem., 149 So.
2d 45 (Fla. 1963). The court based its decision on its view that the subsidiary's
payment of tax savings to the parent constituted an impermissible dividend be-
cause it was a distribution made to only the controlling shareholder. Id. at 659.
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cisions within the last twenty-five years generally have applied what
is tantamount to a per se rule that a parent's decisions concerning the
allocation of tax savings among consolidated group members will not
be questioned. The development of this rule is attributable primarily
to the influence of three early cases: Western Pacific Railroad Corp. v.Western Pacific Railroad Co.,382 Case v. New York Central Railroad
Co.,383 and Meyerson v. El Paso Natural Gas C0.384 This Part firstdiscusses these three decisions and argues that they constitute an in-
appropriate foundation for the construction of a normative rule con-
cerning judicial review of tax savings allocations between parent and
subsidiary corporations. It then summarizes the modern judicial leg-
acy of these decisions and the views expressed by other commentators.In Part V, the Article suggests an appropriate framework for judicial
review of such allocations under traditional principles of corporate
law.
A. Judicial Decisions Addressing the Allocation of Tax
Savings
1. The Early Decisions
a. Western Pacific Railroad Corp. v. Western Pacific
Railroad Co.385
Western Pacific is the seminal decision addressing the allocation of
tax savings between parent and subsidiary corporations. In this case,
Western Pacific Railroad Corporation, a holding company, brought an
The court's view that a subsidiary's payment of tax savings to a parent consti-
tutes a dividend generally has not found favor in subsequent decisions and com-
mentary. See Meyerson v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 246 A.2d 789, 792 (Del. Ch.1967) (referring to Alliegro's conclusion as "questionable"); Centerre Bank of
Crane v. Dir. Of Rev., 744 S.W.2d 754, 760-62 (Mo. 1988) (referring to Alliegro
and holding that payments of tax savings by subsidiary were deductible business
expenses rather than dividends); Case v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 232 N.Y.S.2d 702,
705 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962) (referring to Alliegro and holding that tax savings paidby subsidiary to parent did not constitute dividends), rev'd, 243 N.Y.S.2d 620(N.Y. App. Div. 1963), rev'd, 204 N.E.2d 643 (N.Y. 1965); Note, Corporations: AParent May Not Allocate to Itself Substantially All of the Tax Savings Resultingfrom Consolidated Returns, 1964 DuKE L.J. 923, 926 & n.14 (describing reason-ing in Alliegro as unfortunate); Case Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1185, 1186-87(1964) (stating that court in Alliegro "fail[ed] to recognize that a loss .. .is a
valuable asset"); see also Johnson, supra note 379, at 346 (stating that result in
Alliegro "cannot be explained unless the view is adopted that the parent has no
right to any reimbursement from the subsidiary for the use of its losses"). But seeAriz. Dep't of Revenue v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 604 P.2d 1128, 1132-34(Ariz. 1979) (holding subsidiary's payments of tax savings to be dividends).
382. 197 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1951).
383. 204 N.E.2d 643 (N.Y. 1965).
384. 246 A.2d 789 (Del. Ch. 1967).
385. 197 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1951).
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action in which it sought, as a matter of equity, all or a part of approx-
imately $17 million in tax savings that one of its wholly owned operat-
ing subsidiaries, Western Pacific Railroad Company, had achieved by
offsetting its income with the parent's loss. 38 6 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals ultimately rejected the parent's claim.387 A brief ex-
planation of the relationship between the two corporations and the
manner in which the tax savings arose will facilitate an understand-
ing of the court's disposition of the claim.
The parent and subsidiary in Western Pacific, together with other
affiliated corporations, had filed consolidated returns for many
years.388 In 1935, the subsidiary filed a petition in bankruptcy and
trustees then managed its affairs.389 A plan of reorganization for the
subsidiary was proposed in 1939.390 The federal district court ap-
proved the plan, and in 1943 the United States Supreme Court ulti-
mately affirmed the district's court's approval.391 The reorganization
plan declared the parent's stock in the subsidiary, for which the par-
ent had paid $75 million, to be worthless.392 During the judicial hear-
ings on the plan, the parent objected to it on the basis that,
subsequent to the plan's original proposal in 1939, the subsidiary had
experienced increased earnings. 393 That is, the parent wished to par-
ticipate in the subsidiary's unexpected earnings. The Supreme Court
refused to take the increased earnings into account and approved the
plan as originally proposed.394 Pursuant to the plan and subsequent
agreements, the parent transferred its stock in the subsidiary to the
reorganization committee in April 1944.395
As they had in previous years, the parent and subsidiary filed a
consolidated return for their taxable year 1943.396 The parent
claimed a $75 million loss because the plan of reorganization, which
was finally confirmed in 1943, declared its investment in the subsidi-
ary's stock to be worthless. 397 Paradoxically, the subsidiary had taxa-
ble income in that year. By virtue of a special provision that Congress
had just enacted, the parent's loss, which normally would have been a
capital loss that could be used to offset only capital gain, was an ordi-
386. Id. at 997-99.
387. Id. at 997, 1006.
388. Id. at 997, 1001.
389. Id. at 997.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 997-98. For the Supreme Court's decision affirming the district court's ap-
proval of the plan of reorganization, see Ecker v. W. Pac. R.R. Corp., 318 U.S. 448
(1943).
392. 197 F.2d at 997-98.
393. Id.
394. 318 U.S. at 508-09.
395. 197 F.2d at 998.
396. Id.
397. Id.
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nary loss and could be used to offset ordinary income.3 98 On the con-
solidated return, the parent's loss more than offset the subsidiary's
income. 39 9 The parties carried back part of the remainder of the par-
ent's loss to the previous taxable year and filed a claim for refund of
taxes paid by the subsidiary in that year.40 0 They carried the remain-
der of the loss forward to the short period in 1944 when the parent and
subsidiary were still affiliated and again used it to shield income of
the subsidiary.40' After negotiations with the Service, the two corpo-
rations withdrew their refund claim for 1942 and the Service accepted
the returns as filed for 1943 and 1944.402 As a result, by virtue of the
parent's loss, the subsidiary saved approximately $17 million in
taxes.40 3
The parent brought an action in which it asked, as a matter of eq-
uity, that the court award it part or all of the subsidiary's $17 million
in tax savings. 40 4 The parent asserted that the subsidiary, through
its officers and attorneys, had controlled the parent's board of direc-
tors and, by virtue of this control, caused the parent to file consoli-
dated tax returns for the years in question. Specifically, the parent
asserted that the parent and subsidiary had common officers who did
not act maliciously, but nevertheless "deprived [the parent] of its inde-
pendence and caused it to suffer a loss."405
The federal district court rejected the parent's claim primarily on
two grounds. First, the court viewed the tax savings as a windfall that
never should have occurred. According to the court, the Service never
should have allowed a loss on the subsidiary's stock to be offset
against the subsidiary's own income. 40 6 The court refused to exercise
its equitable powers to assist the parent in obtaining a share of what
398. 197 F.2d at 998 & n.3.
399. See id. at 998.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 998-99.
405. Id. at 999. The parent originally did not assert that the subsidiary had controlled
it. This allegation was first made by three preferred stockholders of the parent
who intervened as plaintiffs to assert claims on the parent's behalf. See id. at
998-99. The parent's shareholders asserted that the subsidiary had dominated
the parent. The parent initially denied this, but later filed a supplemental com-
plaint in which it claimed that the subsidiary had exercised some degree of con-
trol, although its claims in this regard did not go as far as those of its preferred
shareholders. See id. at 999.
406. The district court was openly hostile to the settlement: "In every sense of the
word ... there was a real escape from the payment of taxes here. If I had the
power, I would not hesitate to set aside the tax settlement. Indeed, if I could, I
would order these taxes paid to the United States. That would effectively dispose
of the cause." W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 85 F. Supp. 868, 873-74
(N.D. Cal. 1949).
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it viewed as ill-gotten gains.4 0 7 Second, the court viewed the parent's
claim as a circuitous attempt to share in the subsidiary's increased
earnings. The court reasoned that allowing the parent to share in the
earnings through the guise of allocating tax savings would violate the
subsidiary's plan of reorganization because, during the course of judi-
cial proceedings approving the plan, the courts had specifically re-
jected the parent's request to share in the subsidiary's increased
earnings. 4 08 The court viewed the subsidiary's alleged control over
the parent as "not important in resolving the tendered issue."
40 9
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, in a split decision, affirmed. Its ap-
proach to the issue, however, was quite different from that of the dis-
trict court. It assumed, without deciding, that the subsidiary
controlled the parent and therefore acted as a fiduciary. 4 10 The ques-
tion, according to the court, therefore was whether the subsidiary had
dealt unfairly with the parent.4 1 1 The court concluded that it had not.
The court first rejected the claim that filing consolidated returns for
the years in question was unfair. The filing, it reasoned, was consis-
tent with past practice and had been undertaken with full knowledge
of and participation by the parent's president and its legal advisors,
some of whom represented the parent on appeal.
4 12
The court of appeals also rejected the claim that the subsidiary had
treated the parent unfairly by failing to implement an agreement pro-
viding for the subsidiary's sharing of its tax savings. According to the
court, the common officers of the two corporations had a "positive
duty" to make use of the parent's loss to offset income of members of
the group, and their duty to the parent "required only that they not
sacrifice its interests."413 In the court's view, the officers had not done
this. The court was influenced in part by the group's longstanding
practice of filing consolidated returns. Throughout the group's his-
tory, members with income, including the parent, had never been re-
quired to compensate members whose losses produced a tax
savings. 4 14 Further, the court seemed not to perceive any cognizable
harm to the parent, which it viewed as being in "exactly the same posi-
tion that it was in before the subsidiary had effected the tax
saving."4 15
On the surface, the decision of the court of appeals in Western Pa-
cific appears to stand for the proposition that a controlling corpora-
407. Id. at 874.
408. Id. at 874-75.
409. Id. at 875.
410. 197 F.2d at 1000-01.
411. Id. at 1001.
412. Id. at 1001-02.
413. Id. at 1004.
414. Id.
415. Id.
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tion's fiduciary obligations do not require it to compensate a
consolidated group member to whom it owes fiduciary duties for the
use of that member's favorable tax attributes, such as losses. Even at
this surface level, the court's conclusion is problematic. For example,
in assessing whether fairness requires a controlling corporation to
share tax savings with a controlled corporation, the court described
the appropriate judicial inquiry as whether the controlling corporation
had "sacrifice [d] its interests," a standard that few, if any courts would
accept in the parent-subsidiary context today. Indeed, in an analo-
gous case,4 16 the California Court of Appeals later refused to rely on
Western Pacific because it had been decided before the California Su-
preme Court clarified the fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders
in Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co.417 Further, even accepting the stan-
dard that the court in Western Pacific applied, the court never ex-
plained why the parent's interests were not sacrificed, i.e., why the
parent was not worse off as a result of having its $75 million tax loss
consumed.
Beneath the surface, however, it is apparent that the court of ap-
peals in Western Pacific simply did not accept the subsidiary's alleged
domination of the parent and viewed the parent's claim in much the
same way as the district court did: as an attempt to participate in the
subsidiary's earnings to the detriment of the subsidiary's creditors.
The court's rejection of the alleged domination is explicit: "The record
is barren of evidence to support the contention that [the parent] was
dominated by the subsidiary ... ."418 The court's desire to protect the
subsidiary's creditors is implicit, but clearly identifiable. In response
to the parent's argument that an independent committee of the par-
ent's directors and officers should have been formed to negotiate over
the tax savings, the court focused on the parent's fiduciary duty to deal
fairly with the subsidiary and its creditors:
The [parent] was the sole owner of the subsidiary's capital stock. As such it
was under a duty to deal fairly with the subsidiary having full regard for the
interests of the creditors and holders of other securities. It owed a duty not to
require its subsidiary to forego a legitimate tax saving and could not bargain
to perform its duty. A parent company is not acting in the best interests of its
subsidiary when it seeks to appropriate to itself an advantage which the tax
laws give the subsidiary. 4 19
In addition, there are facts from which one can infer that the plain-
tiffs in Western Pacific were tenacious and somewhat disingenuous.
As noted, the court of appeals ultimately did not accept the subsidi-
ary's alleged domination of the parent. One factor that appears to
416. Smith v. Tele-Communication, Inc., 184 Cal. Rptr. 571, 574 (Ct. App. 1982).
417. 460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969); see supra notes 152-62 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Ahmanson decision).
418. 197 F.2d at 1005.
419. Id. at 1004 (citation omitted).
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have influenced the court on this issue and the general issue of the
parent's candor is that the parent brought this action, in which it ar-
gued that it had been forced to file consolidated returns and treated
unfairly, at the same time that it was negotiating through its attor-
neys to have the Service accept the consolidated returns that had been
filed.420 Further, the parent was joined as a plaintiff by three pre-
ferred stockholders of the parent who intervened to press the parent's
claim. Although the court did not rely on the argument, the court's
opinion alludes to a claim by the subsidiary that the intervening
stockholders had purchased their stock in the parent, which itself was
having financial difficulties, on speculation in the hope of reaping
their proportionate share of the $17 million tax savings.
4 2 1
The tenacity of the parent and its shareholders is reflected in the
lengthy subsequent history of the case. The Ninth Circuit denied
their requests for rehearing and rehearing en banc.4 22 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari on a procedural question related to the man-
ner in which litigants can seek rehearing by a court of appeals en
banc, and after clarifying the law remanded so that the Ninth Circuit
could consider what procedural rules it wished to adopt.4 23 On re-
mand, after clarifying its procedural rules, the Ninth Circuit again de-
nied the plaintiffs' requests for rehearing and rehearing en banc.
42 4
After their petition for certiorari on this ruling was denied, 4 25 the
plaintiffs filed a separate action raising an allegedly new basis for
their entitlement to a share of the subsidiary's tax savings.4 2 6 The
district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the
merits and held the plaintiffs in contempt. The Ninth Circuit dis-
missed the plaintiffs' appeal from the decision on the merits as frivo-
lous, and refused to consider their appeal of the contempt ruling on
the basis that their appeal was premature.
4 27
One further aspect of the case deserves comment. When the Su-
preme Court considered the procedural issue related to rehearings en
banc, Justice Jackson, in a dissenting opinion, chose to discuss the
merits of the controversy. In his view, the case should have been re-
manded for the court to consider whether retaining all of the tax sav-
ings had unjustly enriched the subsidiary.4 28 He suggested that the
parent and subsidiary each had contributed something necessary to
produce the savings (income and loss), and for this reason "the conclu-
420. Id. at 1002.
421. Id. 1006.
422. W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 197 F.2d 994, 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 1952).
423. W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 267-68 (1953).
424. W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 206 F.2d 495, 500 (9th Cir. 1953).
425. W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 346 U.S. 910 (1953).
426. W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 216 F.2d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1954).
427. Id. at 515.
428. 345 U.S. at 277 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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sion would seem warranted that the plaintiff is entitled to what fair
arm's-length bargaining would probably have yielded."429 On re-
mand, the Ninth Circuit addressed these remarks. The court set forth
its view that the subsidiary had not been unjustly enriched because
the tax savings did not represent money that in equity belonged to the
parent and that the subsidiary had obtained under circumstances that
made it unjust to retain it. The parent, it stated, "is claiming moneys
which were earned through the operation of railroad properties in a
trust estate administered for the benefit of unpaid creditors of its for-
mer wholly-owned subsidiary."430 Finally, the court suggested that,
even if it were inclined to do so, the court could not impose an equita-
ble sharing arrangement:
How could this court or the district court determine "what fair arm's length
bargaining would probably have yielded"? Bargaining presupposes negotia-
tions to determine the maximum amount a buyer is willing to pay and the
minimum amount a seller is willing to accept. Such activity is a matter of
business administration, and is not a judicial function. 4 3 1
Viewed in context, the Ninth Circuit's opinion on the merits in
Western Pacific represents a result-oriented decision that had as its
primary goal the protection of a subsidiary's creditors. It is unfortu-
nate that the court of appeals took the approach it did. It could have
disposed of the case by holding that, because the record did not sup-
port the subsidiary's alleged domination of the parent, the subsidiary
owed the parent no fiduciary duty. Instead, it assumed the existence
of such domination and, in order to reach the result it desired, held
that the subsidiary's fiduciary duties did not require it to compensate
the parent by sharing the tax savings that the parent's loss produced.
By taking this approach, the court charted the course for future litiga-
tion of similar issues, including litigation initiated on behalf of subsid-
iaries actually subject to domination.
b. Case v. New York Central Railroad C0.432
In contrast to Western Pacific, Case addresses a situation in which
the parties had entered into an express agreement concerning the al-
429. Id. Justice Jackson gave the following analogy: "It was as if a treasure of seven-
teen million dollars were offered by the Government to whoever might have two
keys that would unlock it. Each of these parties had but one key, and how can it
be said that the holder of the other key had nothing worth bargaining for?" Id.
430. W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 206 F.2d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 1953).
431. Id. at 499-500.
432. 204 N.E.2d 643 (N.Y. 1965). As discussed infra in the text, in Case the New York
Court of Appeals reversed New York's intermediate appellate court, the appellate
division. A number of writers commented on the appellate division's decision.
See Johnson, supra note 379, at 329-42; Note, supra note 381; Recent Case, Case
v. New York Cent. R.R. (N.Y. App. Div. 1963), 77 HARv. L. REV. 1142 (1964); Case
Comment, supra note 381; Thomas B. Ridgley, Recent Decision, 62 MICH. L. REV.
1451 (1964); see also Note, Corporate Fiduciary Doctrine in the Context of Parent-
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location of tax savings. In Case, the parent, New York Central Rail-
road Company, initially owned 74 percent of the stock of one of its
subsidiaries, Mahoning Coal Railroad Company. 43 3 The subsidiary
owned railroad lines, but did not operate them. Rather, it leased the
lines to the parent under leases that required the parent to pay the
subsidiary 40 percent of the gross revenues that the parent earned
from operating them.434 Because the subsidiary had no operating ex-
penses, other than federal income taxes, the leases effectively guaran-
teed that the subsidiary would be profitable.
In 1955, the parent, which at the time had profitable operations,
entered into an agreement with several subsidiaries other than Ma-
honing. The agreement contemplated that the parties would file a
consolidated tax return each year and provided, among other things:
(1) that a corporation in the group receiving dividends from another
member would share with the paying member the tax savings result-
ing from the then-recent elimination of tax on such dividends,43 5 and
(2) that group members that experienced losses were to be reimbursed
for the use of those losses by those members with income, i.e., by those
members that benefited from the losses.43 6 Mahoning was not a party
to the agreement because the parent did not own a sufficient portion
of Mahoning's stock to include it in a consolidated return.
4 37
The parent subsequently proposed to Mahoning's board that, if the
parent increased its stock ownership of Mahoning to the level neces-
sary to include Mahoning in the group's consolidated return (80 per-
cent), then Mahoning would agree to become a party to the tax
allocation agreement. 4 38 The parent, by virtue of its 74 percent stock
ownership, nominated all of Mahoning's directors, and it appears that
at least a majority of Mahoning's directors were officers of the parent
or one of its other subsidiaries. 4 39 Mahoning's board approved the
Subsidiary Relations, 74 YALE L.J. 338, 339, 349-53 (1964) [hereinafter Note,
Corporate Fiduciary Doctrine] (proposing that fairness of parent-subsidiary
transactions be determined according to reasonable expectations of minority
shareholders and applying this analysis to Case).
433. 204 N.E.2d at 645.
434. Id. at 644.
435. The opinion of the New York Court of Appeals does not refer to this provision, but
the opinion of the trial court does. Case v. N.Y. Central R.R. Co., 232 N.Y.S.2d
702, 704 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962).
436. 204 N.E.2d at 644-45.
437. See supra subsection III.A.1 (discussing 80 percent stock ownership
requirement).
438. 204 N.E.2d at 645.
439. The opinion of New York's intermediate appellate court, the appellate division,
refers to six of the members as being officers of the parent or another subsidiary.
Case v. N.Y. Central R.R. Co., 243 N.Y.S.2d 620 623 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963). Ac-
cording to one commentator who had access to the parties' briefs, Mahoning's
board had seven members. Note, supra note 381, at 924.
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proposal, the parent increased its stock ownership of Mahoning to 80
percent, and Mahoning became a party to the tax allocation agree-
ment effective in 1957.
For the group's taxable years 1957 through 1960, the parent in-
curred substantial tax losses and Mahoning had income. If Mahoning
had filed separate returns for those years, it would have incurred a
tax liability of approximately $3.8 million.440 Because the parent's
losses completely offset Mahoning's income, Mahoning paid no tax and
achieved a $3.8 million tax savings. Pursuant to the tax allocation
agreement, Mahoning transferred to the parent more than $3.5 mil-
lion of the savings and retained approximately $268,000.441 It is not
entirely clear why Mahoning retained this portion of the savings. The
opinion of New York's intermediate appellate court, the appellate divi-
sion, suggests that Mahoning's retention is the result of the provision
in the tax allocation agreement requiring members that received divi-
dends (the parent) to share with paying members the tax savings re-
sulting from the elimination of tax on the dividends.442
Minority shareholders of Mahoning brought suit seeking to rescind
the tax allocation agreement and to recover all of the tax savings that
Mahoning had paid to the parent pursuant to the agreement. 44 3 They
asserted that the parent, by virtue of its control, was a fiduciary and
that the agreement was unfair. The trial court granted judgment for
the parent.4 44
The appellate division, in a split decision, reversed.445 The court
emphasized that, because Mahoning effectively was guaranteed to
have taxable income each year, its payment of virtually all of its tax
savings to the parent "was predictable and the inevitable result of the
formula contained in the allocation agreement."446 The court also
stressed that the tax allocation agreement had an effect only on Ma-
honing and its parent, and was "innocuous as to the other affiliates,"
because the parent's other subsidiaries either were wholly owned by
the parent or were lessors of the parent under leases that required the
parent to pay the lessor's federal income taxes. 44 7 Mahoning, it noted,
was dominated and controlled by the parent and had not retained in-
dependent tax or legal counsel to assist it in reviewing the agree-
440. 204 N.E.2d at 645.
441. Id.
442. See 243 N.Y.S.2d 620, 624 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963) (stating that parent had appro-
priated "all of the tax savings except for the minimal amounts involved on inter-
corporate dividends").
443. 204 N.E.2d at 645.
444. 232 N.Y.S.2d 702, 706 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962).
445. 243 N.Y.S.2d 620, 625 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963).
446. Id. at 622.
447. Id.
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ment. 448 The court acknowledged the difficulty in determining what
would constitute a fair agreement and did not specify what would be a
fair allocation of the tax savings. Nevertheless, it reasoned that the
agreement's appropriation to the parent of all of Mahoning's tax sav-
ings, other than the small amounts resulting from intercorporate divi-
dends, was not fair.44 9 The appellate division held that because the
agreement was not fair, the parent could not enforce it against Ma-
honing and was obligated to return to Mahoning all of the tax savings
it had received. 450
On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals reversed. It agreed that
the parent acted in a fiduciary capacity and therefore "was required to
follow a course of fair dealing toward minority holders in the way it
managed the corporation's business."4 5 1 The standard for determin-
ing fairness, it stated, was whether the parent had used its power to
gain "undue advantage to itself at the expense of the minority."4 52
The court reasoned that the agreement was not unfair to the subsidi-
ary because, although it provided a clear advantage to the parent, it
had caused no disadvantage to the minority shareholders because the
subsidiary was better off than if it had filed separate returns for the
year in question.45 3 That is, the subsidiary retained $268,000 that,
absent the consolidated returns, it would have paid in the form of
taxes to the government. The court emphasized that the agreement
allowed Mahoning, "without loss to itself," to contribute to the contin-
ued viability of the parent, which was incurring losses and whose fi-
nancial health was critical to Mahoning's survival.4 54 The court also
seemed influenced by the difficulty of determining precisely what allo-
cation of the tax savings would be fair. 455
The tax allocation agreement in Case was a rather obvious form of
self-dealing by the parent in the sense that the parent controlled Ma-
honing's board and the board, with no independent review of the
transaction, caused Mahoning to enter into the agreement. Accord-
ingly, the New York Court of Appeals correctly analyzed the agree-
ment under a fairness standard. The problem lies in the court's
application of this standard. In assessing whether the subsidiary and
448. Id. at 623.
449. Id. at 623-24.
450. Id. at 624.
451. 204 N.E.2d at 645-46.
452. Id. at 646. As noted earlier, this fairness test is essentially the same test that the
Delaware Supreme Court later adopted as a threshold test to determine whether
a parent corporation has engaged in "self-dealing" in transactions with its subsid-
iary. See supra subsection II.B.3.c.
453. 204 N.E.2d at 647.
454. Id.
455. See id. at 647 (stating that "even the Appellate Division majority felt itself unable
to say what would be a fair proportion of the distribution of [the parent's] tax loss
looking forward from the date of judgment").
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its minority shareholders suffered a disadvantage, the relevant base-
line for comparison should not have been the subsidiary's situation
filing separate returns. Rather, the comparison should have been the
subsidiary's joining in the consolidated return with no tax allocation
agreement in place. From a federal tax perspective, a tax allocation
agreement is not required in order to file a consolidated return. Thus,
there were really two different agreements involved in Case: Mahon-
ing's agreement to join the consolidated return and the agreement
concerning allocation of tax savings. Had Mahoning joined the consol-
idated group but not become a party to the tax allocation agreement, it
would have retained all of its tax savings and the parent and minority
shareholders would have enjoyed the benefit of the savings in propor-
tion to their stock ownership. Compared against this baseline, the
agreement, the effect of which was foreseeable at the time Mahoning
entered into it, clearly put the minority shareholders at a disadvan-
tage: instead of a claim on 20 percent of $3.8 million, they had a claim
on 20 percent of $268,000.
Even if one accepts the court's view that the relevant comparison
in determining disadvantage to the minority is the subsidiary's situa-
tion if it had filed separate returns, the broader implications of the
court's analysis are troubling. In theory, whether the tax allocation
agreement required Mahoning to pay a fair price for the parent's
losses could be determined by comparing the price that Mahoning
paid, i.e., the portion of its tax savings that it transferred to the parent
to comparable transactions between unrelated parties or to the results
of hypothetical arm's-length bargaining concerning price between Ma-
honing and the parent.4 5 6 By definition, however, there are no compa-
rable market transactions between unrelated parties because only
related parties can file consolidated returns. It would seem possible to
establish a range of fair prices by estimating the results of hypotheti-
cal arm's-length bargaining,457 but the courts, like the Ninth Circuit
in Western Pacific, generally decree that they are unable to determine
the results of such bargaining.458 As a result, as long as a subsidiary
456. See CLARK, supra note 35, § 4.1, at 147-48 (discussing these two standards for
determining fairness).
457. See infra note 534 and accompanying text (discussing courts' use of hypothetical
arm's-length bargaining standard); cf. Chelrob, Inc. v. Barrett, 57 N.E.2d 825,
834-35 (N.Y. 1944) (engaging in analysis of whether corporation breached fiduci-
ary duty by selling gas to related party at too low a price by examining what
selling corporation's objectives would be in selling to third party, such as recover-
ing its costs and earning a profit).
458. W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 206 F.2d 495, 499-500 (9th Cir. 1953);
Case v. N.Y. Central R.R. Co., 243 N.Y.S.2d 620, 627 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963)
(Steuer, J., dissenting), rev'd, 204 N.E.2d 643 (N.Y. 1965). The dissent in the
appellate division in Case reasoned that the results of hypothetical arm's-length
bargaining could not be determined because the results "would depend almost
entirely on the bargaining ability and the personal characteristics of the parties."
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gets some benefit from an agreement with its parent, no matter how
small, the court's approach in Case leaves a parent corporation free to
dictate the terms of the transaction in all situations in which there are
no comparable market transactions. It also serves as a disincentive
for parents to engage in actual negotiations with its subsidiaries, e.g.,
by establishing a committee of the subsidiary's independent directors,
because as long as such negotiations do not take place and there are
no comparable market transactions, the parent is assured of control-
ling the transaction's terms. To use the lack of comparable market
transactions and arm's-length bargaining to the fiduciary's advantage
is to turn fiduciary analysis on its head.
As discussed in Part V, it would be much more consistent with
traditional fiduciary norms to place the burden of proving fairness on
the parent and, if the parent cannot establish fairness because no bar-
gaining took place and there are no comparable market transactions,
to require the parent, as the appellate division did in Case, to return
all tax savings to the subsidiary.
c. Meyerson v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. 4 59
Meyerson represents an extension of the holdings in the two deci-
sions previously discussed, Western Pacific and Case. The court in
Meyerson interpreted Western Pacific as standing for the proposition
that a dominant corporation's fiduciary duties do not require it to
share its tax savings with a controlled corporation whose tax losses
produced it.460 It interpreted Case as holding that it is not unfair for a
parent corporation to appropriate for itself all or nearly all of the tax
savings that its subsidiary achieved by virtue of the parent's losses.46 1
One possible synthesis of these holdings is that, if a parent is in all
circumstances entitled to retain or take all tax savings for itself, then
the parent's decision regarding allocation of tax savings must be a
business judgment with which courts generally will not interfere. As
discussed below, this is the conclusion of the court in Meyerson. As
previously discussed, the holdings in Western Pacific and Case do not
provide an appropriate foundation on which to construct a normative
rule. For this reason, and others, the court's conclusion in Meyerson is
unsound.
In Meyerson, a parent corporation purchased from minority share-
holders of its subsidiary, Northwest Production Corporation, a suffi-
Id. This raises the question of how hypothetical the hypothetical bargain is, i.e.,
is it "an approximation of something that particular parties would have agreed
to," or is it instead "truly hypothetical"? DeMott, supra note 23, at 889-90 (dis-
cussing issue).
459. 246 A.2d 789 (Del. Ch. 1967).
460. Id. at 792.
461. Id.
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cient number of shares to bring its stock ownership in Northwest to
the requisite level of 80 percent, which allowed the parent and North-
west to begin filing consolidated tax returns in 1962.462 Northwest
held wasting assets4 63 and therefore had tax losses for the years 1962
through 1965.464 Northwest's losses produced substantial tax savings
for the parent, which the parent retained. During the periods in-
volved, Northwest's directors and principal officers were also directors
and/or officers of the parent.4 65
A minority shareholder of Northwest brought suit and asserted
that the parent had breached its fiduciary duty to treat Northwest and
its minority shareholders fairly by retaining all of the tax savings for
itself. The plaintiff asked that the parent be required to account for
past tax savings and that the court impose a fair tax allocation agree-
ment for future years. 46 6 Specifically, the plaintiff asked that the par-
ent be required to allocate all tax savings to Northwest, which would
allow the parent and minority stockholders to participate in them in
proportion to their stock ownership.46 7
In response, the court reviewed the decisions in Western Pacific
and Case and, as noted above, interpreted them as holding that it is
not unfair for a parent to retain or take all tax savings for itself. It
then reasoned that requiring the parent to contribute all tax savings
to Northwest would not give either the parent or the minority share-
holders any assurance of participating in the savings because North-
west, a wasting asset corporation, might not be permitted under state
law to pay dividends and any dividend declarations would be discre-
tionary with its board.4 6s Referring to Justice Jackson's comments in
Western Pacific and the Ninth Circuit's response on remand, 469 the
court stated that it would be impossible to set fair standards for allo-
cating the tax savings, and that this impossibility did not justify allo-
cating all of the savings to Northwest, which likely could not have
gained any tax benefit from the losses on its own. 4 70 Accordingly, the
court concluded, "[t]he question ... is reduced to one of business judg-
462. Id. at 790.
463. The term "wasting asset" refers to "[ain asset exhausted through use or the loss of
value, such as an oil well or a coal deposit." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 114 (7th ed.
1999).
464. 246 A.2d at 790, 793. Wasting assets such as mines, oil and gas wells and timber
give rise to substantial tax deductions for depletion. See I.R.C. § 611(a) (2000).
465. 246 A.2d at 790.
466. Id. at 790.
467. Id. at 792-93.
468. Id. at 793.
469. See supra notes 428-31 and accompanying text.
470. 246 A.2d at 794.
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ment with which the court should not interfere absent a showing of
'gross and palpable overreaching.' No such showing is here made."471
There are several problems with the court's analysis. 47 2 First, and
most importantly, it oversimplifies the holdings in Western Pacific and
Case and therefore starts from a false premise. As discussed earlier,
Western Pacific involved somewhat bizarre facts and the decision is
best viewed as an attempt to protect those in a position analogous to
that of minority shareholders: creditors of a bankrupt subsidiary.4 73
In Case, the court recognized that the parent, by entering into an
agreement that made its tax losses available to the subsidiary, was
providing something of value for which it was entitled to receive com-
pensation.474 The court applied a fairness standard and inquired
whether the parent had received an advantage from -the tax allocation
agreement at the expense of the subsidiary's minority shareholders.
It concluded that, because the subsidiary received at least some bene-
fit from the allocation of tax savings relative to its tax position filing a
separate return, the allocation was not unfair. As previously dis-
cussed, that holding is troublesome in itself. But even under that
standard, the subsidiary in Meyerson should have been entitled to re-
lief because the parent's advantage (tax savings) came at the expense
of the subsidiary, whose tax losses were consumed. The court's deci-
sion in Meyerson, by virtue of oversimplifying Case, goes a significant
step further and holds that, even when a parent's tax allocation deci-
sions give the parent an advantage and place a subsidiary in a worse
position than if it had filed separately, the parent's decision is subject
to review under the business judgment rule. A business judgment
standard is inappropriate in a transaction that, like the one in Meyer-
son, involves obvious self-dealing by the parent. 47 5
471. Id. The court's conclusion can be traced to the dissenting opinion in the appellate
division in Case, which stated that, because it would be impossible to determine
the results of hypothetical arm's-length bargaining between parent and subsidi-
ary, "it must be the rule that anything short of gross and palpable overreaching
does not warrant court interference." Case v. N.Y. Central R.R. Co., 243 N.Y.S.2d
620, 627 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963) (Steuer, J., dissenting), rev'd, 204 N.E.2d 643
(N.Y. 1965).
472. Other commentators also have found fault with the reasoning in Meyerson. See
Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and
Takeovers, 88 HARv. L. REV. 297, 323 n.54 (1974); William L. Cary, Federalism
and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 682 (1974).
473. See supra subsection IV.A.I.a.
474. See Case v. N.Y. Central R.R. Co., 204 N.E.2d 643, 647 (N.Y. 1965) (stating that
parent's loss was an asset that, had it not been consumed by subsidiary, could
have been carried forward and utilized to offset income in future tax years); supra
subsection IV.A.1.b (discussing Case).
475. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text (discussing business judgment rule
and how it does not apply to decisions potentially influenced by self-interest);
supra subsection II.B.3 (discussing judicial standards of review applied to parent-
subsidiary transactions).
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A second problem with the analysis in Meyerson, which overlaps
with the first, is that it conflates the issue of whether a parent corpo-
ration has treated a subsidiary fairly with the issue of the value of the
subsidiary's tax losses.476 The court focused on the fact that the sub-
sidiary likely could not have made use of its losses on its own because,
as a wasting asset corporation, it produced losses each year. But that
fact is relevant only to the value of the subsidiary's losses, i.e., to the
amount that the subsidiary would have charged for the parent's use of
the losses had the parties engaged in negotiations. As discussed ear-
lier, in reviewing self-dealing transactions between parent and subsid-
iary, courts inquire whether there was fair dealing and a fair price. A
parent can breach its fiduciary duty through lack of fair dealing, even
if it paid a fair price.477 The court's approach in Meyerson ignores fair
dealing and effectively forecloses any examination of fair price by as-
suming that the losses of a corporation in a recurring loss position
have no value. This assumption in itself is unwarranted. For exam-
ple, deductions that produce recurring losses might allow the corpora-
tion to enter or acquire new activities that produce income and shelter
that income from tax. Indeed, that is precisely the type of use that the
parent in Meyerson made of the subsidiary's losses.
A third problem is that the court in Meyerson inappropriately used
the subsidiary's potential inability to declare dividends as a rationale
for allowing the parent to retain all tax savings. The issue in the case
was whether the parent had treated the subsidiary, Northwest, fairly,
not whether Northwest legally could have declared dividends or
whether its board would choose to do so. The plaintiff in Meyerson
asked that the parent be required to transfer the savings to Northwest
because then the minority shareholders (and the parent) would have a
proportionate claim on them and would receive them, either in the
form of current dividends or upon the corporation's liquidation. Taken
to its extreme, the court's reasoning would mean that a parent could
appropriate assets from a subsidiary, such as an office building that is
currently underutilized, without paying for them on the theory that, if
the parent did pay for them, the minority shareholders might not re-
ceive those funds in the form of dividends.
Since the Delaware Court of Chancery decided Meyerson more
than thirty-five years ago, the Delaware Supreme Court has not di-
rectly addressed the appropriate standard of review for a parent's de-
476. Cf. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Forman (In re Forman Enters.,
Inc.), No. 00-20523-BM, 2002 WL 169219, at *2-*3 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Jan. 31,
2002) (noting that defendants' argument that shareholders ofsubchapter S corpo-
ration were not unjustly enriched by using corporation's net operating losses be-
cause losses were of no value for corporation "misses the point").
477. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text (discussing situations in which
courts have granted rescission or rescissory damages for lack of fair dealing).
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cisions concerning allocation of tax savings. It has referred to the
holding in Meyerson in an approving manner on two occasions. In
Wolfensohn v. Madison Fund, Inc.,478 the court referred to Meyerson
when it stated in dictum that "utilization by a parent of its subsidi-
ary's tax loss carryover is not illegal absent 'gross and palpable over-
reaching."' 47 9 In Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co.,480 the court stated
that Delaware courts had applied the intrinsic fairness test to parent-
subsidiary transactions in which the parent controlled the making
and terms of the transaction, but had applied the business judgment
rule to transactions whose terms were set by a third party, such as the
government, rather than by the parent. 4 8 1 The court referred to Mey-
erson as an example of the latter situation.4 82 Even accepting the va-
lidity of Getty Oil's explanation that the business judgment rule
applies when the transaction's terms are set by a third party, an as-
sertion that is questionable,48 3 the terms of the transaction in Meyer-
son were not set by a third party. "The transaction" in Meyerson was
the parties' agreement, or lack thereof, concerning the allocation of tax
savings. As discussed earlier in Part III, the federal tax rules do not
require members of a consolidated group to allocate tax savings
among themselves. 48 4 Such agreements are voluntary. The federal
tax rules do contain extensive rules concerning the treatment of any
tax savings allocations that the parties choose to make, and indeed
reflect a policy contrary to Meyerson: that any tax savings should be
allocated to the group members whose tax attributes produced it.485
For present purposes, however, the point is that the Delaware Su-
preme Court has not squarely addressed the issue raised in
Meyerson.48 6
478. 253 A.2d 72 (Del. 1969).
479. Id. at 76. The court's statement was dictum because it refused to address the
plaintiffs claim concerning a parent's potential future use of its subsidiary's
losses on the ground that the claim was premature.
480. 267 A.2d 883 (Del. 1970).
481. Id. at 887.
482. Id.
483. See Thomas W. Walde, Parent-Subsidiary Relations in the Integrated Corporate
System: A Comparison of American and German Law, 9 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 455,
475 (1974) (describing Getty Oil as "another incursion into the [intrinsic fairness
test] justified, unconvincingly, by third party control"); Note, supra note 171, at
1233 (describing Getty Oil as "perhaps the most feeble attempt on the part of a
court to distinguish between cases in which the intrinsic fairness test, as opposed
to the business judgment test, should be applied").
484. See supra section III.D.
485. See supra subsection III.D.2.b.
486. The Delaware Supreme Court referred to Meyerson in a third decision that has
previously been discussed, Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971),
in which the court cited Meyerson for the proposition that, when the business
judgment rule applies, "a court will not interfere with the judgment of a board of
directors unless there is a showing of gross and palpable overreaching." Id. at
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2. The Modern Legacy of the Early Decisions
The unfortunate modern legacy of the Western Pacific, Case, and
Meyerson decisions is that claims asserting that a parent corporation
has breached its fiduciary duty in allocating tax savings are virtually
destined to fail. As discussed below, since those early decisions, a mi-
nority shareholder successfully argued for a proportionate sharing of
tax savings in one case. In the remaining cases, which were initiated
by or on behalf of creditors of an insolvent or bankrupt subsidiary, the
courts have, subject to a narrow exception, refused to grant relief.
a. An Anomaly: Smith v. Tele-Communication, Inc. 4 S 7
With the exception of situations in which a subsidiary's loss has
given rise to tax savings by offsetting the subsidiary's own income in
another taxable year,48S Smith represents the only case in which a
minority shareholder or creditor of a subsidiary has successfully chal-
lenged the fairness of an allocation of tax savings arising from filing a
consolidated return.48 9
In Smith, a corporation gradually acquired 80 percent of the stock
of a subsidiary, Crystal Brite Television, Inc.49 0  One individual,
720, 722; see supra subsection II.B.3.c (discussing Sinclair decision). As dis-
cussed in Part II, in Sinclair a minority shareholder of a subsidiary challenged
certain actions of the subsidiary's parent. One of the plaintiffs claims was that
the parent had received tax benefits, the nature of which is unclear, from filing
consolidated returns with the subsidiary. Levien v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 261 A.2d
911, 927 (Del. Ch. 1969), rev'd, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971). The Delaware Chancery
Court appeared to view Meyerson as binding precedent on the issue of the appro-
priate standard of review, and declined to award any relief to the subsidiary on
this claim after the plaintiff failed to offer any evidence in support of it at trial.
Id. The plaintiff apparently chose not to pursue this claim on appeal because the
Delaware Supreme Court's opinion makes no reference to it. In a subsequent
case in which a plaintiff challenged a parent's tax sharing arrangement, the
chancery court did not reach the merits of the plaintiffs challenge, but noted that
the parent's reliance on Meyerson to support its tax allocation agreement "may be
unjustified" and suggested that Meyerson's holding may be limited to situations
in which a subsidiary has no prospect of making use of its tax losses. Schreiber v.
Bryan, 396 A.2d 512, 517 n.8 (Del. Ch. 1978).
487. 184 Cal. Rptr. 571 (Ct. App. 1982).
488. See infra notes 535-47 and accompanying text (discussing these cases).
489. As noted earlier, minority shareholders of a partially owned subsidiary success-
fully forced a parent to return to the subsidiary all of the tax savings that the
subsidiary had achieved through the parent's operating losses in one other case.
See Alliegro v. Pan Am. Bank of Miami, 136 So. 2d 656, 665 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1962), affd mem., 149 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1963); supra note 381. The court's decision,
however, was based not on fairness, but rather on its view that the subsidiary's
payment to the parent of the subsidiary's tax savings constituted an impermissi-
ble dividend because it was paid to only the controlling shareholder. 136 So. 2d
at 659.
490. 184 Cal. Rptr. at 572.
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Smith, held the remaining 20 percent of Crystal Brite's stock.491
Crystal Brite's directors, who were elected by the parent and allegedly
"agents or employees" of the parent, contracted to sell all of Crystal
Brite's assets.49 2 The directors sought Smith's consent to the sale
and, in doing so, informed him that the sale would cause Crystal Brite
to incur a tax liability.49 3 In fact, Crystal Brite incurred no tax liabil-
ity as a result of the sale because the parent and Crystal Brite filed a
consolidated return and the parent's loss completely offset Crystal
Brite's income. 49 4 After Smith was informed that Crystal Brite had
no tax liability to the government, the parent caused Crystal Brite to
transfer to it approximately $279,000, which represented the tax lia-
bility that Crystal Brite would have incurred had it filed a separate
return.4 95 That is, the parent claimed it was entitled to all of the sub-
sidiary's tax savings.
Smith brought suit and asserted that the parent had breached its
fiduciary duty in appropriating all of Crystal Brite's tax savings. The
trial court sustained the parent's demurrer and dismissed the com-
plaint, but the California Court of Appeals reversed.4 9 6 The court of
appeals first noted that, under Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co.,497 a
controlling shareholder cannot use its control of a corporation in a
manner that benefits only itself or that is detrimental to minority
shareholders, but instead must use its control in a manner that bene-
fits all shareholders proportionately.4 98 The court emphasized
Ahmanson's statement that a controlling shareholder bears the bur-
den of proving that its transactions with the corporation are fair and
that the appropriate inquiry is whether the transaction bears resem-
blance to an arm's-length bargain.
49 9
The parent argued that Smith had suffered no detriment from the
payment of all tax savings to the parent because, had Crystal Brite
filed a separate return, it would have paid exactly the same amount to
the government. 50 0 Because Smith had suffered no detriment, the
parent argued, the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Sinclair Oil
Corp. v. Levien5 01 suggested that a business judgment standard of re-
view should apply. The parent also referred to Western Pacific as a
491. Id.
492. Id.
493. Id. at 572-73.
494. Id. at 573.
495. Id.
496. Id. at 572.
497. 460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969); see supra notes 152-62 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Ahmanson decision).
498. 184 Cal. Rptr. at 574.
499. Id.
500. Id.
501. 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971); see supra subsection II.B.3.c (discussing Sinclair
decision).
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decision in which the court held that the subsidiary, which allegedly
dominated its parent, had no fiduciary obligation to share the tax sav-
ings it had achieved by virtue of the parent's loss. The court distin-
guished Sinclair as a situation in which the court applied the businessjudgment rule to the subsidiary's payment of dividends because all
shareholders, including the minority, had shared in them proportion-
ately.5 02 It refused to follow Western Pacific because that case had
been decided before the California Supreme Court clarified the fiduci-
ary obligations of controlling shareholders in Ahmanson.503
The court concluded that a fairness standard applied to the par-
ent's allocation of tax savings. In assessing whether Smith's allega-
tions were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, the court focused
on both procedural and substantive aspects of fairness in much the
same way that courts now assess entire fairness by looking to the ele-
ments of fair dealing and fair price.5 04 With respect to procedure, it
emphasized that Smith had no knowledge of either the consolidated
return procedure or Crystal Brite's tax savings until after he had con-
sented to the sale of its assets5 05 and that he had not consented to
Crystal Brite's transfer of the tax savings to the parent.5 06 With re-
spect to substance, the court suggested that, because both Crystal
Brite and its parent had contributed something towards the tax sav-
ings (income and loss), "[flairness requires a proportionate sharing of
the benefit."507 The court recognized that the New York Court of Ap-
peals in Case had applied a fairness standard to a similar factual situ-
ation and had refused to question the allocation of tax savings
imposed by the parties' tax sharing agreement, but distinguished Case
as a situation in which the court viewed the agreement as fair because
it had provided at least some benefit to the subsidiary.508 The court
concluded that it was unable to state as a matter of law that the par-
ent's appropriation of all of Crystal Brite's tax savings for itself was
"fair and in good faith and equitable to Smith under Ahmanson."509
b. The Remaining Cases: Deference to Parents
Since the early decisions in Western Pacific, Case, and Meyerson,
claims seeking an allocation of tax savings have been asserted prima-
502. 184 Cal. Rptr. at 574.
503. Id.
504. See supra subsection II.B.3.b (discussing entire fairness standard of review).
505. 184 Cal. Rptr. 574-75.
506. Id. at 575.
507. Id. By using the term "proportionate sharing" the court seemed to be suggesting
that Smith should share in the tax savings in proportion to his 20 percent stock
ownership, a sharing arrangement that normally would be carried out by allocat-
ing all of the savings to the subsidiary.
508. Id.
509. Id.
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rily by or on behalf of creditors of a subsidiary that was insolvent or in
bankruptcy proceedings. The creditors typically have asserted that
the subsidiary's parent breached its fiduciary duty by failing to com-
pensate the subsidiary for the use of its tax losses by either the parent
or another member of the consolidated group. 5 10 These cases thus in-
volve a fact pattern similar to that in Meyerson. Subject to a narrow
exception, which is discussed below, the courts have uniformly con-
cluded that the parent did not breach its fiduciary duty in failing to
share with the subsidiary tax savings that the parent or another
group member achieved by virtue of the subsidiary's losses. Although
the courts have offered a variety of rationales to support their conclu-
sions, their common bond is that Western Pacific, Case, or Meyerson,
or some combination of those decisions has, at least to some extent,
influenced them all.
(1) The General Trend of Deference to Parents
The courts are not always clear concerning the standard of review
that applies, but it is fair to say that most courts now review alloca-
tions of tax savings under what amounts to a business judgment stan-
dard. One recent decision expressly applied a business judgment
standard to a written tax sharing agreement that compensated a sub-
sidiary for the use of its losses by other group members in only limited
circumstances. 5 1 1 Another decision purported to review a written tax
sharing agreement under a fairness standard, but stated that "[t]he
concept of 'unfairness' equates to 'gross and palpable overreach-
ing,"'5 12 which is the business judgment standard that the Delaware
Court of Chancery applied in Meyerson.5 13 In situations where the
parties have had no written tax sharing agreement, some courts have
inferred from the parties' past practice the existence of a tax sharing
agreement that did not provide compensation for the use of a group
member's losses, and then reviewed "the agreement" under what ap-
510. As discussed earlier, a parent corporation is treated as a fiduciary with respect to
creditors of a subsidiary that is insolvent or in bankruptcy proceedings. See
supra subsection II.B.2.
511. Marvel Entm't Group, Inc. v. Mafco Holdings, Inc. (In re Marvel Entm't Group,
Inc.), 273 B.R. 58, 78-79 (D. Del. 2002). The tax sharing agreement in Marvel
provided that the subsidiary was entitled to receive payments from other group
members for the use of its loss only to the extent that the subsidiary, hypotheti-
cally filing its own separate returns, could have used the loss to obtain a refund
by carrying the loss back to a prior taxable year. Id. at 66. Thus, to the extent
that the subsidiary's loss would not generate such a hypothetical refund, the sub-
sidiary received no payment for the loss.
512. Franklin Sav. Corp. v. Franklin Sav. Ass'n (In re Franklin Sav. Corp.), 159 B.R.
9, 30 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1993), affd, 182 B.R. 859 (D. Kan. 1995).
513. See supra subsection IV.A.I.c (discussing Meyerson decision).
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pears to be a business judgment standard.514 Not surprisingly, such
deference to tax sharing agreements has led one parent to make the
rather audacious argument that the group had a tax sharing agree-
ment in effect under which the parent "customarily filed consolidated
returns each year and arbitrarily allocated any liability or refund
among its subsidiaries in its sole discretion."515 The prevailing ap-
proach to judicial review of allocations of tax savings is perhaps best
reflected in the following concise summary: "the courts will not ques-
tion an allocation which results from an express agreement, or an
agreement which is clearly implied."516
The prevailing approach of reviewing tax sharing agreements
under the business judgment rule fails to recognize that such agree-
ments involve self-dealing by the parent. As discussed in Part V, such
agreements inherently involve self-dealing and therefore are more ap-
propriately reviewed under an entire fairness standard. Inferring the
existence of an "agreement" from the absence of prior tax sharing pay-
ments also is problematic.517 Doing so overlooks the parent's ability
to impose its will on the subsidiary. It also ignores the fact that a
parent benefits from a subsidiary's tax savings regardless of whether
the subsidiary transfers the savings to the parent, but that the con-
verse is not true. That is, if a subsidiary achieves a tax savings by
virtue of a parent's loss and does not transfer the savings to the par-
ent, the parent nevertheless participates in the subsidiary's savings
by virtue of its ownership of the subsidiary's stock. But if a parent
achieves a tax savings as a result of the subsidiary's loss and does not
transfer the savings to the subsidiary, the subsidiary does not share in
the savings at all. Because of the parent's control and its automatic
participation in the subsidiary's tax savings, the fact that a subsidiary
has not previously transferred its tax savings to the parent as compen-
sation for use of the parent's loss should not form the basis for infer-
ring the existence of an agreement that a parent is not required to
compensate the subsidiary by sharing the parent's tax savings.
514. See In re Coral Petroleum, Inc., 60 B.R. 377, 389-90 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986) (stat-
ing that "[i]n the absence of a showing of actual fraud, no equitable justification
exists for overturning the agreement of the parties"); In re All Products Co., 32
B.R. 811, 814 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) (stating that "[t]he only question is
whether facts are present to justify a court to disregard what the parties agreed
to do and to impose its own rule of fairness").
515. Indep. BankGroup, Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re Indep. BankGroup, Inc.),
217 B.R. 442, 444 (D. Vt. 1998).
516. Capital Bancshares, Inc. v. Fed. Dep. Ins. Corp., 957 F.2d 203, 207 (5th Cir.
1992).
517. The fact that a subsidiary joins in a consolidated return, by itself, does not de-
prive the subsidiary of any interest in its tax losses or represent an agreement
concerning compensation for their use. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v.
PSS S.S. Co. (In re Prudential Lines, Inc.), 928 F.2d 565, 570-71 (2d Cir. 1991).
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Other decisions do not expressly adopt a specific standard of re-
view, but reflect Meyerson's reasoning that a parent's fiduciary duty
does not require it to compensate a subsidiary for the use of the sub-
sidiary's losses when the subsidiary is unlikely to be able to obtain a
tax benefit from the losses on its own. For example, in Jump v.
Manchester Life & Casualty Management Corp.,518 the court began
with the premise that a parent's fiduciary duty requires it to compen-
sate a subsidiary for the use of its losses if the losses constitute assets
of the subsidiary.5 19 It then reasoned that such losses could be viewed
as assets of the subsidiary only if the subsidiary could make use of
them by carrying them forward to offset income in future taxable
years or if the subsidiary could bargain with the other group members
over the use of its losses.520 The court concluded that, at the time the
subsidiary made its losses available to group members, it was not a
going concern likely to have taxable income in the future because it
was subsequently put under the control of a conservator and liqui-
dated. 52 1 It also concluded that the subsidiary could not have bar-
gained with the other group members for the use of its losses because
it had previously agreed to make its losses available by joining in the
consolidated return and, under the federal tax rules, was required to
continue filing on a consolidated basis. 5 22 Accordingly, the court held
the parent had no fiduciary duty to share with the subsidiary tax sav-
ings produced by the subsidiary's losses.5 23 Other courts have
adopted a similar analysis. 524
The analysis in Jump and similar cases suffers from the same de-
fect as the analysis in Meyerson: it conflates the issue of the appropri-
ate judicial standard of review with the issue of the value of the
subsidiary's tax losses.5 25 As discussed in Part V, courts should re-
view allocations of tax savings under an entire fairness standard and,
to the extent there is uncertainty concerning the fairness of an alloca-
tion, the uncertainty should not work to the fiduciary's advantage.
The court's analysis in Jump is disturbing for an additional reason: it
uses the subsidiary's inability to bargain over the use of its losses as a
rationale for denying relief. The reason that a subsidiary is not in a
position to bargain is that the subsidiary at some point became a
518. 579 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1978).
519. Id. at 453 (stating that "[tihe linchpin of [the subsidiary's] argument is the pre-
mise that [the subsidiary's] 1974 net operating loss generated a valuable asset
because of its income tax consequences, the asset being the right to use the loss").
520. Id.
521. Id.
522. Id. at 453-54.
523. Id. at 454.
524. See Nisselson v. Drew Indus., Inc. (In re White Metal Rolling and Stamping
Corp.), 222 B.R. 417, 424-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
525. See supra subsection IV.A.1.c (discussing Meyerson).
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member of the parent's consolidated group, e.g., because members of
the group acquired the requisite 80 percent ownership of the subsidi-
ary's stock, and the federal tax rules permit a consolidated group to
discontinue filing on a consolidated basis in only limited circum-
stances. 5 26 To use the fact that the subsidiary is locked into the con-
solidated group as a rationale for holding that the parent has not
breached its fiduciary duty is, to say the least, antithetical to tradi-
tional fiduciary norms.
Certain other recurring themes are evident in these decisions that
refuse to question a parent's allocation of tax savings. One is a com-
mon reference to the fact that the federal tax rules do not require con-
solidated group members who experience a tax savings to share the
savings with the members whose tax losses produced it.527 By making
this reference, the courts to some extent appear to convert the absence
of a federal rule into a positive state law rule that no sharing is re-
quired. This reasoning is no more sound than saying that, because
federal law does not address causes of action between private parties
for negligence, state law does not recognize such causes of action. Fur-
ther, as previously discussed, the federal tax rules reflect a policy that
tax savings should be allocated to the consolidated group members
whose tax attributes produced it.528 Thus, to the extent the federal
tax rules have something to say on the subject, they suggest that sub-
sidiaries are entitled to share in tax savings that their losses produce
for other group members.
A second recurring theme is the difficulty courts perceive in under-
taking a fairness analysis. As noted earlier, the typical claim in re-
cent cases is that subsidiaries have not been treated fairly because
they received no compensation for making their losses available to
other group members. The courts tend to conclude that a fairness
analysis is not feasible because establishing a value for the subsidi-
ary's losses would be difficult and, consequently, determining what
portion of a group's tax savings should be transferred to the subsidiary
as compensation is impracticable.529 Some decisions make reference
to the uncertainty of future events relevant to valuation of the subsidi-
ary's losses, such as the subsidiary's potential future use for the losses
and the possibility that certain Code provisions might reduce or elimi-
nate the losses if specific events occur. 530 Others, particularly in the
early cases, consider the alternative suggested by Justice Jackson in
526. See supra subsection III.A.2 (discussing procedure for electing to file consolidated
return and continued filing requirement).
527. E.g., Marvel Entm't Group, Inc. v. Mafco Holdings, Inc. (In re Marvel Entm't
Group, Inc.), 273 B.R. 58, 65 (D. Del. 2002); In re All Products Co., 32 B.R. 811,
814 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
528. See supra subsection III.D.2.b.
529. E.g., Marvel, 273 B.R. at 79.
530. In re Coral Petroleum, Inc., 60 B.R. 377, 385-86 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986).
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Western Pacific53 1 that the subsidiary is entitled to the compensation
that fair, arm's-length bargaining over the losses would have produced
and conclude that determining the results of such hypothetical bar-
gaining would be virtually impossible. 532 Such concerns seem over-
stated. As noted earlier, courts often are called upon in the corporate
context to consider expert testimony regarding extraordinarily com-
plex valuation methodologies. 533 Further, private parties routinely
engage in valuation of tax attributes such as losses: in a corporate ac-
quisition, the acquiring corporation normally considers the extent to
which the acquired corporation's tax attributes will survive the acqui-
sition and produce future tax benefits. Finally, inquiring into the re-
sults of hypothetical arm's-length bargaining between the parties may
not satisfy a judicial desire for precision, but it is a mode of analysis
that courts commonly use to establish damages in other contexts. 534
(2) The Exception: A Subsidiary's Losses Offset Its Own
Income
The general trend of judicial deference to a parent's allocation of
tax savings has a narrow exception. As noted earlier, if a group of
corporations filing a consolidated return has a consolidated net oper-
ating loss, the group can, subject to certain limitations, use the loss to
offset income in prior or future taxable years.5 35 If a consolidated
group carries the loss back to a prior taxable year to offset income in
that year, the loss produces a refund. The refund represents tax sav-
531. See supra notes 428-29 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Jackson's
suggestion).
532. W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 206 F.2d 495, 499-500 (9th Cir. 1953);
Meyerson v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 246 A.2d 789, 794 (Del. Ch. 1967); Case v.
N.Y. Central R.R. Co., 243 N.Y.S.2d 620, 627 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963) (Steuer, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 204 N.E.2d 643 (N.Y. 1965); see also Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil
Co., 267 A.2d 883, 886 (Del. 1970) (stating that "[ilt is, of course, obvious that it is
impossible, as between parent and subsidiary, to approximate what would have
been agreed upon at arm's length").
533. See supra note 138.
534. For example, a patent holder whose patent has been infringed is entitled to dam-
ages in an amount not less than a "reasonable royalty." 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). If
the patent has previously been licensed a sufficient number of times, then those
prior licenses are evidence of an "established royalty," which is then used as the
.reasonable royalty" for which the infringing party is liable. E.g., Trell v. Marlee
Elecs. Corp., 912 F.2d 1443, 1445-46 (Fed. Cir. 1990). But if there is no estab-
lished royalty, then the courts determine a reasonable royalty by inquiring what
royalty a willing buyer and willing seller would have agreed to in hypothetical
negotiations. E.g., Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1574-
76 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In determining the results of such hypothetical bargaining,
the courts consider a number of factors and are free to consider expert testimony.
E.g., Trell, 912 F.2d at 1445-46; Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F.
Supp. 1116, 1119-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
535. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
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ings produced by offsetting a later year's loss against an earlier year's
income. In several cases, the courts have held that, to the extent the
refund is attributable to losses of a subsidiary that are offset against
the subsidiary's own income in the earlier year, the refund must be
allocated to the subsidiary in the absence of an agreement to the con-
trary.5 36 As discussed below, this rule appears to be limited to situa-
tions in which the subsidiary actually paid the taxes attributable to its
income in the earlier year.
The seminal case that established this exception, Western Dealer
Management, Inc. v. England (In re Bob Richards Chrysler-Plymouth
Corp.),537 provides a good illustration of its operation. In this case,
the subsidiary joined in consolidated returns filed by the parent. The
group had a consolidated net operating loss for its taxable year 1966,
all of which was attributable to the subsidiary.538 The group carried
the loss back to its taxable year 1965 and offset it against the group's
consolidated taxable income in that year, all of which was attributable
to the subsidiary.539 As a result of carrying back the loss, the group
became entitled to a tax refund of just over $10,000.540 The subsidi-
ary had entered bankruptcy proceedings in 1965, and the trustee in
bankruptcy asserted that the subsidiary was entitled to the refund.
The court, relying on Western Pacific, Case, and Meyerson, first stated
536. California Hous. Sec., Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., No. 99-71084, 2001 WL
669589, at *1 (9th Cir. Jun. 13, 2001); Capital Bancshares, Inc. v. Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp., 957 F.2d 203, 208 (5th Cir. 1992); W. Dealer Mgmt., Inc. v. England(In re Bob Richards Chrysler-Plymouth Corp.), 473 F.2d 262, 264-65 (9th Cir.
1973); Cohen v. Un-Ltd. Holdings, Inc. (In re Nelco, Ltd.), 264 B.R. 790, 810(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1999); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Brandt (In re Florida Park
Banks, Inc.), 110 B.R. 986, 989 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); Fed. Deposit. Ins. Corp.
v. Mercer Bancorp, Inc., No. 89-0849-CV-JWO-3, 1990 WL 515173, at *2 (W.D.
Mo. Dec. 5, 1990); United States v. Revco D.S., Inc. (In re Revco D.S., Inc.), 111
B.R. 631, 637-38 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990); United States v. Bass Fin. Corp., No.
83 C 706, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17384, at *4-6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 1984); Jump v.
Manchester Life & Cas. Mgmt. Corp., 438 F. Supp. 185, 188-89 (E.D. Mo. 1977),
aff'd on other grounds, 579 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1978); see also Indep. Bankgroup,
Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re Indep. Bankgroup, Inc.), 217 B.R. 442, 448(Bankr. D. Vt. 1998) (awarding to FDIC as receiver for debtor a refund appar-
ently produced by carrying back debtor's losses against debtor's own income be-
cause parent failed to establish existence of tax allocation agreement giving
parent rights to refund).
537. 473 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1973).
538. Id. at 263, 265.
539. Id.
540. Id. at 263. Pursuant to the Treasury Department's regulations, the Service paid
the refund to the parent. See supra notes 202-11 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing parent's role as agent for consolidated group members and payment of re-
funds to parents). The court correctly noted that the regulations providing for
payment of a consolidated group's refunds to the common parent are procedural
and do not create in the parent substantive rights to the refund. 473 F.2d at 265;
supra note 211 and accompanying text.
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that if parties have an explicit tax sharing agreement or if the exis-
tence of one can fairly be inferred, then the parties are free as a mat-
ter of state corporate law to make allocations among themselves.5 4 1
However, the parties before it had no agreement. The court concluded
that, in the absence of an agreement, the refund must be allocated to
the subsidiary because it arose from offsetting the subsidiary's losses
against its own income. 54 2 That is, if the subsidiary had filed separate
returns, it would have obtained the refund for itself. Under these cir-
cumstances, the court reasoned, to award the refund to the parent
merely because the group adopted the procedural device of filing con-
solidated returns would unjustly enrich the parent.54 3
The court in Western Dealer Management did not indicate explic-
itly whether the subsidiary had paid the taxes that were refunded. 544
It is likely that the subsidiary did pay them because, if it had not, the
court undoubtedly would have addressed that fact in discussing
whether retaining the refund would unjustly enrich the parent. Sev-
eral other courts have followed the analysis in Western Dealer Man-
agement and awarded refunds to subsidiaries, and in most of these
later cases, the subsidiary clearly paid the tax refunded.545
The court's approach in Western Dealer Management can be viewed
as equivalent to, and consistent with, the fairness analysis that the
New York Court of Appeals conducted in Case. As discussed earlier,
in Case the court determined whether a tax sharing agreement's allo-
cation to the parent of almost all of the subsidiary's tax savings was
fair by inquiring whether the parent had used its power to gain an
undue advantage at the expense of the subsidiary's minority share-
holders. 546 The court in Case concluded that, although the parent had
received an advantage from receiving the tax savings, the subsidiary's
minority shareholders had suffered no detriment because the subsidi-
ary had retained at least some of the savings, and therefore the sub-
sidiary was better off than it would have been had it filed a separate
return. In Western Dealer Management, had the subsidiary filed sepa-
rate returns, the subsidiary would have received the entire refund.
Thus, to allow the parent to appropriate the refund, or even a portion
of it, would have given the parent an advantage to the subsidiary's
detriment.
In keeping with the general trend of deference to parents, the court
in Western Dealer Management suggested that the parent and subsidi-
541. 473 F.2d at 264 & nn.3-5.
542. Id. at 265.
543. Id.
544. See id. at 263 (stating that the refund "was due to the earnings history of the
bankrupt" subsidiary).
545. See cases cited supra note 536.
546. See supra subsection IV.A.I.b (discussing Case).
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ary were free as a matter of state corporate law to allocate the refund
between them by agreement, but had not done so. This suggests that
the court would have upheld an agreement in which the subsidiary
gave up any right to the refund in favor of the parent. Subsequent
cases in which a consolidated group obtained a refund by carrying
back a subsidiary's losses against its own income confirm that courts
will uphold such agreements, at least as long as the court views the
agreement as fair.547
B. Commentators' Suggested Approaches to Allocating Tax
Savings
Commentators have suggested a variety of approaches that courts
might take in reviewing allocations of tax savings between a parent
and its subsidiary.548 Some have suggested that the difficulty in-
volved in determining a fair allocation of the savings and the risk of
adverse treatment of minority interests might justify requiring an al-
location of all savings, whether produced by the parent's or the subsid-
iary's tax attributes, to the subsidiary.549 Others have suggested that
the parent's obligations as a fiduciary regarding the tax savings be
determined according to the reasonable expectations of minority inter-
ests in the subsidiary and that minority interests have no legitimate
expectation of sharing in any tax savings arising from filing consoli-
dated tax returns. 550 Another suggested approach is to view the par-
547. See Superintendent of Ins. for New York v. First Cent. Fin. Corp., 269 B.R. 481,
491-95, 500-01 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2001); Franklin Sav. Corp. v. Franklin Sav.
Ass'n (In re Franklin Sav. Corp.), 159 B.R. 9, 29-30 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1993), affd,
182 B.R. 859 (D. Kan. 1995).
548. See generally Johnson, supra note 379, at 334-49 (discussing early cases and pos-
sible approaches to allocation of tax savings).
549. Recent Case, supra note 432, at 1144-46.
550. Hetherington, supra note 105, at 34-37 (arguing that minority shareholders have
no expectation of participating in tax savings, which is made possible by parent's
entrepreneurial investment in subsidiary); Note, Corporate Fiduciary Doctrine,
supra note 432, at 352-53 (arguing that fairness be determined according to rea-
sonable expectations and that, on facts of Case, minority shareholders had no
expectation of participating in tax savings); see also Case Comment, supra note
381, at 1189-90 (arguing that parent, as entrepreneur that made tax savings pos-
sible by investing in subsidiary, should be entitled to all tax savings).
At least one court has rejected, and other commentators have criticized, using
the minority's reasonable expectations as a touchstone for determining the con-
tent of fiduciary obligation in the parent-subsidiary context. See Levien v. Sin-
clair Oil Corp., 261 A.2d 911, 916 (Del. Ch. 1969) (stating that it "would go
against the grain of our decisions to apply [a reasonable expectations approach]
in derogation of duties we have so long regarded as fiduciary"), rev'd on other
grounds, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971); Note, supra note 171, at 1234-35 (arguing that
reasonable expectations approach "contains many of the flaws inherent in the
traditional [fairness] tests . . . and generates additional problems as well"). A
minority shareholder's reasonable expectations play a central role, however, in
an analogous context. In the context of closely held corporations, minority share-
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ent and subsidiary as a joint venture in the sense that each
corporation contributes something necessary to produce the tax sav-
ings (typically, income and an offsetting operating loss), a model that
might call for allowing the courts to determine an appropriate sharing
arrangement or allocating the tax savings equally between the two
corporations. 5 5 1 Still others have advocated requiring tax savings to
be allocated on a neutral basis, such as the relative stock values of the
parent and subsidiary,552 or on the basis of economic efficiency, which
leads, it is asserted, to a rule that tax savings be allocated to the cor-
poration that contributes its operating loss. 553
Despite the many thoughtful proposals that commentators have
advanced, the courts have largely refused to accept them and, as dis-
cussed earlier, have adopted what amounts to a per se rule that allows
a parent virtually unlimited discretion in allocating tax savings. Al-
though there might be a number of explanations for the courts' reluc-
tance to embrace any of these proposals, the most likely explanation is
that the proposals tend to advocate departure from traditional norms
of analysis.5 54 The result is that the courts have not inquired into the
holders often seek judicial dissolution of the corporation pursuant to state stat-
utes that authorize dissolution based on "oppressive" conduct of those in control,
and a widely accepted judicial definition of oppressive conduct is conduct that
defeats expectations of the minority that were both reasonable and central to
their decision to participate in the corporate venture. E.g., In re Kemp & Beatley,
Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984). See generally Douglas K. Moll, Reasona-
ble Expectations v. Implied-in-Fact Contracts: Is the Shareholder Oppression Doc-
trine Needed?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 989, 996-1003 (2001) (discussing shareholder
oppression doctrine).
551. Note, supra note 381, at 929 (advocating joint venture model under which courts
are free to allocate savings "to obtain a fairness to all parties concerned"); Ridg-
ley, supra note 432, at 1455-56 (suggesting possibility of joint venture model
under which tax savings is allocated equally).
552. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 472, at 323 n.54.
553. Chanoch Shreiber & Aaron Yoran, Allocating the Tax Savings Derived from Fil-
ing Consolidated Corporate Tax Returns, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 243, 251-53 (1977).
554. The proposals tend to advocate departure from traditional norms of analysis be-
cause of concern that such norms, which determine fairness by reference to the
bargain that parties dealing at arm's length would strike, are unsuited to the
parent-subsidiary context. See, e.g., Shreiber & Yoran, supra note 553, at 251
(stating that arm's-length test in parent-subsidiary context is "impractical, if not
altogether impossible"); Note, supra note 171, at 1226-27 (arguing that arm's-
length methodology in parent-subsidiary context "leaves something to be de-
sired"); see also Hiroshi Motomura, Protecting Outside Shareholders in a Corpo-
rate Subsidiary: A Comparative Look at the Private and Judicial Roles in the
United States and Germany, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 61, 73-75 (arguing that parent-
subsidiary context is an inappropriate one for an arm's-length test); Wailde, supra
note 483, at 484-85 (arguing that traditional fiduciary duty doctrine in parent-
subsidiary context does not sufficiently protect minority interests). It is interest-
ing to note that in the last two decades corporate law has increasingly embraced
the notion that parent and subsidiary might deal with each other at arm's length.
See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983); see also
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merits of allocating savings in an economically efficient manner or on
some other basis, but rather have adhered to the traditional standards
of review for parent-subsidiary transactions. They have applied these
standards, however, in a manner that completely abdicates any effort
to protect minority interests. What is called for is an approach within
the traditional judicial framework that offers protection to minority
interests and simultaneously avoids what one commentator has de-
scribed as "the inappropriateness of having judges or academics make
contracts for investors based on their own visions of fairness and effi-
ciency."5 55 Part V attempts to do just that.
V. A RECOMMENDATION
As discussed in Part IV, most courts, influenced by the early cases
of Western Pacific, Case, and Meyerson, now review decisions concern-
ing the allocation between parent and subsidiary of tax savings aris-
ing from filing consolidated tax returns under what amounts to a
business judgment standard. 556 Among the factors that have led the
courts to adopt this standard are concern about the feasibility of ascer-
taining the value of a parent's or subsidiary's tax attributes and the
traditional desire to avoid judicial intrusion into corporate decision-
making.5 57 One thesis of this Article is that courts could better ad-
dress these concerns and simultaneously offer protection to minority
interests by reviewing allocations of tax savings under an entire fair-
ness standard. This Part first discusses why courts should apply an
entire fairness standard and then suggests an appropriate analytical
framework under that standard.
A. An Entire Fairness Standard of Review is Appropriate
An allocation of tax savings between parent and subsidiary should
be regarded as a self-dealing transaction whether one conceives of
self-dealing as a fiduciary standing on both sides of a transaction with
its beneficiary55S or instead defines self-dealing in the more restrictive
manner that the Delaware Supreme Court did in Sinclair Oil Corp. v.
Levien559 with respect to parent-subsidiary transactions. Such alloca-
tions constitute self-dealing whether they take place pursuant to ex-
press tax sharing agreements, as a result of less formal tax sharing
practices, or by virtue of the parent's failure to implement an agree-
ment that provides for the sharing of tax savings. Accordingly, as dis-
Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1222-23 (Del. 1999); Kahn v. Lynch
Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1120-21 (Del. 1994).
555. Hetherington, supra note 105, at 38 n.75.
556. See supra subsection IV.A.2.b.
557. See supra subsection IV.A.2.b.
558. See supra subsection II.A.2 (discussing self-dealing by fiduciaries).
559. 280 A.2d 717 (1971); see supra subsection II.B.3.c (discussing Sinclair).
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cussed below, courts should review allocations of tax savings under an
entire fairness standard.5 60
If self-dealing is defined as a fiduciary standing on both sides of a
transaction, then that definition is satisfied in virtually all allocations
of tax savings between parent and subsidiary. The parent, as a con-
trolling shareholder, is a fiduciary of the subsidiary, its minority
shareholders and, at least when the subsidiary is insolvent or in bank-
ruptcy proceedings, its creditors.5 6 1 The parent typically controls the
subsidiary's board and senior management. 56 2 Thus, if a subsidiary's
board or senior management enters into a written tax sharing agree-
ment or acquiesces in less formal tax sharing practices, the parent
stands on both sides of the transaction and has the ability to dictate
its terms.
Even under the more restrictive definition of self-dealing estab-
lished by the Delaware Supreme Court in Sinclair, an allocation of tax
savings between parent and subsidiary should be regarded as a self-
dealing transaction. As discussed earlier, in Sinclair the court estab-
lished a threshold test that plaintiffs must satisfy in order to have a
court review a transaction between parent and subsidiary under the
entire fairness standard: the plaintiffs must establish that the parent
engaged in "self-dealing," defined by the court to mean that the parent
received something to the exclusion of, and detriment to, the subsidi-
ary's minority shareholders. 5 63 To facilitate analysis, it will be help-
ful to consider this standard in the two basic scenarios in which
allocations of tax savings have been challenged: (1) the parent has
achieved a tax savings by virtue of the subsidiary's operating losses
and has failed to compensate the subsidiary for the use of its losses,
i.e., has failed to share tax savings with the subsidiary, and (2) the
subsidiary has achieved a tax savings by virtue of the parent's operat-
ing losses, and has transferred some portion of this savings to the par-
ent as compensation for the parent's losses.
In the first scenario, where the parent uses the subsidiary's loss
and fails to compensate the subsidiary for it, the parent clearly has
received something from the subsidiary to the exclusion of the subsidi-
ary's minority shareholders: the subsidiary's operating loss. 56 4 A sub-
sidiary's operating loss is an asset in the sense that it constitutes an
560. See supra subsections II.A.2.b, II.B.3 (discussing how entire fairness standard
applies to self-dealing transactions).
561. See supra subsection II.B.2.
562. See supra subsection II.B.1.
563. See supra notes 163-71 and accompanying text.
564. This same analysis applies with respect to those in a position analogous to that of
minority shareholders: the creditors of an insolvent or bankrupt subsidiary. See
supra subsection II.B.2 (discussing parent's status as a fiduciary with respect to
subsidiary's creditors).
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opportunity to reduce tax liability.565 If the subsidiary did not join in
the group's consolidated tax return, and instead filed separate re-
turns, it could, subject to limitations, carry the loss forward and use it
to reduce future tax liability for up to twenty taxable years.5 66 But by
virtue of its status as a member of the consolidated group, a status
that is effectively within the parent's discretion, the subsidiary's loss
is made available to the parent. 56 7 The parent's use of the loss with-
out compensation to the subsidiary results in a detriment to minority
interests, just as the parent's use of the subsidiary's office space with-
out paying rent would result in a detriment.568 The subsidiary might
have little prospect of using the loss itself in future years, and this fact
might affect the price that the subsidiary ex ante would charge for it,
but it should not serve as the basis for an ex post finding that the
parent has not received something from the subsidiary to the exclu-
sion of, and detriment to, the minority. Indeed, the phenomenon of a
parent's ability to utilize more than its proportionate share of a par-
tially owned subsidiary's loss is precisely what prompted the Treasury
Department to implement a deemed tax sharing agreement for pur-
565. See, e.g., In re Phar-Mor, Inc., 152 B.R. 924, 927 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993) (stating
that a corporation's loss "has a potential value, as yet undetermined, which will
be of benefit to creditors"); Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 472, at 323 n.54
(stating that "[t]he tax loss which the subsidiary gives up is no less an asset than
tangible property"). That a tax loss constitutes an asset is evident from the fact
that a corporation that desires to acquire another corporation with tax losses rou-
tinely will analyze the extent to which the losses will survive the proposed acqui-
sition and will be available to offset income in the future. See Shreiber & Yoran,
supra note 553, at 245 (noting that tax loss enhances market value of subsidiary's
stock by providing potential purchasers with ability to generate tax-free earn-
ings); supra note 2 (discussing limitations on one corporation's ability to make
use of another's favorable tax attributes through an acquisition).
566. See I.R.C. § 172(a)-(b)(1)(A) (2000).
567. As discussed earlier, in order for a subsidiary to be included in a consolidated
group, other group members must own, in the aggregate, at least 80 percent of
the subsidiary's stock. See supra subsection III.A.1. Thus, by increasing its stock
ownership to the required level, or reducing its stock ownership below the re-
quired level, the parent effectively can decide whether the subsidiary should be
included in the consolidated group.
568. Even if the subsidiary receives as compensation for its loss some portion of the
parent's tax savings, the transaction nevertheless should be regarded as involv-
ing self-dealing. As previously discussed, there are no comparable market trans-
actions between unrelated parties. Further, in the typical case the parent and
subsidiary do not engage in anything resembling arm's-length bargaining con-
cerning the allocation of tax savings. Whether the subsidiary receives fair value
for its losses or instead suffers a detriment is thus uncertain. Given the parent's
status as a fiduciary, any uncertainty concerning the subsidiary's receipt of fair
value should be resolved in favor of the subsidiary by presuming that the subsidi-
ary has suffered a detriment and, therefore, that Delaware's definition of self-
dealing is satisfied.
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poses of determining the adjustments that the parent must make to
the basis of its stock in the subsidiary.5 6 9
In the second common scenario, where the subsidiary has achieved
a tax savings by virtue of the parent's operating loss and has trans-
ferred some portion of the savings to the parent, the parent also has
received something to the exclusion of the subsidiary's minority share-
holders: cash. As discussed earlier, in Case the New York Court of
Appeals examined such a situation under a fairness standard that is
quite similar to the threshold test for self-dealing that the Delaware
Supreme Court adopted in Sinclair.570 In Case, the court concluded
that, although the parties' tax sharing agreement provided the parent
with a benefit because the parent had received cash equal to almost
all of the subsidiary's tax savings, the parent's benefit was not accom-
panied by a detriment to the subsidiary's minority shareholders be-
cause the subsidiary, by retaining a portion of its tax savings, was
better off than if it had filed a separate tax return.57 1 As noted ear-
lier, this approach to determining fairness is troublesome because it
leaves the parent free to dictate the terms of tax sharing agreements
as long as a subsidiary gets some benefit, no matter how small, and
serves as a disincentive for parents to engage in actual negotiations
over tax allocations with its subsidiaries, e.g., by establishing a com-
mittee of the subsidiary's independent directors.5 72 To conclude that
minority interests suffer no detriment when the subsidiary retains
any portion of its tax savings is particularly inappropriate when the
advantage/disadvantage test is used not as the fairness standard it-
self, as Case used it, but in the manner that Delaware does: as a
threshold test to determine whether a fairness standard applies at all.
In both of the situations discussed above, the appropriate reference
point for determining whether minority interests have suffered a det-
riment is what allocation of tax savings would have occurred in a
569. If a parent or other members of a consolidated group hold in the aggregate at
least 80 percent of a subsidiary's stock, then all of the subsidiary's losses are
available to offset income of group members. That is, even if minority sharehold-
ers hold 20 percent of the subsidiary's stock, consolidated group members never-
theless can use not just 80 percent, but 100 percent of the subsidiary's loss to
offset income. The Treasury Department's regulations on stock basis adjust-
ments take this into account by effectively requiring those members that hold
stock in the subsidiary to adjust their basis in the subsidiary's stock as if they
had in effect a tax sharing agreement in which the corporations that benefit from
the subsidiary's loss transfer to the subsidiary the tax savings that the loss pro-
duced. See supra subsection III.D.2.b.
570. See supra subsection II.B.3.c (discussing similarity of Sinclair's threshold test to
fairness standard in Case).
571. See supra subsection IV.A.l.b (discussing Case).
572. See supra subsection IV.A.I.b.
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transaction negotiated at arm's length.5 73 As noted earlier, one can-
not look to comparable market transactions between unrelated parties
as a guide to what arm's-length negotiations might have produced be-
cause, by definition, only corporations related through a sufficient de-
gree of stock ownership can file consolidated returns.5 74 Further, the
tax allocation agreements or practices that are challenged normally
are not the product of anything resembling arm's-length negotiation.
It would seem possible to establish a range of fair allocations by esti-
mating the results of hypothetical arm's-length bargaining, but the
courts have expressed reluctance to undertake such an analysis in
this context.5 75 As a result, those challenging tax allocation agree-
ments or practices have difficulty quantifying the extent to which the
subsidiary has suffered a detriment. To conclude automatically in
this situation that the subsidiary has not suffered a detriment turns
traditional fiduciary analysis on its head by using the absence of com-
parable market transactions and the absence of informed consent by
the subsidiary as a rationale for foreclosing a fairness analysis.
Although an allocation of tax savings between parent and subsidi-
ary is a self-dealing transaction, there might be grounds on which
courts would be justified in refusing to consider the merits of any chal-
lenge. For example, a minority shareholder might lack standing to
challenge a tax allocation agreement through a derivative action be-
cause she purchased her stock after the agreement was in effect. 5 76
Similarly, in the case of a challenge brought by the subsidiary's credi-
tors, a court might conclude that the creditors should not recover be-
cause they had notice of a tax allocation agreement to which the
subsidiary was a party at the time they extended credit to the subsidi-
ary57 7 or because the tax sharing practices complained of took place at
a time when the parent owed no fiduciary duty to the creditors.57 8
573. See Johnson, supra note 379, at 344 (stating that unrelated corporations must
bargain over tax advantages of transactions between them and that "sharehold-
ers of related corporations may expect just as much of the officers and directors of
their corporations").
574. See supra subsection III.A.1 (discussing eligibility to file consolidated returns).
575. See supra notes 457-58, 534 and accompanying text.
576. Schreiber v. Bryan, 396 A.2d 512, 517 (Del. Ch. 1978) (holding that plaintiff who
purchased shares after corporation and parent entered into tax allocation agree-
ment lacked standing to challenge agreement). For discussion of the rationales
for this contemporaneous ownership rule, which precludes a shareholder from
maintaining a derivative action when she purchased her stock in the corporation
only after the corporation suffered the alleged harm, see GEVURTZ, supra note
105, § 4.3.2, at 396-98.
577. Cf. Paul Steelman, Ltd. v. Omni Realty Partners, 885 P.2d 549, 551 (Nev. 1994)
(declining to pierce corporate veil of general partner of limited partnership and
noting that "[i]t is unfortunate that Steelman's recovery is limited to the assets of
two insolvent entities; but Steelman alone is responsible for not protecting
against the eventuality that occurred").
578. See supra subsection II.B.2 (discussing parent's fiduciary duties to creditors).
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The point is that courts should, at the very least, recognize an alloca-
tion of tax savings between parent and subsidiary as a self-dealing
transaction and thereby begin their analysis from an appropriate
point of reference.
B. A Suggested Analytical Framework Under an Entire
Fairness Standard
If courts review the allocation of tax savings between parent and
subsidiary under an entire fairness standard, what framework for
analysis is appropriate under that standard? This section proposes as
a default rule that all tax savings produced by either the parent's or
the subsidiary's tax attributes be allocated to the subsidiary. This de-
fault rule would not apply only if two conditions are satisfied: (1) the
parties' allocation of tax savings takes place pursuant to an express
agreement, and (2) either (a) the parent establishes that the agree-
ment was entirely fair at the time the parties entered into it, or (b) the
parent establishes that the agreement was approved by a disinter-
ested, independent decisionmaker and those challenging the agree-
ment fail to establish that the agreement is unfair. In determining
fairness, the courts should resolve all doubts in favor of the subsidi-
ary. The discussion below elaborates on each part of the proposal.
In the absence of an express tax sharing agreement, it is appropri-
ate to view any allocation of tax savings in favor of the parent, regard-
less of whether the savings is produced by the parent's or the
subsidiary's tax attributes, as unfair. As discussed earlier, when a
parent engages in a self-dealing transaction with a subsidiary, the
burden is on the parent to prove that the transaction was entirely fair,
which means that the parent must prove both that there was fair deal-
ing and that the subsidiary received or paid a fair price. 579 In the
typical case in which no express tax sharing agreement exists and mi-
nority shareholders or creditors challenge an allocation of tax savings,
the parent fails to meet this burden. The absence of comparable mar-
ket transactions between unrelated parties and the usual lack of
arm's-length negotiation between parent and subsidiary over the allo-
cation of tax savings dictate that the parent be regarded as failing to
establish either fair price or fair dealing.
The question then becomes what remedy is appropriate. When a
fiduciary breaches its duty of loyalty through a self-dealing transac-
tion, the traditional rule is that the fiduciary is liable to the benefici-
ary for both any actual damages that the beneficiary sustained and
any profits or other benefits that the fiduciary received. 580 Applied to
the present situation, if the parent fails to meet its burden of proving
579. See supra subsection II.B.3.
580. See supra subsections II.A.2.a, II.B.3.b.
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fair dealing and fair price, then the subsidiary should be entitled to
recover any amount that it paid for use of the parent's losses or other
tax attributes, and to receive any savings that the parent achieved by
using the subsidiary's losses or other tax attributes. Whether liability
for the savings should fall solely on the parent corporation or also on
the subsidiary's officers and directors whose actions or inactions gave
rise to the breach of duty is a matter appropriately left to the discre-
tion of the court. 58 ' Under this default rule, the parent will continue
to participate in any tax savings allocated to the subsidiary through
its ownership of stock in the subsidiary. The parent's participation in
the savings is consistent with the result in analogous contexts involv-
ing breaches of fiduciary duty.58 2
One might argue that the proposed default rule is overly harsh to
the parent. Specifically, the default rule requires the parent to pay to
the subsidiary not just the portion of the tax savings that the subsidi-
ary would have received under a fair agreement, but rather the entire
savings. For several reasons, however, the default rule is warranted.
First, the default rule resolves uncertainties in favor of the party to
whom fiduciary duties are owed. The courts that have considered
challenges to allocations of tax savings repeatedly have expressed
their inability to determine what would constitute a fair allocation of
the savings. If the courts in fact are unable to make this determina-
tion, then their inability should not work to the parent's advantage.
The default rule avoids this result. Second, the default rule, which
applies only in the absence of an express tax sharing agreement, en-
courages parent corporations to implement such agreements, which
should reduce the number of disputes over tax sharing arrangements.
Finally, although the default rule requires the parent to disgorge all
tax savings, the parent will continue to participate in the savings
through, and to the extent of, its stock ownership in the subsidiary.
581. Cf. Strassburger v. Early, 752 A.2d 557, 581-82 (Del. Ch. 2000) (reviewing rela-
tive culpability of four directors and holding three of them liable for rescissory
damages); Gouvin, supra note 84, at 332-38 (arguing that courts should regard
subsidiary's directors as owing duties only to parent corporation and impose di-
rectly on parent corporation the current fiduciary duties of subsidiary's indepen-
dent directors).
582. See, e.g., Meyer v. Brubaker, No. G026361, 2002 WL 110411, at *3-*4 (Cal. Ct.
App. Jan. 29, 2002) (ordering majority shareholders who received excessive sal-
ary and other payments from corporation in breach of fiduciary duty to return
excess portion to corporation despite fact that, on dissolution, such amounts
would be distributed proportionately to all shareholders); Thorpe v. Cerbco, Inc.,
676 A.2d 436, 445 (Del. 1996) (ordering individuals who were controlling share-
holders and who had breached duty of loyalty to reimburse corporation for ex-
penses it had incurred and to pay to corporation amounts they had received from
third party in connection with their breach); Brudney, supra note 30, at 607-10
(discussing how partners who breach duty of loyalty through self-dealing are en-
titled to share in the gains or damages that they return to the partnership).
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The default rule should not apply if the parent demonstrates that
the allocation of tax savings was made pursuant to an express tax
sharing agreement. In that case, the traditional standards by which
courts review a parent's self-dealing transactions with its subsidiary
should apply. That is, a court should review the tax sharing agree-
ment under the entire fairness standard and, assuming that a disin-
terested and independent decisionmaker has not approved the
agreement, the parent should have the burden of proof on the issue of
fairness.
Although determining whether a parent has established the entire
fairness of an express tax sharing agreement requires a fact-specific
inquiry, some general comments on the subject are appropriate.
Whether the agreement is a fair one generally should be assessed as of
the time that the parent and subsidiary entered into it.583 If the
agreement is fair as of that time, it generally should not matter if the
agreement unexpectedly turns out to confer benefits on one but not
the other party. For example, if the parent and subsidiary are unable
to predict their future tax positions at the time they enter into the
agreement, there's a good argument that their agreement to allocate
all tax savings to the corporation whose tax attributes produced it is
substantively fair, even if the parent turns out to be the primary bene-
ficiary of the agreement because it has recurring losses. On the other
hand, if, as in Case, the parent and subsidiary can predict at the time
they enter into the agreement that it will benefit primarily the parent,
then, absent some significant countervailing benefit to the subsidiary,
the parent should be regarded as failing to meet its burden of estab-
lishing fairness.5S4
More generally, a court that inquires into the fairness of an ex-
press tax sharing agreement should examine both aspects of entire
fairness: fair dealing and fair price.58 5 With respect to fair dealing,
the inquiry should focus on the process by which the parties entered
into the agreement, e.g., whether the subsidiary's board obtained the
assistance of outside advisors and negotiated over the agreement, or
whether the subsidiary's board simply acquiesced to terms dictated by
the parent. With respect to fair price, the appropriate inquiry is
whether the substantive terms of the agreement are those to which
parties dealing at arm's length would agree. As noted earlier, deter-
mining the results of hypothetical arm's-length bargaining is a mode
583. GEVURTZ, supra note 105, § 4.2.2, at 327-28; cf. Kahn v. Seaboard Corp., 625 A.2d
269, 271 (Del. Ch. 1993) (analyzing whether claim for breach of fiduciary duty
was barred by statute of limitations and concluding that "[t]he wrong.., alleged
is the use of control over [the corporation] to require it to enter into a contract
that was detrimental to it and beneficial, indirectly, to the defendants").
584. See supra subsection IV.A.I.b (discussing Case).
585. See supra notes 54-55, 135-44 and accompanying text (discussing entire fairness
standard of review).
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of analysis in which courts commonly engage in other contexts. 58 6 Al-
though this type of analysis inherently involves some uncertainty, it
would seem feasible to establish a range of fair terms to which parties
dealing at arm's length would agree and to ascertain whether the
terms of a specific tax sharing agreement are within that range.
When the burden is on the parent to establish the entire fairness of
an express tax sharing agreement, the court should resolve all uncer-
tainties in favor of the subsidiary. As an example, if no negotiations
over the agreement took place and if the court concludes that it is una-
ble to determine whether the terms of the agreement are fair, then the
subsidiary should prevail and the default rule proposed above should
apply.
Consistent with the general standards by which the courts of Dela-
ware and certain other jurisdictions review a parent's self-dealing
transactions with its subsidiary, if the parent demonstrates that the
express tax sharing agreement was either negotiated by a committee
of disinterested and independent directors of the subsidiary or ap-
proved by a majority of the subsidiary's minority shareholders, then
the burden of proof on the issue of fairness should shift, i.e., those
challenging the agreement should have the burden of proving that it
was unfair.5 8 7 Because a tax allocation agreement would obtain the
same protection in the form of a shifting of the burden of proof regard-
less of whether it is approved by minority shareholders or negotiated
by the subsidiary's independent directors, it seems likely that the
most common effect of this proposal would be to encourage the imple-
mentation of tax allocation agreements negotiated by a committee of
the subsidiary's independent directors.58S If the agreement is negoti-
ated by a committee of the subsidiary's independent directors, the bur-
den of proof on the issue of fairness should shift to those challenging
the agreement only if the committee was "truly independent, fully in-
formed, and had the freedom to negotiate at arm's length."58 9 In car-
rying out its duties, such a committee normally should be expected to
retain independent legal and tax advisors to assist it in analyzing the
586. See supra note 534 and accompanying text (discussing courts' use of hypothetical
arm's-length bargaining analysis); see also Chelrob, Inc. v. Barrett, 57 N.E.2d
825, 834-35 (N.Y. 1944) (engaging in analysis of whether corporation breached
fiduciary duty by selling gas to related party at too low a price by examining what
selling corporation's objectives would be in selling to third party, such as recover-
ing its costs and earning a profit).
587. See supra subsection II.B.3 (discussing shifting burden of proof and courts' reten-
tion of fairness standard despite independent approval of a transaction).
588. See Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 59, at 1309 (noting that there is little
incentive for corporations to seek stockholder approval of transactions when ne-
gotiation by a committee of independent directors affords the same protection).
589. Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1120-21 (Del. 1994).
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many complex issues that arise in negotiating a tax allocation
agreement.
If the burden of proof regarding the fairness of an express tax shar-
ing agreement does shift to the challengers, the court should engage in
the same type of fairness analysis described above. Because approval
of an agreement by a properly functioning committee of the subsidi-
ary's independent directors is "strong evidence" of the agreement's
fairness, 5 90 and because of the lack of comparable market transac-
tions between unrelated parties, the challengers typically will have
difficulty meeting their burden. They might, of course, challenge the
integrity of the process by which the tax allocation agreement was ap-
proved, e.g., by establishing that the subsidiary's directors who ap-
proved it were not independent or that material facts were not
disclosed to the shareholders who approved it. But in the absence of
those sorts of problems, successful challenges to tax sharing agree-
ments would be relatively infrequent.5 9 1 The general effect of this
proposal is that the parent would have some degree of assurance that
the default rule, which is disadvantageous to parents, would not apply
when minority interests are represented in the decisionmaking
process. 59 2
The proposal outlined above is not a perfect solution. It requires
courts to analyze express tax sharing agreements under an entire fair-
ness standard, an analysis that the courts have expressed reluctance
to undertake in this context. It also encourages parents to obtain ap-
590. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983).
591. This is not to suggest that there are no circumstances in which those challenging
a tax sharing agreement that was approved by an independent decisionmaker
could meet their burden of demonstrating unfairness. As an illustration, they
might demonstrate that the parent has deliberately structured business opera-
tions so as to maximize the advantages of the tax sharing agreement for itself.
Suppose, for example, that the negotiated tax sharing agreement provides that
the corporation that achieves a tax savings will transfer the savings to the corpo-
ration whose losses produced it. The parent's subsequent practice of purchasing
all depreciable assets itself and leasing them on an as-needed basis to the subsid-
iary in an effort to insure that the parent has tax losses might be a circumstance
in which a court would be justified in viewing the parent's conduct as unfair. Cf.
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Summa Corp., 374 A.2d 5, 12 (Del. Ch. 1977) (hold-
ing that controlling shareholder's purchase of aircraft itself so as to earn a profit
by leasing or selling them to controlled corporation is conduct that fails to meet
intrinsic fairness standard); Note, Corporate Fiduciary Doctrine, supra note 432,
at 350-51 (proposing that fairness of parent-subsidiary transactions be deter-
mined according to reasonable expectations of parties and that, in assessing
these expectations, attention be focused both on parties' original agreement and
"on the overall pattern of their relations since the commencement of the relation-
ship"). In such a case, it would seem appropriate to revert to the default rule that
all tax savings must be allocated to the subsidiary.
592. Cf. Walde, supra note 483, at 491 (arguing for a new approach to protection of
minority interests that might involve, among other things, minority representa-
tion in corporate decisionmaking).
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proval of tax allocation agreements by a subsidiary's independent di-
rectors or minority shareholders, approvals that, as discussed earlier,
serve as imperfect monitors of a parent's self-dealing transactions. 59 3
Nevertheless, the proposal offers several advantages. First, by imple-
menting a default rule that all tax savings are allocated to the subsidi-
ary in the absence of an express tax sharing agreement, the proposal
encourages parents to negotiate such agreements with their subsidiar-
ies. As noted earlier, the presence of such agreements should reduce
the number of situations in which courts are called upon to implement
a tax sharing scheme as a matter of equity. Second, by encouraging
the negotiation of tax sharing agreements, the proposal puts the diffi-
cult issue of a fair allocation of tax savings primarily in the hands of
those best able to deal with it, i.e., corporate decisionmakers. Finally,
by applying the familiar rule that the burden of proof on the issue of
fairness shifts to the challengers when an agreement between parent
and subsidiary has been approved or negotiated by a disinterested,
independent decisionmaker, the proposal encourages parents to en-
sure that minority interests are represented in the decisionmaking
process. 5 94
VI. CONCLUSION
With limited exceptions, judicial decisions within the last twenty-
five years generally have applied what is tantamount to a per se rule
that a parent's decisions concerning the allocation of tax savings
among consolidated group members will not be questioned. Although
the development of this rule can be explained, the rule turns tradi-
tional fiduciary analysis on its head by using uncertainty concerning
the proper resolution of tax sharing disputes to the fiduciary's advan-
tage. The judicial concerns that have contributed to the development
of the rule are better addressed, and minority interests better served,
by recognizing that allocations of tax savings between parent and sub-
sidiary are self-dealing transactions and reviewing such allocations
under an entire fairness standard that encourages the negotiation of
express tax sharing agreements.
593. See supra subsections II.A.2.b, II.B.3.a. The proposal also does not attempt to
address all issues that courts might be called upon to address in this context,
such as how to determine the extent to which the common parent of a complex
consolidated group has achieved a tax savings by virtue of a specific subsidiary's
losses or other tax attributes.
594. With respect to wholly owned subsidiaries, the proposal obviously does not re-
quire parents to install independent members on its subsidiaries' boards. But a
parent who does not do so assumes the risk that, if the subsidiary becomes insol-
vent or subject to bankruptcy proceedings, the subsidiary's creditors will success-
fully challenge the parties' express tax sharing agreement because the parent is
unable to establish the agreement's entire fairness.
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